FOREIGN AFFAIRS

NOVEMBER/DECEMBER 2000

Building on the Clinton Record

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A Twenty-first-Century Military

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Pakistan's Jihad Culture

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FOREIGN AFFAIRS

NOVEMBER/DECEMBER 2000
VOLUME 79, NUMBER 6

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Despite a vast budget that dwarfs the military spending power of both friends and foes, the U.S. military today remains stuck in the past. American strategy still relies on a Cold War–era view of the world, and U.S. technology is ill-suited to current missions. Meanwhile, demoralization is creeping through the ranks. The next president must seize the opportunity to remake the military by forcing it to focus on the missions of the future rather than those of the past. The alternative—more of the same—is too dangerous to consider.

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

AP/WIDE WORLD PHOTOS

A Nigerian peacekeeper with an accused thief, Monrovia, Liberia, 1996

A system of U.N.-sponsored regional peacekeepers will be a messy solution with many risks — but there may be no other way to stop the atrocities.

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Calling All Regio-Cops

Peacekeeping's Hybrid Future

Michael Hirsh

On September 6, an angry crowd stormed a U.N. relief office in West Timor. The mob sacked the building and, in a sickening echo of Mogadishu in 1993, burned the bodies of three U.N. workers in the streets. The U.N. quickly evacuated its remaining personnel from the Indonesian province, casting a pall on its unsteady mission across the border in the newly independent East Timor.

The disaster underscored an independent report that the U.N. had released just a few weeks before. Published at a time when, in Sierra Leone, hundreds of peacekeepers were taking turns being held hostage—the most recent victims being British troops who went in to rescue their blue-helmeted predecessors—the paper was a call to arms that harshly criticized the U.N.'s peacekeeping efforts and laid out a prescription for more robust forces, command, and control.

These events and the U.N. report reinvigorated a debate that has become all too familiar. The debate revolves around several key questions: Can U.N. peacekeeping be made to work at long last, or are such efforts doomed to failure? Are international norms effective, or is raw military might the only thing that can stop the villainous Foday Sankohs of the world? Is humanitarian intervention impractical, or is there some way of balancing both sovereign rights and global values? Such questions have absorbed academics and the international punditocracy for much of the last decade, ever since the tidy Cold War world of interstate conflicts—in which the U.N. played a simple, uncontroversial role as a buffer along cease-fire lines and borders (as in Cyprus and the Middle East)—descended into today's maelstrom of ethnic, tribal, and religious bloodshed.

This debate over humanitarian intervention is an important and well-intentioned one. It is also, for the most part, a phony debate. The discussion, at least as it has been framed in recent years, offers up false choices. For most of the post–Cold War period, arguments about a new world order have centered on whether either the United States or the United Nations, acting separately or in concert, could become some form of globo-cop. But ten years after the fall of the Soviet

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Michael Hirsh is *Newsweek*'s Chief Diplomatic Correspondent.

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Union, it is high time for the world to recognize that neither option will come to pass. Washington does not have the will for it, and the U.N. (thanks largely to American stinginess) does not have the way.

Out of this vacuum, however, a new system is emerging on the ground, crisis by crisis. Call it the rule of the regio-cops. It is a hybrid system, dependent on both U.N. legitimation and local muscle. To work, the new system needs regional powers and organizations to do the dirty work of peacekeeping and peacemaking. But such regional forces are increasingly being trained and pressured to act in accordance with U.N. norms, and typically go in under the auspices of Security Council resolutions.

This was the model followed for East Timor in September 1999, when President Bill Clinton happily accepted Australia's offer to send in combat troops to stop Indonesia's murderous militias—even as the U.S. president took the lead in organizing a multinational response and orchestrating a U.N. resolution. It was the approach in Kosovo, too. The United States insisted on using NATO to drive out Slobodan Milŏsević—mindful of how U.N. troops had abjectly failed to stop earlier atrocities in Bosnia—but ultimately acted under the U.N. flag.

Now the pattern is spreading, gingerly, to western Africa. This past summer, when Clinton announced he was sending U.S. military trainers to Nigeria, it was an implicit recognition not just of the democratic government's newfound legitimacy, but of the fact that, as the region's major power, Nigeria must play the key role in stopping the atrocities in Sierra Leone—no matter how brutally Nigeria's troops may have acted there before.

ON THE CHEAP

Will this pattern spread further? Should it? To answer this, some hard facts must be faced. The current dispute over peacemaking usually centers on whether U.N. resources should be beefed up to deal with certain situations—typically civil conflicts that hover precariously between peace and outright war—into which U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan has boldly pushed the world body. The report of last summer's U.N. peacekeeping commission, chaired by Lakhdar Brahimi, sharply analyzes the current system's flaws and lays out a corrective plan. At the U.N. Millennium Assembly in New York in September, leader after leader took the rostrum to give explicit or implicit support to the Brahimi prescriptions. Among those leaders was President Clinton, who called for a greater U.N. role in humanitarian interventions.

But to think that the Brahimi panel's advice will be carried out, now or ever, is to strain common sense to the breaking point. Demands for a more robust U.N. force, including combat-ready "standby" units, long predate the fall of communism—and there is little reason to think they will succeed now where they have failed in the past. While the new peacekeeping recommendations (which would cost an estimated $200 million a year to implement) were being touted in New York, a skinflint U.S. Congress in Washington, D.C., was trying to cut even more from the U.N.'s present peacekeeping budget. At one point, members of Congress actually tried to entirely eliminate African peacekeeping in order to meet budget caps—this despite the efforts of Richard Holbrooke, Washington's U.N. ambassador, to give Africa

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a higher profile in U.S. national security considerations than ever before.

Hence the absurdity of Clinton's exhorting the U.N. to prepare for more intervention when he has failed to deliver on his four-year-old promise to pay most of Washington's back dues. According to U.N. budget chief Joseph Connor, the United States is responsible for more than half of the world's $3.24 billion total in U.N. arrears. "The United States said, 'Show reform and we will pay,'" Connor complained during the Millennium Assembly. "We showed reform. [The money's] not there." With the United States still refusing to pay, other nations, including long-compliant members such as Japan, are increasingly reluctant to pick up the tab.

And hence one should be realistic about the prospects for U.N. peacekeeping. The United States, as the world's sole superpower, has a greater stake in a peaceful global system than any other country. If Washington is not going to do more for the U.N. now—at a time of unprecedented U.S. prosperity and a record budget surplus, and at a moment when not a single American soldier risks wearing a U.N. blue helmet anywhere in the world—it is unlikely to any time soon. Nor is it likely that Washington will prove any more willing to take on a regular role as the U.N.'s "subcontractor"—as it has only twice before, in Korea and Kuwait, when it mustered multinational forces under the U.N. banner. This is especially true after Kosovo, which set a zero-casualty threshold for U.S.-led humanitarian intervention.

RUDDERLESS

Yet this does not mean that the impulse for humanitarian intervention is going to wither away along with the U.N. budget. Whether Washington likes it or not, interventions are here to stay. They will go on in their haphazard way, with the biggest headlines and the most horrific TV footage typically drawing the biggest efforts, even as academics and experts parse various "rules" for when America and other major powers should jump in—as if such fastidious guidelines carried any weight against the "CNN effect."

Old-fashioned proponents of realpolitik who reject the quixotism of humanitarian intervention—or who, like the writer Edward Luttwak, simply advise us to await the peace that comes once combatants have exhausted their bloodlust—only betray their remoteness from and ignorance of the pressures put on elected officials in the era of "superempowered" democracy (which usually means a superempowered media). It may well be, as Luttwak argues, that humanitarian interventions "artificially freeze conflict." But in a globalized world dominated by Western mores, people do not really care about that. They simply do not want to see slaughter on their TV screens. Egged on by the ever-multiplying hordes of pundits, they will usually demand that their governments do something about it—usually something fast and easy. We live in a world defined by Wilsonian idealism, as even Henry Kissinger has grudgingly admitted. *The New Republic*'s Leon Wieseltier, writing during the Kosovo war, solemnly summed up the popular sentiment: any "place in which innocent men, women, and children are being expelled and exterminated is an important place. It is a place that asks about the philosophy by which we claim to live."

So intervention will continue. But if we stick to the present system, this intervention

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is doomed to remain amateurish, late, and woefully under-resourced, as the experiences in Bosnia, Kosovo, and Sierra Leone have shown. A Wilsonian world this may be, but it is a miserly and self-absorbed Wilsonianism. Just as the death of the nation-state has been greatly exaggerated, so has the idea that the needs of the "international community" will ever trump national interests. Americans today may no longer have a clear idea of what their national interests are, but one interest of which they are quite sure is that their sons and daughters never again die in battle.

If the United States will not lead the charge for the U.N., no one else is likely to fill the vacuum. Indeed, despite the aggressively pro-U.N. rhetoric of British Prime Minister Tony Blair and other Western leaders, U.N. peacekeeping today has been largely sloughed onto the developing world. As the Brahimi report notes,

> In contrast to the long tradition of developed countries providing the bulk of the troops for U.N. peacekeeping operations during the Organization's first 50 years, in the last few years 77 percent of the troops in formed military units ... were contributed by developing countries.

OUT OF THE BOX

The report paints a bleak picture. But there may yet be a way out of this box—if the terms of the debate are drastically altered to account for regional devolution. The emergence of U.N.-sanctioned regio-cops changes many things. For one, it may allow us to finally leave behind the interminable debate between proponents of international norms and institutions (like the U.N.) and those who push might-makes-right realism. Under the new system, without the imprimatur of a U.N. Security Council resolution, intervention by regional powers will become a mere invasion—however honorably motivated—and carry with it the threat of regional hegemony. It will be unwelcome to the locals and lay the seeds for future conflict.

On the other hand, without a force or coalition of forces representing regional military muscle, a perpetually cash-strapped U.N. is certain to continue to lose credibility, as it did in Bosnia, East Timor, and Sierra Leone before regional powers stepped in. Current events have forced realpoliticians and liberal internationalists, so long at odds, into bed together. One mindset has, in many situations, become impossible without the other.

This suggests what the most important future role for the U.N. might become—a legitimizer for local forces. To many nations, today's Security Council may seem more like a domineering Star Chamber than a fount of international jurisprudence. The council's image would certainly benefit if other major powers such as Germany and Japan were made permanent members, thus ridding it of its World War II–era mustiness. But flawed or not, the Security Council still has unique potential. It is the only effective tribunal and repository for international case law for dealing with ethnic cleansing and other humanitarian horrors. As such, it must continue to act as the arbiter of interventions.

The use of U.N.-approved regional peacekeepers will help solve another critical problem: how to keep humanitarian intervention aligned with national interest. Australia, watching the chaos in Timor just across the sea and perhaps fearing an onslaught of boat people, was only too

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eager to intervene for free. Others in similar situations may not behave as uprightly as did the Australians, but there are hopeful signs. Whereas in the past many regional players took advantage of a kind of geopolitical schadenfreude—exploiting the weakness of their neighbors at war—with their national economies becoming increasingly regionalized, few governments now want to risk the economic dislocation and refugee flows that are the major byproducts of nearby conflict. Hence the growing strength of regional organizations across the globe, from the Regional Forum of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) to the once-toothless Organization of American States (OAS). Many of these groups began as economic bodies but have since developed security arms.

And regionalism addresses still another problem that has long bedeviled U.N. peacekeeping: how to command and control polyglot troops who often, in Babel-type confusion, follow different military customs and work at cross-purposes. Finally, U.S. presidents and other major-power leaders who now have trouble prying U.N. funds from their legislatures could, in the future, disguise money for regionalism as bilateral aid.

NOW THE BAD NEWS

Of course, there are plenty of places where U.N.-approved regional solutions would prove impossible, or problematic at best. The Security Council's permanent five members, with their sacrosanct vetoes, are obviously immune. Nor do local solutions always make things easier. For what regional power could intervene between India and Pakistan? China? Afghanistan? There is no one nation trusted enough to play the part. Meanwhile, the newly cooperative Nigeria, freed from its rogue past, could conceivably become the U.N.-legitimized regio-cop of western Africa. But no one in the east of the continent wants the recalcitrant Ethiopians or the Kenyans, the dominant powers of that region, moving in to solve their problems any time soon. As for central Africa, the regional powers there are already doing battle in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. And in South America, Chile, Argentina, and Brazil co-exist in simmering mistrust of each other's militaries. All these situations show that the need remains for a strong peacekeeping capacity within the U.N. as well. And unlike U.N. troops, regional powers rarely stay committed to peacekeeping for long periods—the Australians, for instance, had to introduce a special tax to fund their East Timor adventure and left after just five months on the ground.

But there are regional paths out of many of these nettles—most of them depending on U.S. aid, support for regional organizations and, mainly, the kind of long-term assiduousness that has been lacking in the Clinton administration's foreign policy. Washington has pushed Buenos Aires, for instance, to develop a peacekeeping role (and gave Argentina a small role in the Haiti intervention). But the Pentagon could make its extensive joint military exercises in Latin America far more contingent on regional cooperation under the auspices of the still-teething OAS—which ably preempted a war between Ecuador and Peru in the mid-1990s and recently took Peruvian President Alberto Fujimori to task for election fraud. In Southeast Asia, it is conceivable that the ASEAN Regional Forum could gain more

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bite with greater Chinese participation and, if Beijing behaves itself, eventually take up the U.N. flag in Cambodia.

Overall, then, there seem to be more cases where regionalism would work than where it would not. Last year, a National Intelligence Council study identified 23 countries with ongoing humanitarian emergencies and cited 9 others that were likely to develop crises. Of those 32 cases, the vast majority could benefit from regional peacekeeping or peace enforcement solutions—with some some key exceptions, such as India, Pakistan, Russia, and possibly Nigeria itself. Moreover, in some places, regionalism has already become a tradition. The United States has long acted as a regio-cop south of its border, most recently in Haiti. And Saudi Arabia played such a role in the Gulf War, making the U.S.-led intervention palatable among the Arab world (if not to Osama bin Laden).

Nowhere has the new regional approach to peacemaking and peacekeeping been better demonstrated than in Kosovo. After the failures of Bosnia, the United States went into the Kosovo crisis with a bone in its teeth, brazenly determined to run the campaign through NATO alone. The U.N.—at first—was given no role at all. The Russians and their protests were barely tolerated and treated to dismissive hand-holding diplomacy. "We're just trying to make them think they have a part," said a U.S. official during the war.

All this had changed by the end of the 78-day NATO bombing campaign, however. Milŏsević had stood firmer than anyone had expected, and Clinton, by early June, faced the politically nightmarish prospect of ordering a ground invasion. Washington needed Moscow's help; to get Moscow on board, it needed the United Nations. Backed by a Security Council resolution and a U.N.-sanctioned peacekeeping force, the Russians proved crucial to finally forcing Milŏsević to cave in. NATO, the mightiest regio-cop in history, had to resort to U.N. legitimation to get what it wanted.

THE WAY OF THE GUN

Ironically, much of this "new" vision of peacekeeping is provided for in the U.N. Charter (in the long-ignored Chapter 8). But few observers have connected the dots between that section and the more commonly used Chapter 7, which dictates responses to threats to the peace. And regionalism gets a mere paragraph in the 70-page Brahimi report. Even such astute observers as Stanley Hoffmann, who nimbly took a middle road between the excesses of both traditional realism and liberal internationalism in his important 1998 work *World Disorders*, have tended to overlook the potential of the hybrid approach. In the book, Hoffmann concedes that the Security Council is "the main source of authority" when it comes to global legitimacy. But he plays down the potential link between U.N. power and regionalism, dismissing regional organizations as "too often embroiled in or neutralized by disputes among or within states of the region, or else lacking in means of enforcement."

That is still sometimes true. Improving matters further will depend on the initiative of the nation that will undoubtedly continue to dominate the twenty-first century: the United States. Indeed, Clinton administration officials insist that they have long seen regional peacekeeping as their paradigm, pointing to such small-bore efforts as the African Crisis Response Initiative.

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But their scattershot approach has missed many opportunities. Had Clinton recognized the possibilities of regional action earlier, for instance, he might have exploited the offers of Nigeria, Tanzania, Ghana, and others to send peacekeepers to Rwanda in the early stages of the 1994 genocide. In the end—as James Miskel of the U.S. Naval War College and others have noted—those troops stayed home because they lacked transport and other equipment. And today the U.S. president considers his failure to act in Rwanda one of his deepest regrets.

Given the alternatives, why has the regional option been so marginalized? One answer is that moving to regionalism is, structurally, a steep uphill climb. The entire U.S. government is still built around bilateral relations. U.S. ambassadors to nations are far more powerful than their counterparts to regional organizations; within the State Department, weak desk officers run most regional policy. And decision-making tends to follow the organizational structure. Another reason is that few in Washington care to face up to the possibility that they may have to act less unilaterally and become more indulgent of others' agendas. As for the U.N., it is loath to sideline its own forces.

And regionalism will not look as pretty as U.N. initiatives. Any order the Nigerians now bring to Sierra Leone, for example, is bound to be more rough-edged than that promised (though never delivered) by the U.N.-sponsored Lomé Accord. The last time the Nigerians intervened in that conflict, they occupied Freetown with 10,000 troops while ceding the rebels free run of the countryside—and the diamond trade. But whatever their methods, Nigerians did manage to stop the killing and the limb-hacking. As one Pentagon planner put it tersely, "To pursue regionalism, the United States really has to have a tolerance of regional objectives"—and, he could have added, of regional methods. Still, the United States and the United Nations could make their support conditional on regional actors' observing international norms of behavior.

A system of U.N.-sponsored regio-cops, then, will be far from ideal. It is a messy, often inconsistent muddle-through solution with many risks. But in an environment of astringent alternatives—a determinedly minimal U.S. role and a grossly underfunded and undersupported U.N.—there may be no other practicable way for the international community to stop the atrocities it no longer seems able to stomach.

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The New Sovereigntists

American Exceptionalism and Its False Prophets

Peter J. Spiro

The streets of Washington, D.C., and Seattle may have been controlled last spring and fall by a new breed of antiglobalization progressives, but the old-fashioned, conservative anti-internationalists continue to hold sway among American policymakers. Although the United States has accepted the North American Free Trade Agreement and participation in the World Trade Organization, it has spurned important multilateral regimes relating to arms control, the environment, war crimes, human rights, and other emerging global issues.

This brand of anti-internationalism runs deep in the American political tradition, as any casual student of history knows, and its persistence is to be expected. More surprising is the respectability that the movement is winning among academics and policy analysts. During the Cold War, it was too closely identified with crude conspiracy theories and the isolationist legacy of the Versailles Treaty to attract serious support among policy elites. That has now changed: anti-internationalism claims a growing intellectual following. This group of academics—many of whom are highly credentialed and attached to prestigious institutions or conservative Washington think tanks—has developed a coherent blueprint for defending American institutions against the alleged encroachment of international ones. This school does not oppose international engagement per se and thus cannot be classified simply as isolationist. Rather, it holds that the United States can pick and choose the international conventions and laws that serve its purpose and reject those that do not. Call it international law à la carte.

At the center of their thinking stands the edifice of sovereignty. Sovereignty, in this conception, calls for America to resist the incorporation of international norms and drapes the power to do so in the mantle of constitutional legitimacy. "Because the United States is fully sovereign," claims Jeremy Rabkin, a professor of political science at Cornell University, "it can determine for itself what its Constitution will require. And the Constitution necessarily requires that sovereignty be safeguarded so that the Constitution itself can be secure."

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This "New Sovereigntist" vision explains the continuing U.S. refusal to participate in a broad array of international regimes, some of them now nearly universally accepted by other nations. It drove the Senate's recent rejection of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, the Clinton administration's refusal to sign on to the Land Mines Convention and the Rome Treaty establishing an international criminal court, and the U.S. failure to submit the Kyoto Protocol on global warming for Senate approval. It also explains Washington's persistent refusal to conform U.S. practices to international human rights regimes. The United States stands alone with Somalia in not acceding to the Convention on the Rights of the Child. Washington heavily qualified its acceptance of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and continues to defy that treaty's prohibition of the execution of juvenile offenders (along with Iran, Nigeria, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia). Only the free-trade agreements—provided they are limited to trade and do not include the environment, labor issues, or human rights—pass muster under New Sovereigntism because they are thought to serve American interests.

The particular issues involved could be debated according to their policy merits alone. But New Sovereigntism avoids the policy debate and simply presents a respectable catchall defense of nonparticipation in international regimes. As a result, it limits America's future global involvement—with attendant costs to the nation and the world. As international relations become increasingly tethered to such regimes and their institutional incarnations, nothing less than America's position of international leadership is at stake.

DOING IT MY WAY

New Sovereigntism delivers three flawed lines of attack. The first impugns the content of the emerging international legal order as vague and illegitimately intrusive on domestic affairs. The second condemns the international lawmaking process as unaccountable and its results as unenforceable. Finally, New Sovereigntism assumes that the United States can opt out of international regimes as a matter of power, legal right, and constitutional duty.

New Sovereigntists relentlessly characterize most international law standards as too amorphous to justify American agreement. A favorite whipping post is the broader provisions of human rights treaties. Jack Goldsmith, a law professor at the University of Chicago, asks "would the ICCPR's 'protection against discrimination on any ground,' including 'status,' extend to discrimination on the basis of homosexuality? Age? Weight? Beauty? Intelligence?" This reasoning warns, in effect, of the bait-and-switch possibilities in some international treaties: Washington should not sign on to innocuous generalities today that may become dangerously specific tomorrow.

New Sovereigntists further assert that some international regimes, notably those involving human rights, mark a sharp break from the historical practice of international law. The "new" international law, they argue, trespasses on nations' core domestic authorities, even on powers constitutionally reserved for U.S. state governments. And they lament how international law may now constrain the relationship between a government and its citizens. "For virtually every area of

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public policy," intones John Bolton of the American Enterprise Institute (AEI), "there is a globalist proposal, consistent with the overall objective of reducing individual nation-state autonomy, particularly that of the United States."

Neither argument stands up. Under a New Sovereigntist approach, one could have objected to unelaborated guarantees of the U.S. Constitution to due process and equal protection, which remained amorphous until subsequent Supreme Court opinions refined them. That vagueness did not stop the states from ratifying the Constitution—and it should not stop the United States from joining human rights regimes. And although some provisions of international conventions are quite airy, many are already specific—for example, the ICCPR prohibition on the execution of juvenile offenders. Meanwhile, broader undertakings are being refined in a growing body of decisions and reports from international bodies, including most notably the "treaty committees," which are charged with interpreting particular instruments.

As for the matter of intrusiveness, it is true that traditional international law bracketed a state's treatment of its own subjects. But it has always intruded on a state's treatment of foreigners—and that translated into international limitations on laws regarding property, inheritance, and crime. Human rights norms have expanded these limitations to the treatment of citizens as well, but there is nothing new about international legal constraints on the exercise of domestic—even local—authority.

On the process side, New Sovereigntists assert the deficiency of international lawmaking by raising the specter of

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international bureaucrats who lack accountability within the American constitutional scheme. John Yoo, a law professor at the University of California at Berkeley, warns that "novel forms of international cooperation increasingly call for the transfer of rulemaking authority to international organizations that lack American openness and accountability." New Sovereigntists highlight the lack of direct elections at the international level to strike an unfavorable contrast with the selection of U.S. lawmakers. In the tradition of Cold War critiques of international law, they also question the enforceability and vitality of international law by underscoring the acceptance of human rights regimes by such brazen violators as Iraq, Serbia, and North Korea. This argument echoes historical campaigns against U.S. participation in international regimes: We live up to our word when no one else does, so if we agree to international obligations we are effectively tying one hand behind our back against an enemy who keeps both hands free. At bottom, the New Sovereigntists question whether international law is about anything more than international power.

Here again the arguments fall short. Accountability deficits in increasingly powerful international institutions do exist (the central point of the Seattle and Washington demonstrations), but international organizations are not free-floating entities with unconfined powers. In fact, they are kept on the usually tight leash of their nation-state members. But where mainstream environmentalists, human rights advocates, and labor interests could accept global governance (if it heard their voices), New Sovereigntists reject even the possibility that international institutions can be made accountable. Indeed, in a strange twist betraying their neoconservative tendencies, the New Sovereigntists paint the institutional influence of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) as part of the accountability problem rather than part of its solution.

As for questions of enforceability, the dictum that most nations obey international law most of the time holds true today with greater force than at any other time during the last century. International law is enjoying a tremendous renaissance; it is now an important and necessary force in the context of globalization, governing the increasingly transnational elements of virtually every area of legal regulation, including such domestic issues as family, criminal, commercial, and bankruptcy law. Respect for human rights has significantly advanced over the last 20 years. There will, of course, always be violators, as there are in the application of any legal regime. But as long as laws are generally respected, one does not abandon them in the face of rogue actors. After all, homicide laws should not be repealed just because some people commit murder (and some even get away with it). Compared with the Cold War world, most countries actually live up to the obligations they enter into. Bad behavior by Iraq, Serbia, and North Korea affords no excuse for others to reject international regimes.

DON'T TREAD ON ME

The linchpin of New Sovereigntism is its premise that America has the power to opt out of international norms, even those universally accepted by other nations. "As the strongest and richest country in the world, the United States can afford to safeguard its sovereignty," argues Rabkin.

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"An America that stands aloof from various international undertakings will not find that it is thereby shut out from the rest of the world. On the contrary, we have every reason to expect that other nations, eager for access to American markets and eager for other cooperative arrangements with the United States, will often adapt themselves to American preferences."

This approach echoes the realist conception of international relations as a matter of might, not right—a sticks-and-stones view of international law. At the same time, New Sovereigntists contend that, within the American domestic framework, the federal government lacks the constitutional power to participate in some international regimes. Curtis Bradley, a professor at the University of Virginia Law School, has argued that the unconditional adoption of international human rights conventions would violate federalism constraints. Yoo asserts that the Chemical Weapons Convention violates the Constitution's requirement that executive officers be appointed by the executive branch, not by international bodies; the AEI's Robert Bork has argued that the convention violates the Fourth Amendment's prohibition of unreasonable searches. In a 1997 *Harvard Law Review* article (the opening salvo in the New Sovereigntist crusade), Bradley and Goldsmith argued that federal courts have no place enforcing norms of international law, including established human rights. The bottom line: Not only does the United States have the power to reject international regimes, but in many instances the federal government has a constitutional duty to reject them. America does not have to play by the rules that everybody else plays by because nobody can make it play by them—and besides, it has its own set of more important ones.

These arguments are grounded in highly formalistic readings of the Constitution and selective interpretations of its history. Some revive arguments already made and defeated at other times of critical change in America's relationship to the rest of the world. Most important, the New Sovereigntists forget that the Constitution—hardly blind to the national interest—has always adapted itself successfully to new exigencies of the international system. Such values as federalism, the separation of powers, and individual rights are not so brittle that they will shatter at the intersection with globalization.

Indeed, the Constitution will have to adapt to global requirements sooner or later, for the New Sovereigntist premise of American impermeability is flawed. During the twentieth century, the United States was able to defy various international norms only because other countries were unwilling to bear the costs of sanctioning America for its sins; at the same time, international organizations had little power to wield on their own. (For example, the United States took little heat for its 1984 mining of Nicaraguan harbors despite a strongly critical World Court ruling against it.) True, Washington will continue to maintain the fiction of an opt-out capability, and the international community cannot yet force formal participation in international regimes. But economic globalization will inevitably bring the United States in line.

Meanwhile, the international community can advance the rule of international law by working against key U.S. actors—most notably corporations but also states—in trade and investment decisions.

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That way, it can directly discipline U.S. entities, circumventing and constraining anti-internationalist federal policymakers in the process. Take the test-ban case: Washington is almost certain to respect the prohibition on nuclear weapons testing, notwithstanding the treaty's rejection last year by the Senate. If the United States did decide to undertake such tests in the future, however, the decision would be met not only with international condemnation but with concrete international action in the form of consumer activism. When France undertook nuclear tests in 1995, NGOs launched a campaign against French wine that helped force President Jacques Chirac to back down from future testing. Something similar would happen if America announced an intention to test. Boycotts might threaten certain powerful U.S. industries (e.g., fast-food chains) with lost sales, which would in turn press the federal government to respect the test ban.

A similar story is likely to unfold in the human rights context. The United States stands increasingly isolated, at least among Western nations, in its continued use of the death penalty. It is also one of very few countries that still allows its application against juvenile offenders and the mentally retarded. On the one hand, no one expects Washington to sign on to international accords limiting capital punishment. On the other, international actors are now moving against the U.S. states that continue the practice. Executions in the United States consistently make headlines in Europe, where state-level responsibility for the death penalty is widely understood. As a result, European and other foreign leaders are bypassing Washington to make direct protests to states with frequent or controversial executions, such as Texas, Virginia, and Georgia. Where economic pressure and shaming campaigns might not work against the United States, they can prove effective on the state level. Foreign actors, including corporations, may well start to take human rights practices into account in making investment and purchasing decisions. For example, the chairman of the European Parliament's delegation for U.S. relations warned George W. Bush in 1998 that European companies—which hold $38 billion in investments in Texas—were under pressure from shareholders and public opinion to consider cutting back investments in states that apply the death penalty. It will take only so many lost auto plants, business conventions, and tourist dollars to make the death penalty look dramatically less attractive to state politicians. In the medium term, states will almost certainly eliminate the more internationally offensive uses of the death penalty, and over the long run they will likely end it altogether. Again, the United States will end up complying with an international norm even if it does not take formal steps to accept it. The New Sovereigntists may win high-profile battles on Capitol Hill, but they will lose the war on the more important fronts.

For now, however, the New Sovereigntist grip over Washington imposes significant costs by retarding the advance of international law. The United States may be increasingly vulnerable to international pressure, but it is still the biggest kid on the block. Persistent American rejection will hurt the progress of even well-established international regimes by giving cover to other nonparticipants, and incipient norms will lose the boost

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that would otherwise come with American acceptance. And U.S. noncompliance with international accords saps its authority to press other nations to respect the rule of international law.

Above all, the United States compromises its own interests by formally refusing to adopt widely accepted international regimes. Treaty committees and other international institutions usually extend participation rights only to member states. America thereby forfeits any right to help shape those regimes that it rejects. It has no voice in shaping international norms at a critical stage of their development, even as its ability to resist their imposition diminishes. It plays the part of the complaining, unregistered voter on the international stage, refusing to participate in processes that nevertheless bind him. Sure to lose in the long run, New Sovereigntism also hurts America in the here and now.

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

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The Middle Kingdom Runs Dry

Tax Evasion in China

William Gamble

China watchers regularly warn that a raft of well-known problems besets the Middle Kingdom. These usual suspects include a ballooning population, environmental degradation, growing ethnic tensions, and uncomfortable relations with China's neighbors. But the country has an even more immediate problem that has until now received far too little attention: Beijing can barely collect its taxes. At a time when China's economic growth rate is slowing and its thirst for public funds is growing, this chronic inability to collect taxes has all but crippled the government. And so far, all efforts to address the problem have failed.

Throughout the 1990s, successive crackdowns on tax evaders were launched to little avail. Government income as a share of gross domestic product (GDP) continued to decline throughout the decade, sinking to 12 percent in 1998 from 32 percent in 1978—a rate lower than those of the world's most laissez-faire economic regimes. At the same time, individual income as a proportion of GDP increased from 49 to 61 percent.

Understanding China's desperate thirst for cash is not difficult. It owes in large part to the enormous losses regularly suffered by the noncompetitive state-owned enterprises (SOEs) that employ most of the workers in urban China. These hemorrhaging businesses must be bailed out by loans from state banks that then become insolvent themselves, requiring recapitalization and extending the economic crisis down the line. Workers laid off by those SOEs not kept on life support by the banks also require government support. At the same time, Beijing is spending huge amounts on economic stimulus packages to prop up its GDP. The government also keeps expanding defense budgets to compensate the armed forces for the recent loss of their commercial businesses, which Beijing stripped from them in an attempt to reduce the military's power.

Yet while expenses are increasing, China's government income has dwindled. Beijing has tried to reverse this dangerous trend by improving the efficiency of its tax system; the latest efforts to alleviate the funding drought have included public

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executions of tax evaders, upgraded computer systems for the tax bureaucracy, intensified scrutiny of bank transactions, and closure of many loopholes. These measures may increase revenues somewhat, but because of the inefficiencies inherent in a centrally planned economy, they will not stop the decline of government revenues relative to GDP.

Part of the problem lies with the modern structure of China's government. In the early stages of China's communist development, economic, political, and legal power was concentrated in the government's hands, and this seemed to work—at least at first. But the overwhelming power of the central government devolved over time to local officials and, especially, to managers of large enterprises. These managers also assumed the duties of landlord, mayor, fire chief, and even school principal.

These same local managers and government officials now collude for their own personal interests, those of their enterprise or industry, and those of their locality—but not those of Beijing. The result is that Beijing gets an ever-decreasing share of the tax pie, forcing it to rely on other sources for revenue, such as the few state-owned firms that do earn profits—namely, monopolies in industries such as telecommunications. Years of tinkering have left a tax system full of incentive schemes and loopholes that benefit powerful vested interests but offer no new means to collect taxes from local authorities who protect tax-evading firms. Devolution of power from the center has, on the one hand, stimulated regional economic growth and reform. But as local governments have attained de facto control, they have seriously weakened Beijing's ability to achieve and sustain macroeconomic stability.

Moreover, the system now depends on the very corruption that makes tax collection so difficult. China's inefficient centrally planned goods-distribution system requires collusion between managers of state enterprises and lower officials to resolve surpluses and shortages. This has led to the formation of large networks of informal contracts, swaps, reciprocal relationships, and black markets, all of which enrich the participating individuals but add little to government coffers. Despite their negative side effects, however, many of these arrangements are essential for correcting the shortcomings in the state economic system and for maintaining the output of China's state enterprises.

China's managers and government officials, unchecked by legal restrictions, political restraints, or market discipline, have thus become indispensable to the economy. But they enjoy both the incentives and the means to corral large amounts of public resources and have not hesitated to take advantage of such opportunities. Local officials, for their parts, offer tax concessions to managers while finding ways to avoid sharing taxes with the central government. This may help local economies, but it only worsens the tax drought in Beijing.

ENERGETIC AVOIDANCE

A glance at the sorry specifics of China's tax system helps explain just why government revenues are so low. The problems are staggering. To begin with, 70 to 80 percent of Chinese citizens have had no dealings with tax officials in their entire lives. For more than 30 years, in fact—from 1948 to 1987—China had no income tax at all.

Today, although most urban wage earners have taxes automatically deducted

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from their monthly pay packets, a survey of taxpayers in six cities showed that more than 60 percent of them do not even know what the tax threshold is (that is, the amount of income they have to earn before they are required to pay taxes). And if they did understand the system, few Chinese would be happy with it. Expenses are not deductible, and tax rates are not adjusted to account for inflation and the loss of subsidized social services formerly provided to employees by local SOEs. The withholding process is unpopular, and various means—including payment by cash and bartering—are widely used to avoid it. In fact, around 10 million of China's 27 million self-employed businesspeople have not even registered to pay taxes in the first place. Mounting antagonism against the withholding system has erupted in attacks on tax collectors and tax bureaus and in hostile newspaper stories and editorials. Beijing is finding that merely passing a law does not ensure compliance, especially if the people do not see their interests served.

Oversight is also a problem. Tax officials have enormous incentives to accept bribes to help individuals or enterprises avoid paying taxes. These officials are part of the same government that is trying to stop corruption. But there is no independent agency on the local level to supervise their work or act as a check on venal activities. Quite the reverse: local governments have incentives to ensure that their main sources of revenue—local enterprises—remain competitive by avoiding any extra costs, including taxes. Since evasion has been institutionalized, complying with the tax code has become more expensive than avoiding it. A citizen who chooses to defy a tax official's extortion and to simply pay according to the official tax code runs the risk of attracting groundless criticism and being fined, and has little recourse for appeal.

SEDUCTIVE SIMPLICITY

In the United States, taxes are organized and codified through a top-down process, starting with statutes, then regulations and rulings, and then administrative and court hearings. Applying American tax law is an almost continuous process, one concerned with accurately and fairly ascertaining specific facts and then correctly interpreting and applying the law to them. The process is enmeshed with myriad other laws that define, refine, and elucidate the system. Together, these laws provide a uniform and fairly transparent process for both taxpayers and tax collectors.

In contrast, China's new tax statutes and regulations are both skimpy and inflexible. They favor accountancy precision over legal finesse and mathematical symbols over words. Their legal simplicity makes no distinctions between the subtleties of individual economic situations and fails to account for the myriad transactions of a sophisticated market economy. There is no adequate system to fairly determine the facts; local officials simply use their (often arbitrary) discretion. A one-size-fits-all system, China's tax code virtually guarantees that its application will be exceptionally unfair, unpopular, and unworkable.

In China the government, local or central, holds the power to tax whatever it wants to whenever it wants to. In defining the categories subject to individual taxation, the Chinese system includes a catchall "other income" category, the meaning of which remains open to interpretation by

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the finance departments of the State Council (China's cabinet). Exemptions are likewise approved by this same body. Furthermore, the system includes only a standard deduction and provides no adjustments for individual situations. Without specific deductions, both sides of a business transaction are often subjected to tax. Unsurprisingly, a system with this level of uncertainty lacks credibility. And the conditions are ripe for corruption. Without consistency or an honest method of fact-finding, it becomes safer and more reliable to bribe local tax officials than to submit to the system.

Income tax in China provides less than two percent of government tax revenue, as opposed to the one-third share it contributes in major developed economies. To make up the shortfall, Beijing relies instead on a regressive value-added tax (VAT) to produce more than half of its income. The VAT is generally deemed more efficient than an income tax because it taxes consumption and encourages saving. Furthermore, VATs are easier to collect, since they are paid by businesses, which are obviously fewer in number than consumers, have a lot more money, and usually keep better records.

Yet despite its advantages, even the VAT is difficult to administer in China. A thriving market in fake invoices has sprung up to circumvent the system. These documents are forged and resold to companies who fill them out with inflated figures that overstate the value of inputs and thereby avoid the tax. This practice continues today despite the execution of people found to have used such phony VAT invoices to embezzle state funds. Chinese businesses also manage to avoid paying VAT by persuading tax authorities that their products are worth less than the raw materials used to make them—often the case in inefficient state-owned enterprises.

UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES

Placing their faith in technological solutions, Chinese officials are upgrading their computer systems and providing businesses with adding machines to record revenues that can then be checked by the tax authorities' computers. The problem with this process, however, lies in getting people to actually use the new machines.

Making transactions even harder to monitor is the fact that China's remains a cash-based economy. At least eight of each ten transactions at major department stores in large cities are made in cash. In the countryside, the proportion probably rises to nearly 100 percent. And the incentive to use cash will only grow with the introduction of more technology, as people realize that their transactions are being tracked. Meanwhile, giving people access to better technology may only result in more sophisticated tax evasion.

As in the case of techonological improvements, the structure of some of the newer Chinese taxes may also have unexpected detrimental effects. A tax on interest earned on bank deposits is prompting people to take their money out of banks. But China's four major banks are technically insolvent, and the last thing they need is a diminution of their asset base. A similar problem exists with a proposed social security tax on employees and employers to go into individually owned accounts. Any money set aside in such accounts would be wasted, for where would funds be invested? Chinese government debt? Accounts in

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insolvent banks? Shares of money-losing SOEs? Speculative real estate? None of these present very attractive alternatives.

The failure of banks to allocate funds to more robust sectors of the economy—which, unlike the SOEs, show potential for growth and trade in hard currency—also limits tax revenue. One of the more energetic parts of the Chinese economy since the mid–1980s, for example, has been the growing township enterprises that provided the state with 20 percent of its revenues in 1997. Unfortunately, the growth of these famous enterprises, which are theoretically owned by various townships and villages, has been steadily slowing since 1993. Starved by the state banks, their rate of growth has dropped from 65 percent in 1993 to 15.4 percent in 1997. As they continue to lose steam, so will their ability to pay taxes.

The same problem exists with high-tech, high-growth manufacturers. For example, Huawei, a telecommunications-equipment manufacturer, has seen its sales double annually for the last four years. Yet despite its success, the company has had trouble getting a loan. At the same time, notwithstanding efforts by Beijing to get banks to tighten up lending, loans to the inefficient state sector grew by 16 percent in 1998. Tax-consuming sectors of the economy therefore continue to receive more than ample money, while tax-producing sectors are starved.

THE NEW MATH

With a budget deficit of only 1.8 percent of GDP and a total domestic debt of only 10 percent of GDP, China's inability to collect taxes may not appear to be an urgent problem. These figures take on a new urgency, however, when considered in light of the government's general failure to raise money. Sixty percent of central government revenues last year came from the issuance of debt. Of that debt, 70.9 percent went to servicing and financing redemption of other debts. China cannot continue to service its debt for long by simply issuing more. It needs the cash that would come with increased tax collections.

Some observers see relief coming from the trade revenues and foreign investment that will be generated by China's entrance into the World Trade Organization (WTO). But euphoria is tempered by foreign misgivings over whether China can faithfully implement the required concessions and handle an influx of foreign competitors. Without the uniformity of law, the likelihood that the regulations of a supranational body will be enforced throughout the country is small, especially if they threaten the SOEs, the Communist Party's main power base. Private businesses remain insecure and are unlikely ever to enjoy the inviolable status accorded by China's constitution to state-owned companies.

In a truly law-based society, rules deter narrow interest groups from stealing national resources from society as a whole. Without the protection that such rules provide, however, powerful individuals and groups remain free to follow their parasitic path and enrich themselves while impoverishing the country. Such is the case in China today. As long as narrow but powerful interests continue to obstruct the rule of law, the central government will never be able to collect taxes efficiently. And if taxes cannot be collected, China's one-party government will fall deeper into debt. The economic drought will spread, threatening stability within China, and potentially beyond.

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Essays



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Bill Clinton, Samuel Berger, and Madeleine Albright confer in Istanbul, Turkey, November 18, 1999

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A Foreign Policy for the Global Age

Samuel R. Berger

> Is the U.S. in an irreversible decline as the world's premier power?
>
> — *Time,* October 15, 1992

> The United States won the war against the "evil empire," but it is losing the battle against the forces of decline.
>
> — *Le Monde,* October 20, 1992, in the first of a 12-part series on America in eclipse

> Victory over Saddam Hussein, although incomplete, masked temporarily America's declining economic power and dwindling interest in the rest of the world and postponed moves to fill the vacuum created by America's retrenchment and the collapse of the Soviet Union.
>
> — *U.S. News & World Report,* November 16, 1992

GUIDING LIGHTS

BILL CLINTON was elected president at a moment of both triumph and uncertainty for America in the world. The triumphs of the Cold War and the Persian Gulf War will be long remembered. The memory of the uncertainty is already fading.

In 1992, the United States was widely seen as unlikely to sustain its global engagement in the absence of an overriding threat. It was lagging competitively. U.S. alliances were in jeopardy, with their missions undefined and with new threats—from the Balkans to a nuclearizing North Korea—being inadequately addressed. Japan and

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western Europe were considered increasingly likely to forge separate identities outside their alliances with America. U.S. foreign policy had barely come to grips with the emerging challenges of a globalized world, from the volatility of markets to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction to the spread of disease.

For 50 years, America self-assuredly had defined its leadership in terms of what it was against. In the years immediately following the victory over communism, America defined its "post–Cold War" policy in terms of what was ending. The Clinton administration's task was to renew our leadership in terms of what we were building, while restoring the domestic vitality that enabled us to lead in the first place. Historians may debate the choices we made, but there is no disputing their cumulative outcome.

America today is by any measure the world's unchallenged military and economic power, having completed the first peacetime expansion of our global reach since the days of Theodore Roosevelt. The world counts on us to be a catalyst of coalitions, a broker of peace, a guarantor of global financial stability. We are widely seen as the country best placed to benefit from globalization.

Indeed, our success is so apparent to others that one of our biggest challenges now is to manage the resentment it sometimes generates. This we must do with sensitivity and care—but also with perspective. After all, the same countries complaining today that America is a "hyperpower" were contemplating America's decline eight years ago. That, in my mind, is progress.

It did not come by accident. It happened because a president who believed America's strength abroad depends on our strength at home kept his promise to put our economic house in order, giving us the strength to lead and the credibility to lead by example. It happened because a president who shared his Cold War predecessors' internationalist philosophy fought to preserve our leadership in a radically different era, despite resistance to almost every international initiative that involved risk and cost.

With yesterday's road map obsolete, the big question we have faced repeatedly is how to use our renewed strength in a rapidly changing world.

President Clinton understood before most that the most pervasive force in our world is globalization. He also understood that, although

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globalization is inexorable, its benefits are not. It can expand access to technology that enriches life—and technology that destroys it. It can equalize economic opportunity—and accentuate economic disparity. It can make dictatorships more vulnerable to the spread of liberating ideas—and democracies more vulnerable to the spread of terrorism, disease, and financial turmoil.

But globalization does have qualities that we can harness to advance our enduring objectives of democracy, shared prosperity, and peace. In this era, more and more nations are striving to join global networks of information, commerce, and cooperative security—because their economic well-being and national survival increasingly depend on it. America in many ways is a gatekeeper of those networks, and thus we have influence over the choices nations make. Some of the world's most positive recent developments have occurred because of how we chose to use that influence, not because globalization preordained them.

Although globalization is inexorable, its benefits are not.

For example, if China has begun to dismantle its command economy, despite the risk to its one-party state, it is not just meeting the abstract demands of global markets; it is fulfilling the terms we negotiated for its entry into the World Trade Organization (WTO). If people from Croatia to Bulgaria to Macedonia are rejecting hard-line nationalists and embracing democracy, it is not because they somehow have reached the end of history. They have reached the conclusion that this is the way to join NATO and the European Union (EU)—an opportunity made possible by our concerted effort to expand NATO and made even more attractive by NATO's victory in Kosovo. If the people of Mexico have built a multiparty system, it is not because democracy is unstoppable in a "dot com" world. It is partly because our joint embrace of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) empowered Mexico's reformers to open their system, and because America's support for Mexico during its financial crisis gave reforms time to prevail.

It is not enough for us simply to open our markets, hook up the world to MTV, and hope that people beat their swords into shares on the NASDAQ. The way for America to exercise its influence today is to build with our democratic partners an international system of strong

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alliances and institutions attuned to the challenges of a globalized world. We must ensure that this system is genuinely open to all who adhere to clearly defined standards. And we must be ready to stand up for those standards when they are threatened.

Those are the broad outlines of a foreign policy for the global age. They can't be summed up on a bumper sticker. But they are reflected in the following principles that have guided the Clinton foreign policy and should guide his successor's:

1. America's alliances with Europe and Asia remain the cornerstone of its national security, but they must be constantly adapted to meet emerging challenges. That our alliances will endure is something we take for granted today; eight years ago, their survival was very much in doubt. This was true in Asia: Would we maintain a forward military presence there, and would our allies and friends continue to recognize its legitimacy? And it was particularly true in Europe, where NATO was stuck in its Cold War mission and makeup.

The Berlin Wall had fallen, yet NATO still treated the Iron Curtain as its eastern frontier; it seemed we would be allied with Europe's old democracies forever, but with its new democracies never. Central Europe feared becoming a "gray zone" of poverty and instability. Meanwhile, European security and the values NATO defends were threatened by an out-of-control war in the Balkans. Our European allies tried with good intentions to help the victims but found themselves shielding the victimizers. Shamefully, for the first time in 50 years, America claimed we had "no dog" in Europe's fight.

In both Europe and Asia, we broke new ground in 1993 by welcoming our allies' desire to play a more responsible role, whether through a stronger European role in NATO or the creation of the Regional Forum of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). But in both regions, we decided to maintain our troops and adapt our alliances. We formally updated our strategic alliance with Japan to define how we will respond together to post–Cold War threats. Following a period of recrimination and drift in the early 1990s, that alliance is now stronger than ever. Indeed, the stabilizing effect of our military presence in Asia now is recognized even by North Korea. In Europe, we revitalized NATO from a static Cold War alliance to a magnet for new democracies, with new partners, members, and missions.

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Most important, we have backed with action our commitments to both regions. Doubts about America's commitment to Asian stability and security were erased by our decision to send aircraft carriers near the Taiwan Strait in 1996, and by our solidarity with South Korea in diminishing the North Korean nuclear threat and creating the conditions for eventual North-South dialogue. We proved our commitment to European security by leading NATO in its first military engagement, which stopped the killing in Bosnia, and leading an increasingly successful peacekeeping mission there. (Support for moderate and multiethnic parties has at least doubled in every part of Bosnia in the last three years.) Then, in Kosovo, we did what America should have done in Bosnia in 1992: We acted early enough to return the victims of ethnic cleansing to their homes in a way that protected southeastern Europe from wider catastrophe, preserved our relationship with Russia, and proved NATO could stay together during a sustained conflict.

Our alliances are more durable now than during the Cold War.

Today, Europe is more peaceful, united, and democratic than at any time in history. Asia remains at peace despite continuing tensions. And our core alliances have been saved from irrelevance. They are arguably more durable now than during the Cold War, because they are clearly organized to advance a lasting set of shared interests, rather than to defeat a single threat.

The future challenge in Europe will be threefold: We must ensure that a strong EU—including a strong European defense policy—complements, not undermines, a strong transatlantic alliance. We must use our military presence to protect European security, which means, for now, maintaining a declining but still necessary force in the Balkans. And we must keep NATO's promise to admit capable new democracies to avoid new divisions and further disintegration in southeastern Europe.

In Asia, the challenges to our alliances are harder to predict. They could come in the form of a crisis in Korea or in the Taiwan Strait that will test our will. Ironically, they could also come in the form of success that will test our wisdom. Even if tensions ease in Asia's hot spots, we must maintain our alliances and military presence because

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their purpose is not just to respond to danger, but to be a balance wheel that prevents danger from arising.

2. Peace and security for the United States depend on building principled, constructive, clear-eyed relations with our former great-power adversaries. The question is, Can we do that simply by marking the boundaries of acceptable external conduct for nations such as Russia and China, or must we also seek to influence their internal development?

In fact, we must continue to be wary of threats to peace, whether a Russian move against Georgia or Chinese use of force against Taiwan, because the stability of entire regions and the viability of new democracies depend on it.

But the way these countries manage their challenges at home is just as important as the way they relate to the world. No event in the last half-century has done more to advance our security than Russia's democratic revolution. If both Russia and China become stable, pluralistic, prosperous societies, the world will be safer still. Moreover, the threat we face from our former adversaries lies as much in their internal weakness or retrogression as in their external strength. Russia may be unable to establish the rule of law or to control the flow of technology across its borders. China may fail to fulfill growing popular aspirations for accountability and openness, dooming economic reform and inviting internal upheaval and disintegration.

An effective way to minimize both external and internal dangers is to seize on the desire of both Russia and China to participate in the global economy and global institutions, insisting that they accept the obligations as well as the benefits of integration.

We have brought Russia into the G-8 group of leading industrialized nations and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation group (APEC), into a relationship with NATO, and into close engagement with international financial institutions. Russia's interest in deeper integration helped us negotiate the exit of its troops from the Baltics, to bring its troops into NATO missions in the Balkans, and to win its active support for a just end to the war in Kosovo. We pressed successfully for Russian ratification of the second Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START II), disproving critics who said it could never happen if NATO stood by aspiring allies in central Europe and stuck to its guns in the Balkans. Because we have worked to help destroy and safeguard the old Soviet

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nuclear arsenal, the doomsday scenario of loose Russian nukes and scientists selling their services en masse to the highest bidder has not come to pass.

In the meantime, Russia has seen continued poverty, corruption, two cruel wars in Chechnya, and backsliding on protection of a free press. But nationalism and communism have not resurged, as many feared they would in 1993; in fact, Russians have repeatedly voted to keep pressing ahead. The privatization of the Russian economy, though deeply flawed, shattered the Soviet-era bureaucracy's hold on daily life. And outside support has bought Russia time, helping it conquer the agonizing bread lines, empty food shelves, and hyperinflation of 1993, and endure the transition from communism. Some Russian leaders may still be tempted to rebuild an all-powerful state, but today they face a country with 65,000 nongovernmental organizations, in which the state controls only 30 percent of the economy—as opposed to 70 percent in 1993. Some may still try to hide hard truths from public view, but their efforts are now exposed by a vigorous, if still vulnerable, media. A generation from now, I doubt anyone will be saying we did too much to support Russia's transformation. They may say we did too little.

Resistance to change puts China on the wrong side of history.

With China, our challenge has been to steer between the extremes of uncritical engagement and untenable confrontation. That balance has helped maintain peace in the Taiwan Strait, secured China's help in maintaining stability on the Korean Peninsula, and brought China into many global nonproliferation regimes, by which it has largely abided. It has also allowed us to negotiate a deal to bring China into the WTO.

The WTO deal, along with the congressional passage of permanent normal trade relations (PNTR), represents the most constructive breakthrough in U.S.-China relations since normalization in 1979. It will also bind China more closely to a rules-based international system and change the country internally. To enter the WTO, China must speed the demise of the state-run economy through which the Communist Party has wielded much of its power. The activism that produced more than 120,000 labor disputes in China last year will likely rise. And China's leaders will be forced to make hard choices about political reform.

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To encourage them to make the right choices, we must keep saying plainly, as President Clinton has done repeatedly, that resistance to change puts China "on the wrong side of history." But we must also continue to integrate China into the global economy. Just as NAFTA membership eroded the economic base of one-party rule in Mexico, WTO membership, accompanied by external validation of the struggle for human rights, can help do the same in China.

3. Local conflicts can have global consequences. Like no president before him, Bill Clinton has dedicated the power and passion of his presidency to peacemaking. Like most presidents, he has had to contend with those who say America should do nothing about foreign conflicts unless we are directly threatened—those who say, in effect, "If it's over there, it's not our fight."

We have worked for peace because we believe in defusing conflicts before, not after, they escalate and harm our vital interests. With that in mind, we have advanced a comprehensive peace in the Middle East—with the Israeli-Palestinian interim agreement, the Israeli-Jordanian treaty, Wye, and a Camp David process that put fundamental issues on the table for the first time. We ended the Balkan wars of the 1990s, freeing Europe from a potentially permanent refugee crisis and source of conflict. We helped Turkey and Greece move further from confrontation than they have been in years. We helped pull nuclear-armed India and Pakistan from the brink of what might have been a catastrophic war in 1999. We have used diplomacy where possible, force where absolutely necessary, not pretending we can solve all the world's problems, but rejecting the idea that because we can't do everything, we must, for the sake of consistency, do nothing.

We also have worked for peace for reasons unique to our global age. First, regions endlessly mired in conflict are increasingly likely to become breeding grounds for extremism and terror, which spread even if the underlying conflicts do not. This is especially true in regions containing major fault lines of ethnicity, faith, or ideology, such as the Balkans and the Middle East.

Second, as globalization has raised the strategic cost of indifference to local conflict, it has also raised the moral cost. Americans and their leaders increasingly confront both the images of distant atrocities and the dilemma of how to respond. Today we can choose not to act, but

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we can no longer choose not to know. I believe that the United States should not send military forces into conflict where America's national interests are not at stake. And the reality is that we have not. (For all the talk about humanitarian intervention, the only instance where America has used force purely for humanitarian reasons was Somalia in 1992.) But when our interests and values are challenged, Americans expect their government to do what it reasonably can. Those who dismiss their idealism lack realism.

Finally, the disproportionate power America enjoys today is more likely to be accepted by other nations if we use it for something more than self-protection. It is fine to say Europeans should lead in the Balkans, Asians in East Timor, and Africans in Africa. But we are the only country capable of projecting power globally and often the only one with the impartial standing to mediate disputes. If we fail to support our friends and allies when they do take the lead, we will find ourselves alone when we need them. Indeed, nations will increasingly coalesce against us.

America's peacemaking has had the opposite effect. When a president goes the extra mile for peace in the Middle East or Ireland or South Asia or the Balkans, or flies, as President Clinton did in August, to join a fractious conference in Africa seeking peace in Burundi, where we have no strategic interests, it demolishes perceptions that an all-powerful America is an arrogant America. It earns us influence that raw power alone cannot purchase, while guarding against resentment that could erode our influence.

4. New dangers, accentuated by technological advances and the permeability of borders, require new national security priorities. For 50 years, we faced vertical proliferation: two nations piling their nuclear arsenals higher and higher. Today, we face horizontal proliferation, with arsenals at a lower level, but spread more pervasively. In response, President Clinton has brought sustained focus to nonproliferation—a wise break from the past. Information about North Korea's nuclear weapons program, for example, had been available since the late 1980s, but little was achieved until we negotiated the Agreed Framework in 1994, which froze the production of plutonium for nuclear weapons in the North and verifiably has held ever since. The United States also took little notice of Iraq's 20-year development of nuclear,

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chemical, and biological weapons until after the Gulf War. How many weapons of terror would Saddam have been left to build had he not invaded Kuwait?

Today, nonproliferation is and must be a central goal of U.S. foreign policy. For example, with unrelenting American engagement, China has joined and is complying with the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), the Biological Weapons Convention, and the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). It has lived up to its 1998 commitment to the United States to provide no new assistance to Iran's nuclear program and has halted assistance to unsafeguarded nuclear facilities in Pakistan, although more remains to be done. Nonproliferation has also been a centerpiece of our engagement with Russia and its neighbors, leading to the denuclearization of Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan; the elimination of hundreds of tons of nuclear materials; tighter controls to prevent smuggling; and an intensified, if still inadequate, effort to halt the transfer of weapons technologies to Iran. We also have worked to strengthen global nonproliferation regimes because clear standards of international conduct help us mobilize global pressure against threatening behavior. Some people apparently believe that America should not join any treaty that others embrace. Fortunately, we overcame that sentiment to ratify the CWC and to renew the NPT. The next president must work with the Senate to do the same with the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.

Peacemaking destroys perceptions that an all-powerful America is an arrogant America.

Reflecting the new security agenda, we have mobilized greater internal and international resources to fight terrorism. This effort helped us bring to justice the perpetrators of the World Trade Center bombing and the killings outside CIA headquarters, and to work with Jordan to foil planned attacks against millennium celebrations. We crafted the first national strategy to protect America's computer systems and critical infrastructure against sabotage and are working with local emergency and health providers to deal more promptly with biological and chemical weapons threats.

In a generation, we may remember the clarion call to reverse climate change as a critical turning point in U.S. foreign policy. The conviction

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that economic growth and environmental protection are compatible has not yet been universally accepted. Fortunately, it has more than a fighting chance, thanks to the insistent voices of President Clinton and Vice President Al Gore. The next president must turn that conviction into a global consensus.

Finally, we have made the fight against deadly infectious diseases a national security priority. Some may think this goal stretches the definition of national security, but a problem that kills huge numbers, crosses borders, and threatens to destabilize whole regions is the very definition of a national security threat. Infectious diseases such as malaria, tuberculosis, and AIDS are now responsible for one-quarter of all deaths in the world. In some African countries, AIDS has cut life expectancy by more than 30 years; in South Africa it is expected to reduce GDP by 17 percent in 10 years. These countries cannot survive such an onslaught. Without concerted efforts to fight the disease, AIDS could also ravage India, Russia, and China, where the warning signs already exist. So we have exponentially increased funding to bridge the global health divide and to stimulate the development of drugs and vaccines needed exclusively in poor countries. President Clinton made this issue a centerpiece of his last G-8 summit, but this challenge will call for even greater resources and attention in the future. To dismiss it as a "soft" issue is to be blind to hard realities.

Vast disparities between rich and poor will become more and more of a powder keg.

5. Economic integration advances both our interests and our values but also accentuates the need to alleviate economic disparities. As the first president who has understood the global economy, Bill Clinton has led the greatest world trade expansion in history—from $4 trillion to $6.6 trillion a year—with the completion of the Uruguay Round, the creation of the WTO, and the approval of NAFTA and PNTR with China. Our decision to keep our markets open during the Asian financial crisis, despite the inevitable result of higher trade deficits, is partly responsible for the recovery of the Asian economy, which again is fueling global growth. On the other hand, the loss of fast-track authority for the president in negotiating trade treaties was one of the most devastating wounds of the last eight years. Although the president

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has advanced a partnership with Latin America, he now lacks the full authority to exercise the most vigorous U.S. leadership there. This presents both a challenge and an opportunity for the next president.

Our general success in opening trade has coincided with growing fears about trade, motivated in part by concerns about labor and environmental standards in the developing world. We have the most basic obligation under the universal principles of human rights not to be complicit in slavery and child labor. But we must also guard against the arrogance of privilege. More than one billion people in the world live on a dollar a day or less. Nothing keeps them poor more than barriers and subsidies in wealthy countries, which cost the developing world more than it gains from aid. That is why President Clinton fought to enact trade bills for the Caribbean and Africa, which will give Africa, for example, more liberal access to our market than Europe and Asia enjoy.

At the same time, those who believe open markets alone can lift poor nations from poverty are deceiving themselves. No nation can compete in the global economy if it is crippled by debt, disease, or inadequate education. And helping impoverished nations overcome these obstacles is more than a moral imperative. In a world that increasingly operates as an integrated economic zone, in which everyone increasingly knows how the other half lives, vast disparities between rich and poor will become more and more of a powder keg.

We have successfully pushed the G-8 nations to reduce the debts of the poorest countries by 70 percent, to start tackling the AIDS crisis, and to invest more in basic education. We have had less success in building a bipartisan consensus in the United States to provide a reasonable share of that help. Unless we recognize that what is pocket change for America can foster a sea change in the rest of the world, humanity will be bitterly and violently divided a generation from now.

COMMON CRITICISMS

THE CLINTON foreign policy has drawn a number of criticisms. Some have been serious and constructive. Others have been more persistent than thoughtful.

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The most common and, in my view, mindless critique is that the president has advanced no single foreign policy doctrine or framework—in other words, no successor to containment. I would take this argument more seriously if any one of its proponents actually articulated an all-embracing framework of his or her own. But the simple answer is that even the doctrine of containment was inadequate: It led us well in our dealings with the Soviet empire in Europe, but it led us astray in local struggles elsewhere. What we needed then and need now is not the lift of a driving slogan, but a clear understanding of the changing world and the right strategic objectives, which the president has consistently articulated.

Another cliché is that the Clinton foreign policy has been driven by politics—an assertion that allows critics to avoid substantive arguments. Instead of addressing, for example, what would have happened to NATO had it excluded qualified European democracies because they were once, against their will, members of the Warsaw Pact, critics simply can reject NATO enlargement as a ploy to get Polish-American votes. Instead of confronting what might have happened to indispensable NATO unity in Kosovo had we pressed prematurely for a ground invasion, they can simply dismiss our strategy as a study in political caution. The truth is, a politically motivated president would not have bailed out Mexico against overwhelming congressional and public opposition, fought relentlessly for one trade agreement after another against the opposition of much of his political party, persisted with a winning strategy in Kosovo discounted by conventional wisdom, approved sustained deployments of American troops in Bosnia, or invested so much in building relationships with Russia and China.

Then there are critics who say our ability to lead our alliances again is at risk, pointing to a loss of French support in the Persian Gulf or to complaints about U.S. "hegemony" in Europe and Asia. These critics have a short and selective memory. Our relationship with Europe has always been a bit schizophrenic: we are either dominating or disengaged. Consider these news headlines: "Allies Complain of Washington's Heavy Hand," "France to NATO: Non, Merci," "U.S. Declares Economic Warfare on Allies," "Protestors Rally Against American Arms Plan." The first is from the Suez crisis in 1956. The second is from 1966, when France left NATO's military command.

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The third is from the Siberian pipeline crisis of 1981. And the fourth is from the 1986 debate about deploying intermediate-range nuclear missiles in Europe.

Our alliances are in better shape today than they were during the Cold War. An expanding NATO has renewed purpose; the coalition we led in Bosnia was the broadest in European history; and the coalition in Kosovo held through the longest military engagement in NATO's history. We led a coalition into Haiti that helped spur an unparalleled degree of cooperation among Western nations to defend democracy where it is threatened. We worked with our Asian and Pacific allies to mobilize an unprecedented coalition to intervene in East Timor—something unthinkable a few years ago. After 50 years of estrangement, we engendered a historic thaw in relations with India—not a formal ally, but as the world's largest democracy, a natural one. In a recent poll, a remarkable 91 percent of urban Indians called relations with the United States good or better, a vast change in attitudes. President Clinton also moved our relationship with the countries of Africa to one of genuine mutual respect, traveling to that continent more than any president in history and changing African perceptions of the United States.

Because the president has consciously sought to mark the triumph of American ideals without triumphalism, the dominant view of America is one of a country that exercises leadership for the greater good. Opinion surveys, for example, show that the proportion of Europeans disturbed by America's growing power ranges from just 17 percent in France to 8 percent in Germany and Britain. With continued care, that attitude will endure.

WHAT NEXT?

WHAT FUNDAMENTAL questions will the next administration face? Some are self-evident extensions of questions we have already faced: how to influence Russia and China, consolidate peace in the Balkans and the Middle East, preserve our alliances, promote economic development. A few are less obvious or merit special mention.

For example, will the roots of democracy's post–Cold War expansion deepen with time or wither under corruption, inequity, and poor

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governance? Even in 1999, more people around the world won the right to choose their leaders than in 1989, the year the Berlin Wall fell. But if new democracies don't deliver in such countries as Nigeria, Indonesia, and Ukraine, and if old democracies fail in countries such as Colombia, the pendulum that has swung toward freedom from Latin America to Asia to Africa to the former Soviet Union could swing back. Winning democracy's post-election contests requires our full attention and support.

A second question is how to promote change in those nations that have been most hostile to the United States over the last decade, and how to manage that change when it comes. That question applies to Iran and to Cuba; with both countries, we must be unafraid to advance openness without being naive about how far either has come.

The question also applies to North Korea, which, thanks to the U.S.–South Korean policy of deterrence and diplomatic engagement, and the failures caused by isolation, may be rethinking its policy of confrontation. We hope that the North will gradually open until the massive task of reunification becomes manageable. But few totalitarian regimes have peacefully, smoothly, and gradually transformed into stable and open societies. And North Korea is the most perfectly constituted totalitarian society on the planet. What will happen when its people gain knowledge of the outside world and when its leadership begins to feel threatened by change? The policy we have pursued with South Korea offers the best framework for encouraging peaceful change while dealing with the military threat that remains. But we must be ready for potential crises down the road.

With Iraq, our policy has achieved its immediate goals. We have contained Saddam and prevented his rearmament, diverting 90 percent of his oil revenues from the production of nuclear weapons and anthrax to the purchase of food and medicine. In 1989, Iraq earned $15 billion from oil exports and spent $13 billion on its military. This year, it is projected to earn $20 billion from oil-for-food exports but can spend none of these revenues on its military. But support for the policy cannot be sustained indefinitely, and Saddam will not be around forever. We need to intensify both our planning for a post-Saddam Iraq and our efforts to speed its arrival.

A third question is how to deal with both supernational and subnational threats to our security. A particularly troubling supernational

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threat is the growing globalization of grievance networks, including the transnational network of terror groups active from South and Central Asia to southern Russia to the Middle East and Africa. Coordination among these groups, which share a messianic hatred of open, tolerant societies, makes them a particular threat. But because they are loosely connected, they cannot be extinguished with one stroke. The solution is to reduce the economic disparities on which they breed; to resolve the Middle East conflict in order to delegitimize their grievances; and to beef up counter-terrorism cooperation even further, without assaulting civil liberties.

America cannot be a first-rate power on a third-class budget.

The subnational threat is the challenge to the nation-state from the potential disintegration of ethnically diverse societies, whether Nigeria and Indonesia today, or Russia and China tomorrow. How do we balance legitimate demands for self-determination against the danger of unleashing new grievances? In part, as the president has often noted, we must all recognize that in this new global economy, diversity can be a strength, a source of economic connectivity and therefore wealth, and that states and regions preoccupied by internecine conflicts will be left further behind. In part, the solution is integration among ethnically diverse states so that boundaries are less onerous—the experience of western Europe after World War II and the goal of the Balkan Stability Pact in southeastern Europe. In the short run, we need better international tools for maintaining peace in divided societies.

Which leads to a fourth question: How do we reconcile the growing need for global collective action with the inadequacies of our principal instrument of collective action, the United Nations? U.N. reform has made progress these last few years, but the Clinton administration has had to spend most of those years simply struggling to restore our dues payments. The next administration must help reinvent the U.N. into the kind of institution we would design today. And it must overcome American suspicion of the U.N. by arguing that an effective U.N. gives us options beyond putting out global fires alone and letting them burn.

A fifth question is how we should adapt our military to new challenges. The issue is not whether we must maintain the best-trained,

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best-equipped, most ready military in the world. We have and we will. The real issue is how to match the capabilities of our armed forces to their missions. How can we ensure that our forces are simultaneously prepared for high-intensity conflicts and smaller-scale peace operations that require special skills and different rules of engagement? Each service is responding with its own transformation plan. The next president will have to build on those efforts.

The most fundamental question of all is whether we can continue to sustain America's leadership role in the world. The answer is yes, if we devote adequate resources to the task and convince other nations that their interests are served by joining us.

America cannot be a first-rate power on a third-class budget. We should not have to struggle to fund patently vital programs like our effort to secure nuclear materials in Russia. We should not have to respond to pressing needs in one part of the world by robbing money from pressing needs somewhere else. This damages our ability to lead. It is hard to explain to the Japanese, for example, why we can't fund our $35 million share to help denuclearize North Korea (to which they have contributed $1 billion) when they read of our $2 trillion surplus. Some people argue we spend too much on foreign aid, yet America's entire budget for everything from diminishing the nuclear threat to preventing conflict to fighting AIDS to advancing democracy costs no more (at $14 billion) than what Americans spend each year on dietary supplements.

Finally, we must squarely confront the sense among some that we can maintain our position either by diminishing our role in the world or by imposing our will on it. What threatens to alienate our allies today is not that we are wealthy and powerful, but that despite our wealth and power we do not meet our obligations to the U.N., or fully fund our commitment to the development banks, or devote as much of our GDP to the reduction of global poverty as do 16 countries not as wealthy as us, or ratify treaties we urge others to adopt. It is not that we consider initiatives to defend our soil from missile threats or terrorism, but that we sometimes seem to suggest they are the sum total of our approach to the world—that we'd rather fence ourselves off from a dangerous world than work with others to improve it. We should not apologize for being a "hyperpower." But to remain strong, we must be a hyperpower that our friends and allies can depend on.

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We must remember that there is a difference between power and authority. Power is the ability to compel by force and sanctions; there are times we must use it, for there will always be interests and values worth fighting for. Authority is the ability to lead, and we depend on it for almost everything we try to achieve. Our authority is built on qualities very different from our power: on the attractiveness of our values, on the force of our example, on the credibility of our commitments, and on our willingness to listen to and stand by others. There may be no real threat to our power today. But if we use power in a way that antagonizes our friends and dishonors our commitments, we will lose our authority—and our power will mean very little.

In the last eight years, the United States has revitalized its alliances, begun to integrate its former adversaries into the international system, brought peace to regions critical to its security, adapted its global strategy to meet new challenges, and built the most open, dynamic world economy in history. But I believe President Clinton's most fundamental achievement is that he steered America from the Cold War era to the era of globalization in a way that enhanced not only our power but also our authority. That is the foundation on which we must advance our interests in a global age.

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Defending America in the Twenty-first Century

Eliot A. Cohen

WHAT'S WRONG WITH THIS PICTURE?

LAST YEAR, the U.S. military looked something like this: it had 1,380,000 troops, a budget of some $279 billion, and featured 10 active Army and three active Marine Corps divisions, about 20 active and reserve air wings, and 11 active aircraft carriers. Its forces drove M-1 tanks, flew F-15 and F-16 fighters and F-117 bombers, and sailed Nimitz-class carriers. They were organized into unified and specified commands, governed primarily by the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986.

Ten years earlier—with the Soviet Union still standing and the Gulf War soon to begin—the picture was strangely similar. The U.S. military had slightly over two million troops. With a budget of $382.5 billion (in today's dollars), it had 18 active Army and 3 active Marine Corps divisions, 36 active and reserve air wings, and 14 carriers. Its troops drove M-1 tanks, flew F-15 and F-16 fighters and F-117 bombers, and sailed Nimitz-class carriers. They too were organized into unified and specified commands, governed primarily by the Goldwater-Nichols Act.

To be fair, the Pentagon did make some changes in the interim. The American military presence in Europe shrank to something like a third of its late–Cold War size—down to roughly 100,000 troops. Some organizations disappeared (most notably the Air Force's nuclear-armed Strategic Air Command), while others expanded in size and influence. Precision-guided missiles and bombs, once a small portion

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of the arsenal, came to dominate American air campaigns. And in the invisible theater of cyberspace, networks multiplied and the information flow became a torrent.

But despite these alterations, the Defense Department in 2000 closely resembles its predecessor of a decade ago, despite growing insistence by politicians that things must change. "Transformation," and not mere "reform," has become the catchword of the presidential defense debate. Texas Governor George W. Bush, in a keynote defense speech, promised a "revolution" that would "skip a generation of technology"; Vice President Al Gore has declared that the country must "rise to the challenge again—to transform today's armed forces into tomorrow's Information Age force."

Why such bold rhetoric from both parties? What makes political leaders talk about radical change instead of mere fine-tuning? After all, the U.S. defense establishment has handsomely won several minor wars in recent years, and with astoundingly few casualties. Why overhaul a military feared by former foes and by rising antagonists? Even allies are worried by a Pentagon that spends as much on research and development (some $36 billion per year) as some of them (the United Kingdom, specifically) spend on defense altogether.

Something more than politics or the quest for novelty is at work. The Pentagon suffers from serious, long-term troubles. Although it has just begun to adjust to some of these failings, it remains indifferent to or unaware of others. These problems fall into several categories. The first is strategic. American strategy still relies on a Cold War–derived understanding of military power and fails to focus on the challenges of the new century: homeland defense, a rising China, and what can only be termed "imperial policing." Meanwhile, American technology—impressive as it is—also still follows Cold War paths. The Pentagon tends to purchase systems suited for a war in Europe with the defunct Soviet Union rather than hardware optimized for Asia, North America, and the far-flung trouble spots where Washington tries to keep the peace. Finally, the military's organizational structures, also adapted chiefly to the challenges of a bipolar world, require overhaul as well. And signs of demoralization have begun to appear in the backbone of the force—its junior and middle-rank officers. The military's structure represents two outdated visions (a

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command structure conceived in 1943 and a recruitment and personnel system begun in 1970) out of touch with today's needs.

The next U.S. president—whether Gore or Bush—and his administration will get the chance to change all of this. But they are unlikely to do so, since inertia overwhelms the impulse to change at the Pentagon. Having won its wars cheaply (if not decisively), buttressed by formal and informal lobbies that understand their interests well, and led by competent but harried men and women who have neither the time nor the inclination to question their institutions' methods of doing business, the military will resist transformation. This may seem understandable at first, for failing to reform will not incur any visible penalty in the next five or ten years. Indeed, making changes will most assuredly cause short-term pain. But the costs of not reconfiguring the U.S. military now are steep and are likely to emerge in the coming decades. The country will miss out on important foreign policy objectives, and American power will fail to sustain the global semi-peace that we now take for granted.

FOUR WAYS TO FIGHT

In 1989, the Bush administration began demobilizing from the Cold War. Its basic concept was simple: the American military would slowly shrink by roughly 25 or 30 percent while maintaining a high operations tempo and reasonably generous pay, benefits, and research and development budgets. But it would slow the acquisition of military hardware. This was a cautious policy for a cautious administration that was not entirely convinced that the Soviet Union (or its successor, Russia) was down for the count. The Base Force, as the new concept became known, was a stopgap to remain until the Russian threat was clearly gone; it seemed a prudent approach for a government that dreaded the precipitate and feckless demobilizations that (it believed) had followed past conflicts.

A decade later, although Russia is no longer a threat, the Base Force remains alive and well, albeit under a different guise. Following the logic of the so-called Bottom-up Review of the early Clinton administration and then the 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review, American forces now aim at fighting two "major theater wars" (MTWs)—presumably against North Korea and Iraq. America's conventional force

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

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Still fighting the last war: U.S. soldiers in Iraq, 1991

structure has been built toward this goal, and nuclear policy has been consigned to the realms of arms control and unilateral disarmament.

The two-MTW strategy requires almost the same force structure as did the Base Force; a dispassionate observer would be hard pressed to see much difference between the two. And neither strategy suffices today. For one thing, the defense budget simply cannot sustain the current military without substantial increases: for a decade now the Pentagon has not had enough money to replace the aging hardware that it uses around the world. Estimates of the shortfall range from $25 billion a year to three times that figure (the latest assessment from the Congressional Budget Office comes in at about $50 billion a year). But even adequate funding would not solve the problem. More than money, an entirely new strategy is needed, one that does not cling to one obsolete scenario (an Iraqi invasion of Saudi Arabia) or to a threat that may collapse within a few years (North Korea). The United States needs a strategy that realistically addresses all of America's challenges in the next decade and beyond.

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Unfortunately, the current system will not produce such a new strategy. This is because it remains captive to an excruciating bureaucratic process: the congressionally mandated Quadrennial Defense Review, which, at least in the last round, ended in a document composed by scores of subpanels of officers and civil servants, who reported to seven panels, who reported to an "integration group," who reported to a "Senior Steering Group," who, aided or screened by the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, reported to the secretary of defense. Nor will the new strategy come from external studies by commissions acting without real authority or responsibility, worthy and wise though their participants may be. Rather, crafting a new strategy requires a small civilian and military staff working directly for the secretary of defense, protected from normal bureaucratic pressures and willing to make some hard calls. A successful new defense strategy must recognize America's extraordinary role in international politics and the consequent ambiguity and uncertainty of the circumstances in which the United States will use its military power.

National missile defense has become a question of theology, not policy.

The resulting strategy should have the following four components: defense against weapons of mass destruction (WMD), conventional dominance, short-term contingencies, and peace maintenance.

Defense against WMD should supplement traditional nuclear strategy with national missile defense and domestic counterterrorism. To be effective, defense against WMD sometimes requires the military to cooperate with other government agencies, or even to let them take the lead. Already the Pentagon works with organizations such as the Federal Emergency Management Agency to prepare for WMD attacks on American cities, and there has been talk about—and some action toward—preparing the National Guard to provide first-response units for biological attacks against American cities. Depending on the level of threat that actually materializes, however, the United States may eventually adopt far more comprehensive measures to protect its borders.

An effective national missile defense may eventually require the United States to withdraw from the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM)

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Treaty—an entirely legal option under the treaty's terms—if it proves impossible to negotiate major changes. The moment for such a withdrawal has not yet arrived, however. National missile defense has become a question of theology rather than policy, especially in an election year. President Clinton was probably right to defer the final decision on this matter, but sooner or later the difficult choice will have to be made. NMD will make sense only if it offers protection, not only against the odd missile from North Korea, Iraq, or Iran, but against America's main rival—China. Finally, a revised Pentagon strategy must acknowledge that the American nuclear arsenal will again become an essential element in defense against and deterrence of WMD attacks against the American homeland.

Achieving conventional dominance, meanwhile, means developing long-term superiority over any potential opponent. This will require investment not only in research and development, but also in actual systems. It may also mean stepping back from traditional but aging weapons systems such as the aircraft carrier or the main battle tank. But these will be prices worth paying. The objective should be to have—and no less important, to be seen to have—a decisive edge over any major competitor, most likely China. To remain dominant over China, the United States must not only shift its attention to the Pacific but also start thinking in entirely new ways about technology, logistics, and operations. For nearly half a century, the American military organized itself to fight a short, extremely intense battle in Europe from large, fixed bases dispersed over relatively short distances. Whatever a future war in Asia might look like, that will not be it. Winning a conflict in Asia will mean long-range warfare, with dispersed, mobile, or concealed basing, and the kinds of forces that can sustain a long, perhaps only intermittently violent, clash in the air, at sea, and in space.

Short-term contingencies are the kinds of conventional conflicts until now covered under the two-MTW concept. But whereas that construct is based on the Gulf War case—envisioning the deployment of a massive, armor-heavy force supported by a vast fleet and hundreds or thousands of aircraft—what is needed now is a much more precisely defined set of scenarios, such as defense against Iraqi or Iranian aggression in the Gulf, against a North Korean attack on South Korea, and, conceivably, the ability to respond to overt Russian action

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against new NATO members. In each case, the kinds of forces needed will be fewer than those posited in current planning.

Finally, the United States needs a real peace-maintenance strategy. International police work is the wayward child that the Pentagon cannot decide whether to embrace (because it is the only job immediately available and because it justifies the current force structure) or reject (because it conflicts with Cold War concepts of what the military exists to do). Posturing by both parties has made the problem worse, as Republicans insist that they would walk away from all peacekeeping or peace-enforcement missions, whereas Democrats are too eager to accept such involvements without conceding the long-term problems they pose for the defense establishment.

Executing all four types of missions outlined above will involve making tradeoffs, which current Pentagon models do not accept—at least in a forthright way. For example, the kinds of units required for peacekeeping—military police, civil affairs detachments, even lowly water-purification units—are very different from those needed for conventional warfare. Training for and conducting operations that emphasize political action with only severely limited uses of force over long periods of time is at odds with the fast and intense bursts of violence that work best in conventional war.

What will make such a four-pronged strategy even more difficult to prepare for are the political obstacles to speaking plainly about these issues. To openly accept America's long-term peacekeeping role is to expose oneself to a barrage of criticism from Capitol Hill—even if the party in opposition would otherwise be just as likely to send peacekeepers abroad as one's own. Meanwhile, justifying long-term investments in conventional military power will mean naming potential opponents. That will be no small feat. Even during the Cold War, the Pentagon sometimes resorted to a coy euphemism, "the Threat," when talking about the Soviet Union. Today a far greater difficulty looms, for China is not simply an adversary: the United States has a large economic interest in its well-being. Identifying it as America's primary strategic opponent will provoke the ire not merely of those who think goodwill can reduce or eliminate the need for saber-rattling, but also of the bankers, merchants, entrepreneurs, and managers of multi-billion-dollar companies who see China as a market of unlimited

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potential. China's leaders, talented as they are at manipulating foreigners' guilt and greed, will play to the ambivalence, anxiety, and avarice of the West, aided by some of the most talented lobbyists money can buy. Like it or not, the United States must identify its potential competitors or opponents by name. Unless it does, Washington will continue to buy the wrong hardware for the wrong war.

BETTER BUYING

ALTHOUGH PENTAGON planning documents and reporting seem to recognize that the Cold War is indeed long gone, in truth it lives on—even in the subtle metal alloys, exotic carbon fibers, and superabundant silicon chips that make up America's machines of war. The Army, for example, still wants to buy a 55-ton self-propelled howitzer—even though it could hardly hope to deploy it in a timely or ample fashion to the obscure parts of the world where it will actually have to go. At the same time, the Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps still hope to spend about $200 billion on the joint strike fighter—a short-range airplane that can deliver only limited quantities of ordnance on target and that would probably be inadequate for the long-range missions ahead.

To be fair, military technology often serves functions that the original designers and manufacturers never even imagined. Still, hardware is the inanimate reflection of strategic assumptions. For half a century, those assumptions were that the United States would fight the next war from extensive fixed bases in Western Europe, against a large conventional force attacking in a relatively compact and heavily built-up landscape. But those assumptions now need to change. And new equipment must take advantage of contemporary technologies.

As it stands, the American military's current hardware is suited to only one of today's four main missions: fighting short-term conflicts. Yet the military will have problems with even that. The hardware requires relatively long periods of time to deploy or pre-position in quantity in distant theaters. It also requires ample logistical support and secure base areas. The vast supply dumps of the Gulf War and the crowded taxiways of the Aviano air base during the Kosovo conflict typify that old American way of waging war—and its vulnerability as well.

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As for the other three strategic missions that the United States should be preparing for, these will require very different kinds of technology. Homeland defense, the first of these missions, will call for not only some kind of national missile defense, but also industrial resources and stockpiles of both mundane and exotic items—vaccines, protective suits, and all the other paraphernalia needed for what is known as "consequence management." Conventional dominance, particularly against China, will involve long-range forces, primarily aerial and naval, that could cope with events such as an assault on Taiwan. U.S. conventional forces should be tailored to handle the vast distances and more complicated basing problems of the Pacific, rather than the well-developed and more familiar terrain of Europe and the Persian Gulf. As for peace maintenance, this requires long-endurance manned or unmanned aircraft to monitor and control airspace (as the United States has done for almost a decade now in Iraq), surveillance and monitoring equipment, and a kit for urban warfare not yet seen in the dusty valley of the Army's National Training Center.

Cancelling obsolete weapons programs will show the defense industry that this revolution is for real.

To start making these changes, the next U.S. administration should first make some dramatic cancellations. Crusader (the Army's monster artillery piece) and the joint strike fighter are two prime candidates for such cuts. Meanwhile, the B-2 production line may need to be reopened, a variety of unmanned aerial vehicle programs should be pressed, and the Navy should be compelled to experiment with the arsenal ship—a large container for various cruise and ballistic missiles that are invaluable for the kinds of strike missions that have characterized real (as opposed to hypothesized) missions in the past decade. Even if the defense budget goes up, as it ought to, the ruthless retirement of old systems (such as the creaky B-52 bomber, older generation M-1 tanks, and squadrons of F-16s) will help pay for the new systems. More important, purging obsolete hardware will show the armed services and the defense industry that Washington is finally serious about the "revolution in military affairs."

To construct the hardware it needs, the U.S. military must more effectively tap the exploding civilian technology market. In doing so,

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however, it will need to bear at least two things in mind. First, experimental technology is just that—experimental, and thus prone to (sometimes expensive) failures. Yet the current research and development system has nothing like the tolerance for risk that characterized the American military-industrial complex in the 1950s and 1960s, when extraordinarily complex systems like the Polaris sea-launched missile and its land-based counterpart, the Minuteman, went from concept to operating capability in roughly five years. Moreover, for experimental technologies to work, they must be tested in the field, and in numbers large enough for troops to learn how to use them. Simply spending money on R&D but then skimping on acquisition until a crisis arises would do a disservice both to the defense industry, which makes money on production, not R&D, and to the military itself, which trusts only hardware it has used in the field.

Second, Washington should recognize how the defense industry has changed. The pell-mell consolidation of the defense establishment in the last decade has produced a much smaller yet more unwieldy and far more conservative military-industrial complex than existed ever before. Washington should take note of this trend and its consequences and ensure that from now on it has at least two suppliers of military aircraft, advanced electronics, and large ships. The military is almost the only buyer in the U.S. defense market. Its indifference to the contraction of its supplier base has left it captive to a handful of large companies that make their money not by coming up with new products, but by churning out old ones.

PEOPLE POWER

GETTING THE RIGHT EQUIPMENT will be hard enough. But the Pentagon's largest challenge lies at its heart: how to reform the structures within which it operates and that govern the 1,380,000 people who fill its ranks in uniform and its 700,000 civilian employees. Problems today exist at three levels: the very top, the intermediate institutions of the services and their large commands, and the individual personnel system. All three need to change.

The leadership structure of today's military was molded by the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of

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1986. The law strengthened the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Joint Staff at the expense of the individual services and, unintentionally, of the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD). This reorganization fulfilled a vision first conceived by General George C. Marshall and the Army staff in the midst of World War II: a powerful, centralized military command in Washington presiding over theater commanders in chief who wield a great deal of influence over local matters and, less directly, over defense policy at home.

In the years since 1986, proponents and critics of the Goldwater-Nichols Act have overstated both its good and bad points. The act did, to some extent, abate the mixture of deadlock and compromise that made getting crisp military advice from service chiefs a frustrating affair. It also ratified, symbolically and practically, a simple fact: the services would henceforth begin overlapping and interacting to an ever greater extent. It made the Joint Staff—the bureaucracy of officers from all services who constitute the country's central military staff—report directly to the chairman, turning it into a far more effective organization. And it gave a voice to theater commanders who could now exercise unified control over the forces in their arena without having to wage guerrilla warfare against service chiefs in Washington. These were all very real benefits.

The act's negative consequences, however, were no less real. By making "jointness" (that is, inter-service cooperation) a matter of dogma rather than good sense in all cases, it paved the way for more logrolling, favor-trading, and a least-common-denominator approach. It does not always make sense for the different branches of the military to work together. There are, for example, many cases in which the needs of the different services mandate disparate approaches to the acquisition of military technology (unmanned aircraft being one such instance where the requirements of the four services differ utterly).

The act also threatened to reduce to one (namely, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs) the channels for giving military advice to civilian leadership. Under the act, the chairman can effectively exclude the individual service chiefs of staff from advising the secretary of defense. By elevating the Joint Staff without also strengthening the OSD, the legislation actually weakened civilian power and authority—to the point

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that the OSD and Joint Staff often attend interagency meetings offering separate Department of Defense views on what ought to be done.

By increasing the influence and prestige of the theater commanders in chief—who focus, understandably, on the emergencies of the moment and the likely contingencies of the next year or two (their tour of duty)—the act also undermined advocates of long-term investment and experimentation, who traditionally reside in the service bureaucracies. Finally, the legislation created a joint officer promotion system that rewards ticket-punching tours on staffs over field command, creating a personnel system that was not only inflexible, but also biased against operational expertise.

The four services will remain the foundations of U.S. military power long into the future.

Given these flaws, the time is now ripe for a revision of the Goldwater-Nichols Act. Its deformation of the personnel system, in particular, requires examination—especially its rigid requirements for so-called joint tours. The emergence in September 1999 of a Joint Forces Command as the nominal proponent for long-term defense innovation also needs review. In theory, the JFC should be the incubator of military experimentation and innovation; in practice, it has not served that function, nor has it done much more than serve as an irritant to service initiatives along the same lines. Although the role of the chairman as the leading military adviser to the government should be preserved, revised legislation should give the civilian leadership more leeway to turn to other senior military figures for consultation. Furthermore, means must be found to strengthen the Office of the Secretary of Defense, including making it more attractive to senior civil servants and streamlining the processes of appointing qualified political candidates.

The individual services—which for more than two decades now have been cast as the myopic and parochial enemies of sound military policy—still retain responsibility to train and equip their forces. This is as it should be. Despite criticism, most notably from Admiral William Owens, former vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the services remain the custodians of military culture, training and education, basic technology development and acquisition, and, most important, the long view of military power. "Jointness" notwithstanding, the

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individual services will remain the foundations of military organization as far as the eye can see. The truth is that the physical environments in which the armed forces operate differ radically from one another, and what sometimes goes by the name of parochialism is often a rational—if occasionally narrow—reaction to the different challenges posed by operating at sea, on the land, or in the air.

The problem with today's military, then, is not the fact that it has discrete services, but the fact that segments of the services often work at cross-purposes. The services cling to established ways of war, and to combinations of technology, organization, and personnel systems that have come to acquire value in and of themselves—even if they are no longer entirely functional. At the same time, each service contains dissident or innovative groups of officers who are keen to experiment with new techniques that might cause as great a dislocation as the mechanization of horse cavalry, say, or the displacement of the battleship by the aircraft carrier. Civilian leaders should cultivate and support these innovators. Some Air Force generals are eager to see unmanned aerial vehicles supplement if not replace fighter aircraft; some Army generals would replace traditional heavy forces with hybrids of light infantry and long-range precision-fire systems; some admirals would invest in flotillas of semi-submersible ships that would serve as little more than barges carrying dense arrays of cruise and ballistic missiles. Behind them are far greater numbers of junior officers ready to experiment with the technologies and operational concepts that can make such notions reality.

The challenge is not, therefore, to suppress the services, but rather to open them up. And the best way to do this is through the oft-despised service secretaries—the civilian heads of the Army, Navy, and Air Force. In the past, many of these individuals received their positions as political payoffs for party or personal loyalty to the president, and many of them limit their role to that of cheerleaders and advocates for the organizations to which they have been assigned. Rarely have they made an enduring mark. Small wonder that reformers often call for the abolition of these throwbacks to the days before defense unification.

But abolition would be an error. The secretaries can provide a new administration with one of its greatest points of leverage in molding

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a new Pentagon—but only if they view their job properly. If they do so, the secretaries can perform two invaluable functions in particular. First, they can serve as impartial observers of institutions that—unlike so many others in the modern world—are led exclusively by men and women who have spent their entire working lives in the same institution. The secretaries also can and should enforce the policies of their administration on their reluctant service.

Second, the secretaries have the chance to get to know their service and its leaders far better than any other civilian. They should therefore be given the determining voice in selecting officers for promotion, particularly at the general or admiral ranks. Civilian leaders cannot change military institutions by fiat; they must work with like-minded officers. It is the business of civilian leaders to pick the right military leaders, and that requires the kind of time and attention that only the service secretaries—as opposed to the harried secretary of defense and his or her staff—can provide.

To the extent that civilians can control the Department of Defense, they do so less by issuing edicts (which can be evaded, watered down, or delayed by the military and civil service bureaucracy) than by grooming and selecting internal leadership. But they have another, often ignored point of purchase: the military's education system. Officers spend as much as a third of their careers in classrooms. Yet what goes on there receives remarkably little attention from civilian leaders. And when it does get attention, secretaries of defense still seem more concerned with managing the consequences of 20-year-olds cheating at a service academy than with figuring out whether 40-year-olds have thought about improving their professions. Yet never has military education been more important, for rarely has the quality of military thought mattered so much.

The American military today faces challenges certainly more complex, if in some respects less daunting, than those of the Cold War. To understand the politics of obscure corners of the world, to integrate shimmering, darting information technologies, and to create new systems of organization and discipline, the military needs first-rate thinkers. And yet, when one asks who are America's strategic thinkers in uniform, one draws a blank. Move beyond the more technical aspects of military craft, and the ranks are dismayingly thin.

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The U.S. military's educational institutions are relics of the Cold War, devoted primarily to producing well-rounded practitioners, experts in tactics and familiar with the broader aspects of strategy. They are not, however, incubators of military change. Service on their military faculties usually indicates a career coming to an end, and officers who acquire doctorates or write books do so as a hobby—often at the expense of their careers rather than to their benefit. Civilian leaders need to review and, if necessary, overhaul the military educational system, particularly for senior officers. One step might be the creation of one or two joint graduate institutions of military art modeled on the Army's School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS), an elite program for operational planners that follows the standard one year of command and staff college. Such a school would require stable, possibly civilian, leadership (presidents of the war colleges currently change at least every three years) and should truly integrate the services—unlike SAMS or the service war colleges, which merit thorough re-examination themselves.

The military today faces challenges more complex than during the Cold War.

The low-level recruiting and retention crisis of recent years—much discussed in the presidential campaign—has forced several of the services to either miss their quotas or reduce the quality of those they take in. In the late 1990s, the Army and the Navy fell short of recruiting goals by as much as ten percent and were forced to start accepting non–high school graduates. Attrition rates for officers of all ranks up to colonel rose, as the promising junior and middle management of the services left early—not because their pay lagged behind the private sector (although it does, and the differentials are growing) but because of frustration with the way they were managed and an erosion of funds for high-quality training.

To some extent these problems merely reflect the health of the economy. But they also result from a deeper malaise and a growing disjunction between military and civilian life—one that requires attention. The Navy has only in recent years come around—grudgingly, and with opposition yet to be overcome—to the notion that it makes more sense to use private contractors to chip paint in port than to

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have sailors, some of whom are highly trained technologists, do it. As this suggests, the "conscription mentality," as Secretary of the Navy Richard Danzig has called it, is far from dead. The services have yet to create personnel structures that would give men and women in uniform something like the career flexibility of their civilian counterparts. Some concepts—lateral entry at the higher ranks, for example, or moving senior officers across services—may be too much to hope for, but still merit exploration. The services must also make it easier for young people to serve in the military, leave for a number of years, and return without suffering for so doing.

Most delicate of all, civilian leaders must get at the root of junior and mid-level officers' distrust of the senior leadership—a problem currently denied at the top but the subject of constant discussion lower down. Radical changes may be under way. The mass army of the nineteenth century drew on large numbers of poorly paid conscripts or volunteers, managed and trained by noncommissioned officers and led by middle-class officers. That model of military personnel works less well today, however. New hybrid kinds of organization—militarized civilian contractors—have emerged to provide logistical support and training, and soon, perhaps, to operate combat systems as well. This development should be pushed even further, for it is clear that the military life appeals to an ever narrower segment of a highly developed society.

Today the overburdened American military emphasizes doing, not thinking. Yet never was thinking more necessary. The country's armed services are extraordinarily busy. They wage a low-level war in Iraq (barely noticed in the newspapers), patrol the streets of Kosovo, cruise the South China Sea, and train peacekeepers for Sierra Leone and antinarcotics commandos in Colombia. Despite stories about soldiers on food stamps (in most cases, parents with substantial families who had no business joining the military at the bottom to begin with), they are reasonably, if not lavishly paid. The military's equipment remains good, if aging. No one else can match its ability to do big things in distant places. Yet it suffers a pervasive, palpable malaise. Evidence for this abounds: for example, one Army study of officers at its elite command and staff college concluded, "Top-down loyalty doesn't exist.... Senior leaders will throw subordinates under

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the bus in a heartbeat to protect or advance their careers." Such discomfort stems from many sources: a sense of relative deprivation, compared to what equally talented people can do in the new American economy; mistrust of the senior military leadership; uncertainty of purpose in the absence of an enemy; wearisome deployments; and a sense of intellectual and doctrinal stagnation. The next president and secretary of defense may ignore or paper over these discontents for another four or eight years; they may also continue to repair, upgrade, and replace the old array of Cold War hardware. Should they continue the process indefinitely, however, a reckoning will come, a humiliation—possibly, a bloody humiliation—for a global hegemonic power that still fears to admit to itself that it polices the world.

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Beyond Border Control

Stephen E. Flynn

TEARING DOWN THE WALLS

LAST DECEMBER, as year 2000 celebrations approached, Americans got a case of the pre-holiday jitters when news broke that an Algerian terrorist with suspected ties to Osama bin Laden had been arrested in Port Angeles, Washington. Ahmed Ressam had arrived in the United States from Vancouver in a car loaded with bomb-making materials. Only a U.S. Customs Service official's unease with the way Ressam answered her questions prevented him from driving onto American soil. What was most surprising about Ressam's arrest was that he was detected and apprehended at all—one man amid the 475 million people, 125 million vehicles, and 21.4 million import shipments that came into the country last year. The United States has nearly 100,000 miles of shoreline and almost 6,000 miles of borders with its neighbors. People and goods arrive daily at more than 3,700 terminals in 301 ports of entry. Intercepting the ripples of danger in this tidal wave of commerce is about as likely as winning a lottery.

The global economy's movement toward more open societies and liberalized economies does not just facilitate the movement of products and workers—it also expedites passage for terrorists, small arms, drugs, illegal immigrants, and disease. The obvious solution to the challenge of filtering the bad from the good might seem to be increased funding for border controls. On the face of it, such an

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investment would appear logical. Stopping threats at the frontier is better than trying to cope with them once inside the country; customs officials also have the strongest legal authority for inspecting and searching people and goods. Accordingly, if there are more people and goods to police, there should be more agents and security forces along the border to do so.

But efforts to bolster regulatory, enforcement, and security operations at busy borders may result in a cure worse than the disease. Such endeavors place governments on a collision course with easy trade, which is key to the sustained expansion and integration of the global economy. Most successful enterprises need to move workers and products quickly, reliably, and affordably around the planet. Delays associated with intensified inspections along borders undermine the competitiveness of exports by raising transaction costs. Overseas buyers are likely to avoid ports where there is a heightened risk that products will arrive damaged, spoiled, or late. And rapid, hassle-free immigration controls are essential to both global business and tourism.

Fortunately, there is an alternative to long queues and intrusive border inspections, but it requires creative thinking on the parts of the private sector, states, and international bodies. The sights of regulation and enforcement must be set beyond national borders. Properly confronting new threats without disrupting business requires a three-part paradigm shift. First, rather than relying on a hodgepodge of controls at national borders, countries must tighten security within the international transportation and logistics system to reduce the risk that importers, exporters, freight forwarders, and transportation carriers will serve as conduits for criminals or terrorists. Second, states must urge international companies to develop transparent systems for tracking regional and global commercial flows, so that regulators and enforcement officials can conduct "virtual" audits of inbound traffic well before it arrives. And third, border agencies need faster and stronger capabilities to gather intelligence and manage data. A well-informed customs and immigration agent can identify and target high-risk goods and people for inspection while quickly and confidently processing those that pose less of a danger.

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THE PRICE OF TRADE

MOST AMERICANS—particularly those clamoring for more vigorous border enforcement—have little appreciation for the scale and sophistication of the logistical backbone underpinning global commerce. Take the automotive industry, for example. General Motors, Ford, and DaimlerChrysler buy some of the parts to build their cars and trucks from suppliers in the Canadian province of Ontario. The contract requires that within as little as six hours from receipt of an order, these Canadian suppliers must have made their deliveries to the assembly plants in the United States. Delivery trucks are loaded so that parts meant for specific vehicles can be unloaded and placed directly on the appropriate chassis as it moves down the assembly line. This "just-in-time" delivery system has given the Big Three a more cost-effective and efficient production process. But the resulting savings could evaporate with a delay at the border. If trucks carrying the parts for a Ford Explorer are stuck in an inspection queue, assembly plants can quickly fall idle, with costs running as high as $1 million per hour.

The need to move beyond old-fashioned border control becomes apparent on visiting a major port of entry. Five inspectors take, on average, three hours to conduct a thorough physical inspection of a loaded 40-foot container. Even with the assistance of new high-tech sensors, there will never be enough inspectors or sufficient hours in the day to inspect the cargo arriving in places like the Port of Long Beach, California, which received more than one million inbound containers in 1999 (more than double 1995 levels). Nor is it possible to check all the inbound vehicles at the world's busiest commercial land-border crossing—the Ambassador Bridge between Detroit, Michigan, and Windsor, Ontario—where a record-breaking 7,000 trucks entered the United States on a single day in February 2000. At these rates, U.S. Customs officials must clear one container every 20 seconds in southern California, and one truck every 12 seconds in Detroit.

Even if the number of inspectors were to rise in proportion to the growth in traffic, there is little room for trucks or containers to wait for inspection. The explosion in international trade is pushing port, bridge, rail, and road infrastructures to their capacity and beyond. Congestion along the access routes, within port and airport terminals,

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and at border crossings is becoming more commonplace. For instance, the parking lot for secondary and tertiary inspections at Detroit's Ambassador Bridge can accommodate only 90 tractor-trailers at a time. Although it might be possible to double the number of inspectors doing primary inspections, there is no room for the labor-intensive and time-consuming follow-ups. Once the parking lot fills, trucks back up onto the bridge. The resulting pileup virtually closes the border, generating roadway chaos throughout metropolitan Windsor and Detroit.

After making massive investments to improve their transportation systems, companies now want the state to do its part.

Faced with these volumes, the U.S. Customs Service must still monitor compliance with more than 400 laws and 34 international treaties, statutes, agreements, and conventions on behalf of 40 federal agencies. One of the Customs Service's top priorities is to interdict illicit narcotics—a daunting task when one considers that all the pure cocaine to feed America's annual coke habit could be transported in just 15 40-foot containers. As the southern California and Detroit statistics make clear, drug traffickers have more and more haystacks in which to hide their contraband needles. Nationally, 16.4 million trucks and more than 5 million loaded 40-foot maritime containers entered the United States in 1999, and trade is expected to more than double in the next two decades.

Rising volumes are not the only consequence of economic globalization making the lives of border control agents so difficult. In addition, agents must bear in mind that delayed shipment clearance raises costs for any business that engages in cross-border trade—and few companies can survive today without at least a minimum level of participation in other countries' markets. Media and scholarly discussions about the wonders of the modern global economy are ubiquitous, but most dwell on liberalized trade rules and the rapid spread of information-age technologies. Not enough attention goes to affordable and reliable transportation, the third leg of the global-market stool. Legal access to a distant client and instantaneous ordering will mean very little if the number of hours required, expense, and uncertainty of these transactions are high. Only efficient and rapid transportation can

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render large distances irrelevant; only when distance means little in economic terms does the construction of global assembly lines become possible.

More and more firms in a diverse array of industries are finding themselves (and their profit margins) dependent on international transportation. To retain their competitive edge, international companies must outsource production, have ready access to customers worldwide, and invest in new technologies to adapt the production process to its widening geographical breadth. The automotive giants' just-in-time delivery system, one such adaptation, means that the automakers do not need large inventory reserves to guarantee that the assembly line keeps running. Inventory guarantees that supply will be available to meet demand. But maintaining large stockpiles of goods consumes capital and may be wasteful if they sit around forever. According to one industry study based on U.S. Commerce Department sales and inventory reports for 1997, the total value of retail sales in the United States for that year was $2.6 trillion. To support these sales, retailers, merchant wholesalers, and manufacturers held $300 billion, $250 billion, and $450 billion in inventory, respectively—a total of $1 trillion. In order to help lower this cost, logistics and transportation providers are investing in faster and more efficient shipping, aviation, rail, and trucking fleets; constructing seamless chains; consolidating distribution networks; upgrading warehouse management systems; and incorporating state-of-the-art tracking, communications, and database technologies. This "value-chain inventory opportunity" is a powerful driver of the transportation and logistics revolutions.

After making such massive capital outlays in technology and infrastructure, companies now want the state to do its part to enhance the savings and efficiency resulting from these private-sector investments. Not surprisingly, customs, immigration, and other officials are finding themselves under mounting pressure to improve the "facilitation" of transborder flows. After all, a just-in-time delivery system works only if the goods actually do arrive just in time.

Large corporations are not the only ones that would suffer in a world of heavily policed borders. Developing countries would be worse off as well, especially those hoping that export development

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will lead them to future prosperity. In Central Asia, through which 40 percent of the heroin consumed in western Europe flows, Uzbekistan has been busy installing electronic sensors, erecting barbed-wire barricades, and mobilizing its military to patrol its once largely open borders with neighboring Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. Although it is unclear if such measures will succeed in blockading illicit drugs, they certainly keep the region's prospects for cross-border trade and cooperation at a distance. For those developing countries that find their exports all dressed up with no place to go, the benefits of opening up to the world will not materialize. This, in turn, might lead to greater civil unrest, higher emigration, and a backlash against globalization. Thus unilateral border-control initiatives that disrupt the flow of trade and travel could end up fueling the very flames of transnational threats that led to the adoption of tighter controls in the first place.

CLEAR AND PRESENT DANGER

ADVOCATES of better-policed borders are battling against rising volume and mounting pressure for expedited customs clearance. Even if they somehow prevail against the powerful market forces arrayed against them, their victory will prove hollow. The economic costs of supply-chain disruption would be huge. On the other hand, if the market prevails and border controls collapse—leaving no suitable security alternative in place—the resulting price in insecurity may also be more than most societies are willing to pay.

As the December 1999 Port Angeles terrorist arrest made clear, Americans have reason to worry about the porousness of their borders. Considering that more than 2.7 million undocumented immigrants have succeeded in entering the United States simply by walking, swimming, or riding across the Mexican and Canadian borders, a terrorist could just as easily slip by the Border Patrol and the Immigration and Naturalization Service. Five to ten million pounds of chlorofluorocarbons are smuggled into the United States each year to supply the large black market for these ozone-depleting products, so it is probably a safe bet that a few pounds of a deadly biological or chemical agent could make their way into the United States undetected. One of the

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dark jokes circulating through the Pentagon is that if a terrorist wants to smuggle a weapon of mass destruction into the United States, the best place to hide it would be in a shipment of illicit drugs.

American concern over the spread of weapons of mass destruction may soon translate into an investment of more than $60 billion in ballistic missile defense. But why should a rogue state or terrorist organization invest in ballistic missile technologies when a weapon of mass destruction could be loaded into a container and sent anywhere in the world? Osama bin Laden could have a front company in Karachi, Pakistan, load a biological agent into a container ultimately destined for Newark, New Jersey, with virtually no risk that it would be intercepted. He could use a Pakistani exporter with an established record of trade in the United States. The container could then be sent via Singapore or Hong Kong to mingle with the half a million containers that are handled by each of these ports every month. It could arrive in the United States via Long Beach or Los Angeles and be loaded directly onto a railcar or truck for the transcontinental trip. Current regulations do not require an importer to file a cargo manifest with U.S. Customs until the cargo reaches its "entry" port—in this case, Newark, 2,800 miles of American territory away from where it first entered the country—and the importer is permitted 30 days' transit time to make the trip to the East Coast. The container could be diverted or the weapon activated anywhere en route, long before its contents were even identified as having entered the country.

Let us hope such a scenario will be only grist for a future Tom Clancy novel. But if such an incident did take place, the political repercussions would be swift and brutal. All eyes would turn to Capitol Hill for the congressional postmortem. The public would be outraged when the U.S. Customs commissioner testified that routine practice allows 40-foot containers with multi-ton shipments to roam around the United States for up to 30 days without anyone declaring the contents or the sender. At a minimum, one could expect a serious public backlash against the current systems that facilitate trade, travel, and commerce. The political base for global liberalization could be severely and irreparably eroded.

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UNITE AND CONQUER

POLICYMAKERS may soon find themselves in a rather tight spot. Calls for greater vigilance in ports of entry and along national frontiers will be met by private-sector warnings of the dire economic consequences of disrupting the global supply chain. The only way around this potential deadlock requires the private sector to become a part of the solution. The age when improving border security meant simply reinforcing national reporting and inspection processes is past. Reforms must instead work backward from "point of entry" controls to the networks that take goods from their "point of origin" toward their destination. If greater security and accountability can be embedded within transportation networks, then much of the traffic can be audited, cleared for entry, or targeted for inspection well before it arrives at national borders.

It is in an international firm's own interest to clean up the logistical quagmire of its transportation procedures. The same competition driving just-in-time delivery also mandates greater levels of oversight and control throughout the international transportation process. Virtual global assembly lines with minimally stocked shelves require a degree of logistical choreography impossible just a few years ago. Given the high costs associated with cargo losses or delays, managers want guarantees that goods will arrive by the date specified in the contract. Transportation and logistics firms have responded by embracing new tagging, tracking, communications, and information technologies that make it possible to monitor in near real time the flow of products and passengers as they move from their points of origin to their final destinations. Shipper Web sites, such as those developed by the Ohio-based Roadway Express, provide customers with their own personal home page where they can monitor all their active shipments aboard the company's global positioning system–equipped trucking fleet, including their current locations and a constantly updated estimate of the expected delivery times.

Security concerns also receive new priority in the global marketplace, since the importance of guaranteeing delivery has placed a premium on tightening safeguards within the transportation industry. According to the National Cargo Security Council, American

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companies lost $10 billion in stolen cargo in 1999. The computer industry has been particularly hard hit, with theft and insurance costs adding an estimated ten percent to the cost of the average personal computer. Sixty high-tech companies with combined annual revenues of $750 billion have responded by forming the Technology Asset Protection Association (TAPA). Founded in 1997, TAPA has identified a comprehensive set of security practices to govern the shipment of members' supplies and products. If a freight forwarder or carrier wants to do business with any of TAPA's well-heeled members, they must adopt these practices.

Surging global trade creates new security risks that will require new global safeguards.

Thus market pressures are mounting for the transportation and logistics industries to embrace standards and adopt processes that can make some border-control activities redundant or irrelevant. In response to these pressures, companies are becoming better able to implement safeguards, police themselves, and provide useful and timely information necessary for public security—information that states have traditionally tried to verify independently at border crossings. Theft-proof transportation networks are more difficult for criminals and terrorists to compromise. Should there be advance intelligence of such a compromise, these computer systems will make it easier to locate and interdict a contaminated shipment before it enters a crowded port; alternatively, authorities can put together a "controlled-delivery" sting operation, where the contraband is allowed to reach the intended recipient so that the appropriate arrests can be made.

These technological innovations could reduce the need for time-consuming and personnel-intensive physical examinations at the border. In principle, government inspectors can remotely examine commercial tracking and monitoring systems for compliance with regulations. If customs agents can verify that a company is using such safety checks when transporting goods and people, they will feel confident enough to allow that cargo expedited passage through border crossings.

To put principle into practice, laws and regulations are needed that compel companies to maintain and provide access to supply-chain information that can assist inspectors in their work. Since border-control activities can cause long and unpredictable holdups, companies

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should be receptive to alternative arrangements that can reduce that disruptive risk. Left to its own devices, it is unlikely that the private sector would willingly allow remote inspections. Happily, however, borders offer governments substantial leverage to encourage international firms to do so. Governments enjoy the power of having the final say over who and what can enter their land—the key is for the state to exploit its power to make or break the success of international supply chains.

Wielding the stick of entry delays or denials over companies that are unwilling to develop viable and transparent security systems, governments could hold out a carrot to those who have made such developments. Manufacturers, freight forwarders, travel agents, carriers, importers, and retailers who maintain tight control over their transportation flows and provide detailed and timely information to support customs and immigration activities would qualify for expedited border passage. Those private-sector actors who facilitate compliance with regulations and reduce the risk of serving as criminal or terrorist conduits could be allowed to move through the equivalent of a trade and travel "E-Z lane," garnering the benefits of lower transportation costs by way of prescreening and clearance through border entry points. Border-control agents would continue to conduct spot checks to ensure compliance, but the overwhelming majority of these goods and people would be allowed to travel with few restrictions. Private-sector actors who were unwilling to adopt the requisite security and transparency systems could inch through the "slow lane" of traditional inspections as they move across borders. Similarly, private-sector actors who have signed up for the E-Z lane but fail to comply with its mandates would, at a minimum, be placed back in the slow lane for a probationary period.

THE NEW FRONTIER

The U.S. Customs Service has taken some tentative steps toward such a preventive approach to border control. Rather than taking a gamble on waiting to intercept illicit drugs at the border, given the daunting odds of identifying and intercepting narcotics at a busy port of entry, the agency has sought to lower the risk of drugs' entering the transportation processes upstream. Beginning in 1998, the Customs Service launched the Americas Counter Smuggling Initiative (ACSI), which sends customs

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officers throughout Latin America to assist exporters, carriers, manufacturers, and other businesses in developing and implementing security programs to reduce their risk of being exploited by drug smugglers. As an incentive for participation, the Customs Service agrees to reduce penalties should a company's good-faith efforts prove less than foolproof.

To lower congestion at the border, U.S. Customs has also begun experimenting with an automated clearance system that encourages carriers to provide advance customs documentation electronically. Revenue Canada, the Canadian customs agency, adopted a similar program in 1991 for single-load trucks. Companies that enroll in these programs and comply with their mandates receive immediate release of the cargo when their conveyances arrive at the border.

Although these systems are designed primarily for high-volume, low-risk shippers, the approach could be readily applied to the movements of people as well. The promise of expedited immigration processing through airports and borders could encourage frequent travelers to carry a "smart" passport containing immunization records, travel history, or handprint or even retina information. Such a system is already in place in Bermuda, where IBM has developed the FastGate immigration "smart" card system aimed at shortening passport queues. Passengers who want to bypass the normal immigration procedures can encode passport details and an identifying handprint on something resembling an ATM card. On arriving at the airport, passengers must swipe their card through a machine and place their hands on an electronic reader before proceeding.

As the FastGate system suggests, the days of tedious, paperbound, labor-intensive border inspection systems—the bane of every legitimate international traveler and business—should be numbered. The time losses and geographic constraints inherent in traditional border-control practices guarantee their continuing inability to tame the surge in international commerce and the growing array of threats that confound the international system.

The days of private-sector opposition to all reporting and inspection requirements—criticized as bad for the bottom line—should be over as well. Although existing methods are often inept and at times even counterproductive, states have important and legitimate reasons to control their borders. Governments need to manage the flows of contraband such as weapons, drugs, and child pornography. Immigration policies require

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that states possess the means to regulate who enters and who leaves their jurisdictions. Many public-health strategies aimed at managing the spread of disease require the identification and isolation of people, livestock, and agricultural products that could place the general population at risk. Safety and environmental threats connected with unsafe shipping and trucking mandate that the transportation sector be monitored. And particularly in the developing world, many states continue to rely on the collection of import duties as an important source of government revenue.

Cooperative international mechanisms for policing trade flows are needed to enforce and substantiate arms control agreements and economic sanctions. Lengthy negotiations on export controls for nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons are meaningless without effective impediments to the cross-border transfer of restricted materials and technologies. And although the international community continues to roll out economic sanctions to demonstrate disapproval with wayward states, these sanctions have teeth only to the extent that proscribed imports and exports are actually prevented from entering or exiting the targeted country.

In short, virtually all of the imperatives that have made border control a critical mission for states in the past remain operative today. What is different now is that commercial and social patterns of interaction are becoming more dynamic, organic, and transnational. As such, the traditional means at states' disposal are proving insufficient to enforce the many national and international rules and to advance important security and public policy interests. Absent a follow-on act, the late-twentieth-century triumph of capitalist markets and democratic institutions may prove short-lived.

The growing crisis of border control suggests that global economic activity risks becoming like the robber-baron capitalism of the nineteenth century. In that era, the private sector tried to avoid responsibility for the negative effects of its commercial activities. At the same time, public institutions were unable to keep up with the scope, pace, and complexity of the public-policy challenges spawned by the implications of the commercial explosion. The result was massive economic dislocation. History will repeat itself unless the major beneficiaries of our increasingly open global society take responsibility for the welfare of a free and stable international system.

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Vietnam's Contradictions

Andrew J. Pierre

NOT A SYNDROME, BUT A COUNTRY

IN NOVEMBER, President Clinton will become the first U.S. president to set foot in a unified Vietnam. His visit will finally draw American attention to a country that is vastly different from the one many remember. Contemporary Vietnam is characterized by paradoxes and contradictions. The bustling streets of Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City are packed with youth on Honda Dream motorbikes, weaving between the bicycle-taxis and the many peddlers balancing enormous pyramids of vegetables or other wares. The energy is palpable: 60 percent of Vietnam's population is under 30 years of age, and 85 percent is under 40.

But first impressions are often misleading, and appearances frequently deceive. The vibrant and hard-working younger Vietnamese love to congregate at the many "cybercafes" or more modest street-front computer rental shops. But this country of 80 million people—the 12th most populous in the world—still has fewer than 60,000 Internet subscribers, two-thirds of which are ministries and other governmental or Communist Party institutions. An hour on the Internet costs more than the average Vietnamese earns in a day (per capita GNP in 1999 was $320). When one looks into those cybercafes and sees very little "surfing" going on (a lot of word-processing and games

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instead), the Internet revolution appears a long way from opening Vietnamese society to the outside world.

In the early to mid-1990s, the Vietnamese economy seemed to be opening, and many foreign investors rushed in with high expectations of future growth. But as a result of Vietnam's three-year-old economic decline, these investors have mostly disappeared. The newly built hotels and office buildings that now stand empty starkly symbolize the lowered expectations.

Many Vietnamese would welcome the economic opportunities that increased foreign investment would create. But the country's leadership has been hesitant to open the economy. Frequent warnings cite the dangers of "peaceful evolution," a term used to deride those perceived as seeking to discredit communism by advocating the "Western" values of capitalism, democracy, and human rights. Vietnam has yet to reconcile its centrally controlled economy, one-party political system, and historic fear of foreign interaction with the growing pressures for change in a rapidly globalizing world.

PRESENT-DAY PARADOXES

THE END of what the Vietnamese call the "American war" was a truly epochal triumph for the North. Independence was finally won in 1975 after a century of struggle against the French, the Chinese, the Japanese, and ultimately the Americans. Hanoi was the cockpit of this fight and is now the nation's capital; Ho Chi Minh, the nation's deeply venerated founder, lies here in a mausoleum fully equal to Lenin's on Red Square. But on April 30, 2000—the 25th anniversary of the final victory against the United States and South Vietnam's "liberation" from foreign influences—Hanoi lay eerily quiet. Ho Chi Minh City (formerly Saigon, the capital of South Vietnam) hosted the major ceremony instead. The authorities' tight control over the day's festivities belied the populist rhetoric celebrating the "people's uprising." The official explanation for keeping the celebration inside the gates of the Palace of Reunification, formerly the presidential palace, was the wish to keep the costs down. But limiting the setting also protected against possible political demonstrations.

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AP/WIDE WORLD PHOTOS

A facelift for Ho Chi Minh? Marking the 25th anniversary of the end of the Vietnam War, Ho Chi Minh City, April 2000

Another contradiction is that although the North won the battle, the South may yet win the war. A "Northernization" campaign during the first decade after independence included a deliberately brutal policy of land collectivization and forced more than 400,000 people into ideological "re-education" camps for as long as a decade. Tens of thousands were killed and more than 100,000 fled in boats. The government imposed communism on the South and severely curtailed freedom of speech and religious practice. The resulting

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economic tailspin created large pockets of famine, a tragic anomaly in a country rich with agricultural promise.

Today a gradual "Southernization" of the North is becoming visible. The industrial parks on the outskirts of Ho Chi Minh City and the rice paddies of the Mekong delta now drive the national economy, producing two-thirds of the nation's wealth and accounting for 80 percent of its tax revenue. Southern constituents urging privatization, entrepreneurial initiatives, and capitalist ideas are pressuring party politicians and the rigid ministerial bureaucracies of the North to change. The more robust economy of Ho Chi Minh City rewards its inhabitants with considerably higher wages than those earned in the nation's capital. Thus in the struggle for the "hearts and minds" of the people, the former Saigon could win over Hanoi after all.

Leaders fear the political chaos that might follow economic reform.

This battle today lies at the center of Vietnam's greatest paradox: both the Vietnamese people and the leadership want to strengthen the economy and improve the quality of life, but their proposals for how to do so are highly contradictory. The communist leadership talks of the need for a "market-based but socialism-driven structure of economic development." This jumble of Karl Marx and Adam Smith reveals the party's ambivalence about reforming its economic ways. But the population is growing more impatient. A surprisingly rudimentary knowledge of the outside world (the media is tightly controlled and opportunities for travel are few) has not prevented the Vietnamese from understanding that without moves toward a free-market economy, the country will be unable to reap the fruits of globalization and compete economically, even within the Asian region. Indeed, Vietnam is likely to continue its present troubling decline.

The Vietnamese government feels the mounting pressure of the people's concerns, but it also knows that any move toward capitalism would undoubtedly require a simultaneous political step toward a more democratic society. Above all, the party leadership fears social disorder and a loss of control. Globalization, some of Vietnam's top officials believe, could erode the authority of a state and party still based on Marxist-Leninist principles. Throughout the leadership is

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a deeply rooted anxiety that too rapid a pace of change could increase expectations, generate instability, and erode the levers of political control essential to the maintenance of a one-party state.

COMMUNISM À LA VIETNAMESE

THE VIETNAMESE COMMUNIST PARTY (VCP) still pervades all dimensions of life in the country, even if it faces an uncertain future. This dominance is key to understanding contemporary Vietnam. The VCP's exclusive role in government is constitutionally mandated, and advocacy of a multiparty political system is forbidden. Party members control the top echelons in the ministries, the military, the internal security services, the media, and the many state-owned enterprises. Accordingly, drawing a distinction between government and party is close to meaningless. The National Assembly is subject to party direction and the VCP approves most candidates; the judiciary is fully subservient to the government; People's Committees of the VCP begin at the hamlet level and run up through the village, district, province, and so on. In effect, Vietnam's population of 80 million is now ruled by a party membership of approximately 2.5 million.

Vietnam is run by a "troika" of the president, the prime minister, and the general secretary of the VCP. The current top leadership, selected in late 1997 by the 18-member Politburo, was a cautious compromise. Prime Minister Phan Van Khai, an economic reformer, was intended to balance General Secretary Le Kha Phieu, a conservative and dedicated party worker who had climbed the ranks as a political commissar within the army. President Tran Duc Luong stands in the middle. The struggles and secretive inner workings of the Communist Party are arguably even more difficult to fathom than were those of the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, the fissures do not always remain hidden. Le Kha Phieu has emerged as the most aggressive and powerful within the troika and reportedly will seek the presidency in the next reshuffle, due at the Ninth Party Congress in 2001. Meanwhile, Phan Van Khai, having tried and failed to obtain greater political support for economic reform, has offered to resign and is clearly on his way out.

This discord within the triumvirate presents a microcosm of the VCP's current dilemmas. Today the party is divided over the economic

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and political questions that reach to the heart of independent Vietnam's identity. How can it respond to the forces of globalization when the need to adapt the country's command economy to the world marketplace is still in dispute? If the wisdom of established economic doctrine falls into question, how can the party confidently ensure the continued political direction of the nation? This dissonance within the party leadership presents a serious problem because important decisions require the unanimous consent of the Politburo. Dispute frequently leads to paralysis, as evidenced in the yearlong delay in agreeing to the recently signed trade deal with the United States.

Many—though not all—in the VCP's younger generation and even some elder statesmen understand the urgent necessity for economic reform and closer integration into the global economy. But Vietnam is a Confucian society that venerates seniority, and these younger voices speak with less authority than the older leaders. The turnover is low and slow in the all-powerful Politburo, which remains the domain of conservative communists who fear that opening Vietnam would invite capitalism, and perhaps even democracy.

These party elders spent their formative political years successfully fighting for the independence of their country. The legacy they carry is a residual fear of foreign interference, which in turn influences the Vietnamese government's foreign policy: many senior party members instinctively question too much interaction with the outside world. They feel threatened by the emerging transnational forces and "soft power" of the twenty-first-century global system. In a widely noted speech marking the VCP's 70th anniversary, Le Kha Phieu condemned technology-driven globalization and pledged that Vietnam would not "change its colors" of socialism.

The party tapestry, however, is not woven purely of anachronistic threads. Members are also united by the substantial privileges that accompany party affiliation. Good public-sector jobs, better houses, cars, and opportunities for funded overseas travel come with party membership or contacts. Even in the growing but still limited private sector, obtaining the required approvals and licenses from the heavy-handed bureaucracy can be difficult without political assistance. So the VCP continues to attract some of the "best and brightest" of the younger generation, even if they personally care little about its ideology.

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Inevitably, such a culture engenders pervasive corruption. General Tran Do, former head of the Ideology and Culture Department of the VCP's Central Committee, admitted being disillusioned with the party he had joined as a teenager in 1941. He observed that "exclusive power inevitably leads to the abuse of power." Abuses extend to the regional and local levels. Protests have occurred in the countryside, with angry farmers facing the local People's Committees that hold sway over crop pricing, local taxation, housing, and land distribution. In 1997, farmers from more than 100 villages in Thai Binh province, south of Hanoi, attacked local officials who had imposed multiple taxes. Although the Politburo has responded to criticism with an anticorruption campaign that brought the 1999 dismissal of Deputy Prime Minister Ngo Xuan Loc and some showpiece executions, a great deal of cynicism about its true degree of commitment remains. Indeed, some believe that conservatives have used the anticorruption campaign to justify the removal of some reformers.

Concessions to change, moreover, are hard to make when the leaders of the VCP talk of the need for maintaining "stability," a euphemism for continued party control. Many of these officials oppose economic reforms that might undermine their political power. The drama and chaos of Indonesia in recent years is cited as an example to be avoided.

More haunting to the Vietnamese leadership is the specter of the Soviet Union's collapse and the disintegration of its empire in Eastern Europe. Many in the cadre were educated in the Warsaw Pact countries, with which Vietnam enjoyed close fraternal relations for 30 years. The communist bloc's demise has not shattered the Vietnamese leaders' faith in communism as a political and economic system. Rather, they view Mikhail Gorbachev as having lost control of that system by recklessly undertaking economic reforms without assuring political stability. Communism's collapse is blamed on avoidable political mismanagement rather than a bankrupt economy or a failed ideology.

IDEOLOGICAL DISCORD

IN CONTRAST to Vietnam's leaders, most of its citizens are generally indifferent to communism. Ideology and politics cannot rival the people's primary and often sole concern: putting sufficient food on

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the table and making ends meet. Even the small proportion of the population (mostly city dwellers) that has some disposable income is preoccupied with buying a motorbike, a TV set, or a better place to live. Most Vietnamese dismiss the historic struggle for independence and the "American war" as events before their time that lack the immediacy of daily concerns. The streets of Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City may be replete with banners displaying hammers and sickles or statues of Ho Chi Minh, but these symbols go largely ignored.

"People remain the voiceless subjects," one former party official said.

Economic concerns help account for the widespread ideological apathy, but fear and intimidation also play a role. In a society with no legal opposition, no right of assembly, and no autonomy for the national press, arbitrary arrest and detention remain conceivable results of political expression. The underdeveloped judicial system provides no guarantees because it lacks independence. The internal security apparatus is thought to be massive and intrusive, comparable to East Germany's Stasi. Such circumstances prohibit free speech as it is understood in the West. Speaking critically of the party means criticizing the state and is therefore treasonous. Few Vietnamese want to subject themselves to the harassment that will inevitably ensue.

Even senior party members muffle themselves, deterred by the VCP's severe discipline. Only a very few venerable elders whose party credentials are irreproachable have felt sufficiently secure to constructively criticize the country's present direction—and their fate will not inspire more to do so. General Tran Do was one such daring critic. The 1997 farmers' riots in Thai Binh, his home province, confirmed his belief that the party had lost touch with the masses and was leading the country to ruin: "In the past, party and people were one. ... Today the party and the people are two. The party is an elite group of rulers over the people. People remain the voiceless subjects."

Tran Do—like many other Vietnamese—recognized the irresolvable contradiction between a market economy, essential for Vietnamese economic development, and the socialist direction of the VCP. Rejecting the often-asserted view that economic improvement must precede talk about political reform, he argued that economic reform actually

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requires vigorous political reform. Furthermore, loosening communist structures could be beneficial to Vietnam: "Claiming that democracy will end political stability is illogical." Refusing to stop his criticism after warnings from party boss Le Kha Phieu, Tran Do was stripped of his party membership in January 1999, ostensibly for having talked to the foreign media.

Colonel Tan Bin was another outspoken dissenter who was punished. Well-known as the officer who accepted the surrender of the South Vietnamese government in 1975, he had become a high-ranking party member, the widely read deputy editor of the party daily, *Nhan Dan,* and a trusted "barbarian handler" (the name given to those tasked with dealing with foreigners). But when he wrote honestly about the party's corruption and called for a legal opposition, he was forced into exile and now resides in a communist-voting suburb of Paris.

To become an outcast in Vietnam brings not only excommunication from the VCP and severed ties with former associates but threats of house arrest, cut phone lines, surveillance, and other forms of harassment. As history has shown, revolutions often consume their children, and Vietnam is no exception.

Political repression is only one black mark on a Vietnamese human rights record that has been a point of contention with the United States for many years. The State Department's most recent annual report on human rights concludes that in 1999, the Vietnamese government continued to limit some basic freedoms and commit numerous abuses, including unwarranted imprisonment in harsh conditions. Limitation of religious practices poses a particular problem. After 1975, the government banned the pre-independence Buddhist organization of southern and central Vietnam and replaced it with a state-sponsored group created specifically to put Buddhist activities under government control. Recalcitrant monks have been imprisoned or placed under "pagoda arrest." The eight-million-member Catholic Church also lies under various restrictions designed to limit its growth and influence.

Although religious and other freedoms have very gradually been increasing, Human Rights Watch this year released a strongly critical report concluding that the Vietnamese government systematically silences dissident voices. The Hanoi authorities deeply resent such charges as unwarranted interference in domestic affairs. They assert that

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constitutionally approved freedoms are ensured in practice and that no political prisoners exist except those convicted of breaking the law.

The next test of Vietnam's political system will be a crucial one—the Ninth Party Congress in March 2001. The internal debate there about the country's direction over the next five and ten years could be fierce, although it will likely remain opaque to outsiders. Still, signs of discord are already evident. In April, little agreement could be reached at the plenum of the Central Committee, part of the run-up process to the party Congress. Five years ago the Eighth Party Congress's disagreements resulted in temporizing on most issues. This logjam is the price of a political system that considers consensus essential and allows elders to hold on to power for too long. The Politburo's awareness of the country's fundamental problems does not assure forward progress.

What may come out of the Ninth Party Congress remains decidedly uncertain, even contradictory. The recent decision to sign the U.S.-Vietnam trade agreement after a year of hesitation suggests that the party finally recognizes the need to engage more fully in the global economy. The invitation to President Clinton also indicates a new openness. On the other hand, the past 18 months have witnessed a return to the old-style rhetoric that is the hallmark of the conservatives. General Secretary Le Kha Phieu has led the party into a self-criticism campaign with the avowed aim of fighting "individualism," giving priority to "stability" over "reform," and emphasizing the importance of resisting "peaceful evolution." At the November 1999 Central Committee plenum, the VCP leaders focused on "party-building work," avoiding internal disunity, and closing ranks against any external challenges. Hanoi bureaucrats, skilled at reading the tea leaves, have turned more cautious. This development suggests that the primary concern of retaining political power will continue to override all other interests. How long such an approach can last, given Vietnam's precarious economic condition, is the critical question.

UNREALIZED POTENTIAL

A STRIKING CONTRADICTION lies in the huge gap between Vietnam's economic potential and its actual performance. The country is rich in resources. Its young, industrious, and disciplined population grew up in a culture that gives priority to education (Vietnam has a

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92 percent literacy rate) and possesses a strong work ethic. Already a major exporter of petroleum, rice, seafood, and coffee, the country has abundant natural resources and a primitive but large agricultural base, both waiting to be exploited. Opportunities for developing an information-technology sector abound. Yet Vietnam has been unable to match the economic progress of most of its neighbors.

The first decade after the "American war" was disastrous, as the widespread famine resulting from forced collectivization made Vietnam depend on assistance from the Soviet Union and, to a lesser extent, China. By 1986 the rigidities of the command economy had become so debilitating that the VCP was forced to embark on its policy of *doi moi*, or economic renovation, that reduced the state's omnipotent control. For the first time, small-scale private commerce and foreign investment, tightly regulated and limited to minority ownership in joint ventures, were permitted. Substantial economic growth and macroeconomic stability followed, but the benefits were unevenly spread. A small, consumer-oriented middle class emerged in the major cities, while in the rural areas—where 80 percent of the population resides—45 percent of farmers remained below the poverty line.

For the past three years, the economy has been in sharp decline, despite the preceding decade of improving performance. Annual growth in 1999 stagnated at four percent, less than half the rate of the mid-1990s and barely enough to tread water for such a poor country. Government revenue has decreased by five percent of GDP. Stagnant job creation has left increasing numbers of the 1.3 million people annually seeking to enter the work force either jobless or underemployed. Exports have lagged, especially the goods produced by the state-owned enterprises that cannot compete in global markets but remain a major sector of the economy, accounting for 30 percent of GDP.

Particularly notable is the drop in foreign direct investment, down to $1.4 billion in 1999 from $8.3 billion three years earlier. Expecting Vietnam to become the next Asian tiger, with its enticing consumer market of 80 million people, international companies rushed in during the early to mid-1990s. After several years of deep frustration with the massive red tape of the Hanoi bureaucracy, not to mention the abundant corruption, however, many firms have just as quickly moved out.

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Fortunately, today two supplementary sources of income help balance the economy: $2 billion per year in family remittances from the 2.5 million *Viet kieu* (Vietnamese living overseas), mainly in the United States; and an additional $2.2 billion in official development assistance from donor nations and international lending agencies. But clear indications show that the lack of adequate economic reform is inducing "donor fatigue," which would be disastrous for the country.

Vietnam's current economic difficulties cannot be more than partially attributed to the Asian economic downturn, which some VCP conservatives cite to counter arguments for closer global integration. In fact, the country was too isolated from the world economy to have caught the Asian flu. Rather, Vietnam's key problems are internal. Poor management of the state-owned enterprises means that they require subsidies to stay solvent and thus drain scarce government resources. Structural weaknesses plague the banking sector, also largely government owned. Moreover, a Byzantine bureaucracy, unclear licensing rules, and inadequate foreclosure and bankruptcy laws persist. The centrally planned economy lacks flexibility and transparency and just is not compatible with today's fast-moving, increasingly integrated global economy.

Economic liberalization would require major reforms in Vietnam's still highly restrictive regulatory framework, which hinders foreign investment, financial services, telecommunications, intellectual property rights, and information flows. But the Vietnamese government has made some tentative steps in this direction. To stem the decline in foreign investment, amendments to the Foreign Investment Law in May 2000 streamlined the many legal and foreign-exchange control regulations that had frustrated foreign companies. Two months later, after eight years of procrastination, Vietnam's first stock market opened in Ho Chi Minh City. Initially, however, only four companies were licensed to list shares, trading was restricted to three days per week, and daily price fluctuations were capped at five percent.

The most hopeful advance to date was Hanoi's recent decision to move ahead with the U.S.-Vietnam trade agreement, signed on July 13. The signatures came after three years of laborious negotiations that began in 1996, with Hanoi surprising all observers in September 1999 by suddenly balking just before it was expected to sign, and a

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subsequent further year of government hesitation. Finally, the deadlock within the Politburo broke to the advantage of the reformers.

Given the severe deterioration in Vietnam's economic situation, the trade agreement was most likely motivated by desperation to reverse the economic decline. Vietnam is one of only a handful of countries to which the United States has not yet granted permanent normal trade relations (PNTR). Increased American investments and access to American markets through the granting of PNTR could help arrest the erosion of Vietnam's economy. The reduction in U.S. tariffs by as much as 40 percent could quickly raise Vietnamese exports to the United States to $800 million from the 1999 level of $500 million, according to World Bank estimates. And the long-term potential for trade is far greater.

Vietnam inserted all sorts of conditions into its trade deal with the United States.

Another factor contributing to Vietnam's signature was Beijing's late-1999 decision to sign a comparable trade deal with Washington. The U.S.-Vietnam trade agreement, like its Chinese counterpart, will boost the country's hopes for joining the World Trade Organization (WTO). By agreeing to reduce tariffs on goods and services and abide by WTO rules on intellectual property rights and trade in services, Hanoi will similarly increase its chances by becoming more compliant with the organization's requirements.

These necessary changes, however, will be far from rapid. Vietnam insisted on, and received, considerable grace periods and conditions. American banks may not open fully owned subsidiaries for nine years or issue credit cards for eight years. Telecommunications providers (which can erode the government's ability to exercise political control) will have to wait four years before entering into joint-venture agreements with local partners. Even then, they will be allowed to take only a minority equity stake. American retailers have permission to enter the market, but are limited to a single retail store per city. A great deal will depend on how the government implements this comprehensive trade agreement over the years.

As these problems suggest, the trade agreement will not bring significant economic benefits to the United States for some time. In

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the six years since President Clinton lifted the nearly 20-year-old trade embargo, U.S. exports to Vietnam have averaged less than $300 million annually, or just three days' worth of exports to Japan. The agreement will likely raise exports, but to no more than an estimated $800 million to $1 billion annually. Nevertheless, new safeguards for direct investment will encourage American companies to enter the market and establish manufacturing facilities. Market access for U.S. products, whether agricultural or industrial or services, will now be guaranteed. In 1999, the United States ranked only eighth among Vietnam's trading partners. Unfortunately, Congress is unlikely to approve the trade agreement this year, due to its crowded calendar, union opposition in an election year, and the White House's preoccupation with the China trade bill. But its passage in the next session appears safely assured.

The agreement's chief benefit could be its catalytic impact, providing momentum for economic reform and political development toward a more open, entrepreneurial, and democratically accountable society. To implement the agreed-upon measures, the Vietnamese government will have to remove the trade barriers that now protect inefficient state-run companies. The pact will also force Vietnam to adopt international norms on such matters as accounting and corporate governance and could accelerate the privatization of state-owned industry. This move should greatly help develop an expanded and more vibrant private sector. To the extent that these advances are well implemented and become the norm for bilateral trade relationships with other countries, Vietnam can better integrate itself into the regional and world economy. At that point, the contradiction between Vietnam's economic potential and its reality will have largely disappeared.

A DELICATE BALANCING ACT

CONTRADICTORY VIETNAMESE attitudes about the appropriate policies toward the United States and China show that, despite Vietnam's hesitation about deeper international engagement, there is a growing impatience with its relative isolation. For the reformers and much of the educated younger generation, the United States represents modernity; its technology, universities, and popular culture are especially

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attractive. Opportunities for travel to America and Europe are much sought after. For the conservatives and a sizable portion of the political and bureaucratic class, the United States represents an undefined threat in a dangerous and unstable world. Some within the military and security services suspect that Vietnamese-Americans, hostile to Hanoi, might seek to intervene in southern Vietnam—the war in Kosovo is held up as a bizarre example. American visitors to Vietnam, however, remark that the proverbial people in the street could not be more friendly toward the citizens of a nation that used to carpet-bomb their country. The war was a quarter-century ago and apparently is best forgotten.

Vietnamese-American relations remained frozen for the first two decades after the fall of Saigon. But in 1994, President Clinton lifted the U.S. trade embargo on Vietnam in recognition of Hanoi's cooperation on soldiers missing in action (MIAs); the following year, diplomatic relations were established. Former member of Congress Pete Peterson, for six years a denizen of the infamous "Hanoi Hilton" (the prison where American flyers were incarcerated), has moved back to the city as the American ambassador. The thawing process is now gradually continuing but remains incomplete. For example, when Secretary of State Madeleine Albright visited Vietnam in September 1999, her conversations about the importance of human rights received a very cool response.

In March, William Cohen became the first serving secretary of defense to visit the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, after Hanoi had cancelled two earlier trips. The two countries reached agreement to provide equipment to clear an estimated 3.5 million remaining land mines, undertake joint research on the harmful effects of Agent Orange, and continue cooperating on American MIAs. In turn, the Vietnamese requested assistance in finding their own MIAs, who number in the hundreds of thousands. The two sides also discussed low-level military-to-military contacts, but the Vietnamese made it clear that they preferred to proceed very slowly on matters of security and foreign policy.

President Clinton's visit will mark a new stage in relations between the two countries, but whether its lasting impact will be greater on the American psyche or on Vietnamese realities is an open question.

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When dealing with the United States, the Vietnamese look over their shoulder at the reactions of the Chinese leadership. Fear of provoking anxiety in Beijing deters rapid or substantive rapprochement with Washington. China is the neighborhood titan, with growing dominance in Asia and a long, troubled history with Vietnam. Intermittent conflict between this Asian David and Goliath has gone on for more than 1,000 years and continued after Vietnam's independence. In 1979, China made a short but bloody incursion into northern Vietnam, ostensibly to punish Hanoi for its own 200,000-troop intervention in Cambodia that deposed the pro-Chinese Khmer Rouge regime. In 1988 their long-standing dispute over the Spratly Islands also led to naval clashes. Although a treaty on the Vietnam-China border was reached at the end of 1999 and the two countries have since committed to finalizing soon an agreement on a demarcation line in the Gulf of Tonkin, conflicting claims over the Spratly and Paracel Islands—which possibly hold massive oil and gas reserves—remain unresolved.

The Soviet Union's collapse has given Hanoi no choice but to mend its ties with Beijing. The Vietnamese are actively seeking to improve and fully normalize relations through a series of high-level visits and accords. Nevertheless, apprehension and disagreement persist about China's intentions, just as with the United States. Vietnamese conservatives, especially in the military, value China as the last important remaining communist ally. Reformers, including officials of the Foreign Ministry, point to the threat that China could pose in a decade or two as it builds up its military strength, especially the navy. The historic mistrust between the two countries is deep and will not soon dissipate.

In recent times, Vietnamese diplomacy has become increasingly active in other areas. Vietnam joined the Association of Southeast Asian Nations in 1995 and has since developed ties with the member countries. And it also rekindled economic and cultural contacts with France following a summit of francophone nations in Hanoi in 1997. The country maintains close contacts with Cuba and several of the formerly communist states of eastern Europe. Yet most important in the long run will be Vietnam's delicate balancing act between China and America.

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HUNGER FOR CHANGE

AFTER MORE than 80 years of French colonial rule, nearly 20 years of terrible war, 15 years of xenophobic isolation and entanglement in the Soviet Union's economic web, and the last 10 years adrift as a communist country in a noncommunist world, Vietnam has reached a crucial crossroads. Will it transform itself to become a Thailand or a progressively changing China? Or will it slide into the backwardness of Cambodia or Laos? Of the four countries divided by World War II and the Cold War, Vietnam was the first to reunify. Yet compared to Germany, Taiwan, and South Korea, its performance has been abysmal. Today it faces being relegated to the communist dustbin of North Korea, Laos, and Cuba.

Change is inevitable. The real question is, Will the change be evolutionary or revolutionary? Casual observers of Vietnam, impressed by the size and vitality of the "Honda at the cybercafe" crowd, speak of a coming generational change that will sweep aside today's geriatric leadership. But this optimism is far too simplistic. True, the French-speaking veterans of the "senior" generation, esteemed for having fought the wars and unified the nation, are rapidly passing from the scene. But the next generation, 40 to 60 years of age, has begun to run the country and will not readily give up power and privilege. This "middle" generation, trained in Moscow and the capitals of the Soviet bloc, is committed to the VCP. The "junior" generation that grew up in the more open environment of the past decade will have to wait. Moreover, within this younger generation there will be competition, as the sons and daughters of current party members vie to inherit jobs and privileges.

The traditional Vietnamese way of transition is evolutionary. Thus gradual reform from within the structures is the most likely path. A Soviet-style breakup of the VCP in the next ten years is unlikely. But nothing lies beyond the realm of plausibility. In those rural areas mired in poverty and corruption, a new wave of riots targeted at the local People's Committees could erupt. In the increasingly crowded major cities, which attract peasants seeking work, unemployment is rising. Within the younger, educated elite an increasing dissatisfaction feeds hunger for fundamental change. All of Vietnamese society is

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subject to the revolution of rising expectations. The VCP's legitimacy cannot continue to be based on the victorious wars of the past century. Legitimacy will now have to be earned through sound management of the economy and widening prosperity in the twenty-first century. How long a one-party state can continue to absorb these pressures before moving toward pluralist democracy is uncertain.

The risk remains that the desperately needed economic overhaul and political rejuvenation will not come about soon enough. Without reform, Vietnam will fall still further behind its ASEAN colleagues, now recovering from the Asian economic flu. Even the communist government in Beijing is moving faster toward a market economy. Given its impressively rich potential, however, Vietnam can turn itself around and become a prosperous, multiparty, democratic nation. But when?

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The Confirmation Clog

Norman Ornstein and Thomas Donilon

RUNNING THROUGH MOLASSES

On August 1, Peter Burleigh, one of America's most seasoned and effective diplomats, quietly tendered his resignation after 33 years in the U.S. Foreign Service. Burleigh's nomination to be ambassador to the Philippines had been held up for nine months in the Senate. With no prospects for movement through the remainder of the year, Burleigh decided to move on with his life. He had been in limbo not because of questions about his qualifications or actions, but because Senator Charles Grassley (R-Iowa), upset about the State Department's treatment of an American whistle blower at the United Nations, had exercised his senatorial prerogative to hold up Burleigh's nomination and two other ambassadorial appointments indefinitely.

Burleigh was no stranger to delays in appointments. Previously, he had served as the acting U.S. representative to the United Nations for more than a year while the administration's nominee for the post, Richard Holbrooke, was himself the victim of long executive and legislative branch delays. The Burleigh and Holbrooke examples stand out because of the importance and visibility of the positions, but sadly they are not unusual. More and more top executive jobs are sitting unfilled or filled on an acting basis for months or even years. Without significant changes in laws, rules, and norms, the incoming president of the United States faces the prospect of waiting for nearly

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a year after his inauguration on January 20 for his team to be set in place—not to mention the headaches any subsequent vacancies will cause.

Forty years ago, when John F. Kennedy became president, cabinet and subcabinet officers were nominated and confirmed expeditiously. On average, the 196 top-level executive positions requiring Senate confirmation were filled less than two and a half months after the presidential inauguration.

Thirty-two years later, when Bill Clinton assumed the presidency, it was a different story. The 786 top-level Clinton nominees requiring Senate confirmation took an average of almost nine months after inauguration to assume their posts—meaning they missed more than a sixth of the presidential term! Thanks to a president who moved slowly to name top officials, a glacial presidential vetting process, slow FBI background checks for nominees, and a balky Senate confirmation process, securing a top appointed position was like running a marathon in molasses. In some respects, those initial nominees were lucky: many who came later were denied the Senate's predisposition to confirm a new president's people. Nearly all nominees after the first wave were left hanging in the Senate for months after their formal nominations. Many went through the further indignity of anonymous holds by senators, leaving them twisting in the wind for additional months or even years.

Average Number of Months
from Inauguration to Confirmation of Initial Administration Appointees



Source: *Obstacle Course: The Report of the Twentieth Century Fund Task Force on Presidential Appointments* (1996), p. 72.

The problem went beyond the humiliations suffered by individual appointees. As the United States waited a year for Holbrooke, it faced the war in Kosovo and its aftermath without a permanent representative at the U.N. By the time Mary Schapiro was finally sworn in as head of the Commodities Futures Trading Commission in 1994, the post had been vacant for 21 months, resulting in what Bloomberg Business

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News called at the time a "hobbled" agency beset by "complaints, indecision, and industry uncertainty." In the Philippines, the delicate negotiations over an American hostage held by Abu Sayyaf rebels have been conducted without an American ambassador to represent U.S. interests.

That the nomination and confirmation process is broken is a truism now widely accepted by both Republicans and Democrats. It is also clear that the problems did not start with Clinton's administration but have been building for at least 30 years. As the figure at left shows, the average time from inauguration to confirmation of initial administration employees has been increasing since J.F.K.'s presidency, jumping particularly during the Bush and the Clinton eras. This trend applies to all executive appointments, not just those made at the beginning of an administration.

The lag in getting people into office seriously impedes good governance. A new president's first year—clearly the most important year for accomplishments and the most vulnerable to mistakes—is now routinely impaired by the lack of supporting staff. For executive agencies, leaderless periods mean decisions not made, initiatives not launched, and accountability not upheld.

Moreover, the problems persist into an administration's second year. The average tenure of top government positions is only about 14 months, mostly because of promotions and reassignments, which open up gaps in leadership. The gaps become even greater when a top position becomes vacant midway through an administration. Many major positions now routinely go unfilled for a year or more, and sometimes—as in the case of the assistant attorney general for civil rights in the Clinton administration—they are blocked by the Senate for the duration of a presidential term.

The damage to governance is matched by the damage to individual nominees. For many selected to serve at the beginning of an administration, a year or more in limbo is typical. This wait leads to widespread frustration and demoralization for individuals who must give notice to their employers, plan moves across the country, coordinate school schedules for their children, and make home sales and purchases. A survey of 435 senior-level appointees from the Reagan, Bush, and Clinton administrations conducted for the

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Presidential Appointee Initiative found "a nomination and confirmation process that exacts a heavy toll on nominees, leaving them exhausted, embarrassed, and confused." The frustration, they found, increases at every stage of the process.

JUMPING THROUGH HOOPS

TIME, UNFORTUNATELY, is only one part of a larger problem. Nominees to executive posts must fill out thick stacks of financial disclosure and conflict-of-interest forms to comply with the ethics requirements of both the executive and legislative branches. Simply filling out the forms—which requires one to list every foreign trip ever made and every foreigner met, every speech given over the past several years, and every investment and income item—takes weeks of effort and a considerable amount of money. One cabinet officer estimated it cost about $20,000 in legal and accountants' fees to ensure the forms were complete and accurate. Most of the information on the forms goes into public files for any inquisitive neighbor, opposition researcher, or reporter to peruse and even publish.

All nominees requiring Senate confirmation must go through full FBI background checks—including agent interviews of family members, neighbors, coworkers, friends, and adversaries—designed to compile every bit of negative information, including rumors and unsupported allegations, into raw FBI files that are then frequently shared with Senate committees and occasionally disclosed to the press. A move from one appointed position to another can require another FBI investigation, starting from scratch.

The full FBI field investigations date from a 1953 executive order. Most of the required forms stem from the Ethics Act of 1978 and subsequent revisions, which were usually responses to new scandals or allegations. But together, these rules and requirements have contributed to a political atmosphere that is unremittingly hostile to nominees. If public service was once considered an honorable calling, these days political appointees are, in the words of one participant, considered "guilty until proven innocent." Joycelyn Elders, who served as surgeon general in the Clinton administration, gave her

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reaction to the process as she left government: "I felt it was more a mechanism to destroy me than anything else. I came to Washington, D.C., like prime steak, and after being here awhile I feel like poor grade hamburger."

The destructive "mechanism" that Elders described included the scrutiny she received from the press and political adversaries once she took office. For many public officials, the smallest misstep or misfortune of being in the wrong meeting at the wrong time can trigger an investigation, leading to bad publicity and ruinous legal fees. A high-ranking White House aide was overheard saying, "How can I work this way? If I simply go to the wrong meeting my kid's college fund could be gone."

HELP WANTED

THIS DISHEARTENING political atmosphere creates problems in recruitment. People with direct experience and expertise in a policy area are often considered unfit to manage that area because they cannot be trusted to oversee their previous employers or patrons. The Clinton administration, for example, had great difficulty filling key Energy Department positions overseeing the disposal of nuclear waste because most experts in the field came directly or indirectly from the nuclear industry and were thus rejected for their perceived conflicts of interest.

Finding top-flight people to serve in government for brief periods in their professional lives has always been a challenge. It requires individuals either at the peak of their professions or on their way up to leave midstream, uproot their families, learn new jobs and skills, adjust to a system without the bottom-line standards present in business and many professions, absorb political flak, and usually take sizable pay cuts. But in recent years the challenge has transformed into a nearly insurmountable one, especially for posts below the prestige level of the cabinet. It is one thing to face these challenges once one has assumed a position of responsibility. It is quite another to make the leap of faith and then wait for months or years of uncertainty accompanied by poking and prodding into one's personal life and financial records, to see if one can even be considered for the job.

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No systematic, quantitative evidence suggests a drastic drop-off in the recruitment of America's best and brightest to top public policy positions. But every available piece of anecdotal evidence suggests that the recruitment problem has mushroomed into a recruitment crisis. Fewer and fewer prominent people in business, industry, or professions such as law, medicine, architecture, or science will even consider positions in the federal government. Fewer students in public policy programs aspire to jobs in Washington. If the sheer number of résumés submitted to presidential candidates or presidents-elect has not declined, the quality of the applicants, according to those who look at them, has. More and more positions fit the pattern of the deputy secretary of defense during the Bush administration, when more than 20 qualified possibilities were contacted before a willing candidate who lacked insurmountable conflicts of interest emerged.

BLOCKAGE POINTS

THIS CRISIS in public service and governance has structural, legal, cultural, and political causes. The following is a partial list:

1. A steady expansion in the number of executive appointees—what Brookings Institution fellow Paul Light calls "the thickening of government"—has clogged the machinery at every stage of the nomination and confirmation process.

2. Incremental changes in the law and executive orders, each a directed response to an actual or alleged scandal, have accumulated into an unworkable morass of rules intended to legislate morality. At the same time, they cumulatively contribute little to real safeguards of ethical standards, instead bordering on harassment and voyeurism for potential and actual nominees.

3. A more individualistic Senate culture has turned the "hold" from an occasional instrument of modest delay into a lethal weapon used regularly to hold nominees hostage to the whims or unrelated demands of individual senators.

4. The general rise in litigation has found its way into politics; lawsuits and the discovery process have become political tools, used increasingly to embarrass or bankrupt political adversaries.

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5. The post-Watergate rise of investigative reporting has increased the media focus on scandal over substance and added to a cultural climate in which public figures are deemed guilty until proven innocent.

CLEARING THE PATH

THESE DANGEROUS TRENDS in the executive appointment process have been widely noted for more than a decade. In 1989, the National Commission on Public Service chaired by former Federal Reserve Chairman Paul Volcker found that, "if these trends continue, America will soon be left with a government of the mediocre." In 1997 G. Calvin Mackenzie, the leading scholar on the subject, declared "the appointment process had its worst year in its history." Mackenzie goes on to conclude, "The process grows thicker and slower. Vacancies grow longer. Talent grows thinner. Governing becomes more difficult." Still, there has been no serious effort to reform or streamline the appointment process.

The problem will not be easy to solve. The most difficult barrier is a cultural one, as cynicism about public figures has replaced the healthy skepticism that was once a hallmark of American democracy. But culture can be changed, beginning with small but significant steps to reform laws, rules, and norms that signal the society's intention to rethink its ethos. Both Republicans and Democrats now agree that the process is broken and that enough blood has been spilt on both sides of the aisle over the last 20 years. With the election of a new president, perhaps both parties can "call it even" and work to construct a more civil and rational system to staff the senior ranks of government.

First, as several panels have recommended, the president-elect should name his chief of staff and key White House staff as early as possible—ideally the week after the election. President Clinton has said that not moving on the White House staff early was his biggest regret about his own transition. Why? Naming early the chief of staff and key White House staff gives the transition ballast and focus, eliminates a great deal of useless jockeying, and allows a president-elect to operate as a fully staffed president two months before the inauguration.

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Second, the president-elect and congressional leaders need to expressly recognize the crisis in convincing America's best to take up public service. They should meet immediately after the election and instruct their top aides to report within 45 days on specific steps to rationalize and streamline the appointment process. The goal would be to publish an agreement on the appointment process by January 1, 2001. The agreement could include the following steps:

1. Implement a common electronic nominations form. Today, a nominee for a Senate-confirmed position at the State Department must complete three separate background forms for the State Department Diplomatic Security Division, the White House Counsel's office, and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. The candidate must also complete a financial disclosure form for the Office of Government Ethics. This multiplicity of forms is common to all executive departments. Most of the required information is redundant; much of it is irrelevant. The Transition to Governing Project of the American Enterprise Institute and the Brookings Institution is overseeing the production of software that will allow appointees to enter information only once and have it automatically travel to all the necessary forms. The next president should direct all the appropriate agencies and authorities to accept these computer-produced forms and work together to eliminate unnecessary repetition and unnecessarily intrusive questions.

For most positions, the full FBI background check is a Cold War relic.

2. Decriminalize the appointment process. Today, a misstatement on a nominee's financial disclosure form, a violation of a postgovernment employment ban, or any contact with one's prior government agency is subject to criminal investigation and prosecution. This means that even filling out the forms prior to nomination or having dinner with a former colleague after leaving one's agency for private-sector employment are quite literally dangerous activities. Indeed, a lunch in Seoul, South Korea, after he left the State Department for the private sector cost U.N. representative Richard Holbrooke months of investigation. The government admitted that the case involved absolutely no venality. But the Department of Justice's Public Integrity Section believed that the law compelled it to pursue a criminal investigation for what it viewed as a strict liability offense.

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Such criminalization is unnecessary and gravely damaging to recruitment efforts. Two steps make sense: first, decriminalize the appointment process by having the Office of Government Ethics enforce the disclosure and postemployment statutes as civil or regulatory matters. Second, repeal by executive order the additional postemployment bans put in place by President Clinton in 1993. These largely unenforceable restrictions go beyond the statutes and provide additional opportunities for mistakes with little gain in ethics.

3. *Streamline the FBI background check.* Beginning with the Eisenhower administration, most executive appointees have been subject to the FBI's "full field investigation." For national-security posts and other sensitive positions, the investigation makes sense. For most executive positions, it is a Cold War relic and a waste of the FBI's good resources. Surely Washington can move to graduated levels of investigation: full field investigations for national security and other sensitive posts, abbreviated background checks for most appointees, and simple identification checks for part-time and other minor positions. The savings in time and resources would be immense.

Additionally, to ensure timely confirmations, a president-elect should be able to submit a list of potential top appointees to sensitive positions to the FBI just after the election and have their FBI checks begin immediately, even before they have been formally nominated for specific positions.

Finally, the president-elect should ask the director of the FBI for advice on how to streamline the background-check process. The FBI's top officials have a tremendous amount of experience in what has been useful and what has not in this process.

4. *Protect FBI files.* The FBI usually does not edit or judge the information it gathers in its full field investigations. As a result, FBI files contain both accurate and inaccurate information, both legitimate, well-sourced facts and rank hearsay. Former FBI Director William Webster has noted that these files are "often freighted with hearsay, rumor, innuendo, and unsubstantial allegations." When former National Security Adviser Anthony Lake was nominated as director of central intelligence, Congress demanded that every member of the reviewing committee see the FBI report. John Tower's 1989 nomination to be secretary of defense also saw broad and inappropriate

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dissemination of FBI report material. Given the damage FBI files can do to a nominee, access should be limited to the chair and the ranking minority member of the relevant committees.

5. Change the "hold" custom in the Senate. A "hold" occurs when any single senator asks that a piece of legislation or a nomination not be brought to the floor of the Senate for an unspecified period of time, even though it has passed out of committee. It is an informal practice, has no time limit, and until recently could be totally secret. This past winter—after a good deal of admirable effort—Senators Grassley and Ron Wyden (D-Ore.) persuaded the Senate leadership to agree that a senator who places a hold must tell not only the leadership but also the sponsor of the legislation and the chair of the relevant committee. This was heralded as the end to secret holds.

Senate "holds" probably violate the Constitution and are antidemocratic.

Not so. When Holbrooke's nomination passed out of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, chaired by Jesse Helms (R-N.C.), it took another two months to get a Senate vote. It turns out that four senators had put holds—three of them secret—on Holbrooke for reasons unrelated to his qualifications for the position. Senators Trent Lott (R-Miss.) and Mitch McConnell (R-Ky.) were seeking to force President Clinton to nominate their candidate for the Federal Election Commission; Senator George Voinovich (R-Ohio) was protesting the Clinton administration's Balkans policy; and Senator Grassley was protesting the State Department's treatment of a whistle blower (whom Holbrooke had never met) at the United Nations. The only one who announced and explained his hold was Grassley.

Holds, mentioned nowhere in Senate rules, are antidemocratic and probably unconstitutional (although not likely subject to judicial review since the courts tend to be deferential to political questions). The Constitution, by requiring a two-thirds Senate vote on executive appointments, reflects the idea that a simple majority is an inadequate check on the executive's power to appoint. Yet the hold subjects nominations to a single senator's veto. The Grassley-Wyden reform should be revisited with an eye toward limiting a hold's duration (to, say, a week, long enough for the legitimate purpose of meeting with

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or getting additional information on a nominee) or eliminating holds altogether in the case of nominations. At a minimum, the reform should be strengthened to ensure that secret holds are truly not permitted.

6. Enact other Senate procedural reforms. The Constitution's provision for senatorial approval of nominees suggests that a president should be permitted to choose his team, that the team should be subject to the political process, and that the president should be held ultimately accountable to the nation for the team's performance. Three Senate procedural reforms (all of which were proposed by a 1996 Twentieth-Century Fund task force) could reaffirm these principles and aid in recruitment. First, an executive nomination should be scheduled for a floor vote within 20 legislative days after the nomination has been voted out of committee. If a senator has problems with a nomination, he or she can vote against the nomination—or even filibuster—and let the Senate as a whole make its judgment. Second, committees should use their authority to waive hearings on lower-level positions. The Twentieth-Century Fund report recommended that a hearing be waived if no member of a Senate committee demands one. Third, the Senate should take former President Bush's 1991 suggestion that the Senate meet in executive session to review a candidate's personal or other sensitive matters. This allows the Senate to do its job while respecting the privacy of nominees.

7. Start with national security. Following tradition, the foreign relations, armed services, and intelligence committees should hold pre–Inauguration Day hearings on the nominees for the secretaries of state and defense; on Inauguration Day they should vote on them. Furthermore, the president should present to the relevant committees by Inauguration Day the nominations for the top ten positions in the Departments of State and Defense, and for the top three positions at the CIA. The leaders of those committees should agree to move those slates of nominees to full Senate votes within 30 days after Inauguration Day, barring a specific problem with a specific nominee. This would allow the president to have a national security team in place by March 1—and would promise a rational, efficient process to prospective nominees for those positions.

8. Reduce the number of political appointees. Currently the executive branch appoints more than 3,000 political positions, roughly a third

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of which require Senate confirmation. Senators John McCain (R-Ariz.) and Russell Feingold (D-Wisc.) have sponsored a bill to reduce that number to 2,000, as recommended by the Volcker Commission. Most scholars of public administration believe that this streamlining would actually promote more accountable management by political appointees. It would also make the remaining political appointments more prestigious and desirable and would unclog the nomination and confirmation process for them.

9. Stop the legal assault on the executive branch. The executive branch is constantly under legal assault—a major deterrent to public service. Very few of Clinton's aides have avoided retaining a lawyer and appearing before a grand jury or other legal processes. Congress made a step in the right direction last year when it let the independent counsel law expire; that law should be buried for good. Other steps should also be taken. First among them, Congress should repeal *Clinton v. Jones,* in which the Supreme Court held that Paula Jones could bring her civil action for sexual harassment against the president while he was in office. The opinion would be rather quaint, with its citations of ancient presidential memoirs, if not for the carnage it has caused over the last few years and the carnage it promises for future presidents. Stunningly oblivious to the age of modern media, the Court claimed that the case, "if properly managed by the District Court," would be "highly unlikely to occupy any substantial amount of [Clinton's] time."

So much for Supreme Court sagacity. On the eve of the *Jones* trial, which was thrown out by the district court judge, *The Washington Post*'s Howard Kurtz reported that nearly "seven hundred journalists had signed up to chronicle the trial in Little Rock." Of course, the *Jones* case and its consequences occupied a very substantial amount of the president's time—as well as that of the nation.

But the Court was not entirely oblivious; at least it asked Congress to review its decision. Congress should accept the Court's invitation—and soon—because civil litigation against the president will surely be used again as a political tactic.

These steps will not solve everything. The media's skepticism about government and its obsession with scandal will persist no matter what changes are made in ethics laws or otherwise. A top federal

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manager's salary is now barely more than half that of a first-year associate at a major law firm. This "wage gap" is likely to widen before it narrows, and candidates for public service simply have to resign themselves to serious financial sacrifice.

But Washington can convert cynicism back to skepticism and remove some of the unnecessary obstacles, annoyances, and harassments from the executive appointment process. These changes should be embraced before the 2000 election and enacted as soon as possible after the election. Governing in the twenty-first century will be difficult enough without the handicap the American political system has placed on its public managers.

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Turkey's Dream of Democracy

Eric Rouleau

THE RULES OF THE GAME

TURKEY TODAY stands at a crossroads. Few other moments in the 77-year history of the Turkish republic have been so decisive. In the coming weeks, its parliament will begin to consider the "accession partnership document" recently presented to it by the European Union. The document is a road map for the far-reaching economic and political reforms Turkey must enact if it is to join the EU. Actual membership negotiations between Ankara and Brussels cannot begin until these reforms are implemented, which both parties hope will happen before 2004. But if Turkey expects to meet that deadline, it will need to start acting fast.

Less than a year ago in Helsinki, Finland, the EU finally decided to accept Turkey's candidacy for membership. The Turks were overjoyed. Since 1987, all of their previous applications to join the EU had been rejected. For 12 years, Turkey had complained that as a Muslim nation, it was being discriminated against by an exclusively Christian club. The Europeans had countered that democratic and economic deficiencies in Turkey's institutions and practices disqualified it from membership. If Ankara really wanted to join, Brussels instructed, it should start taking steps to meet the union's many requirements.

Then, at the December 1999 Helsinki meeting, the EU softened its stance and dropped its preconditions. The reasons for this about-face were several. Thanks to a thaw in bilateral relations, Greece had finally

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lifted its veto. And Turkey was too important a player on the international chessboard to be ignored. Bordering the oil fields of the Middle East, at the edge of the ex-Soviet Turkic republics of the Caucasus and Central Asia (some of which are also rich in oil), and linked through its Ottoman past to the Balkans, Turkey has huge potential to play a stabilizing role in a turbulent region. Moreover, in the economic domain, Turkey had intensified its lucrative commercial and financial ties with Europe and had come to be considered one of the world's ten most promising emerging markets by the U.S. government.

The Helsinki decision called on Turkey, like all other EU membership candidates, to comply with the so-called Copenhagen rules. These guidelines, established in 1993, require EU hopefuls to build Western-style democratic institutions guaranteeing the rule of law, individual rights, and the protection of minorities. Indeed, the EU's eastern and central European candidates adopted most of the Copenhagen norms on their own, before even knocking at the doors of the union.

In contrast, in the ten months since the historic Helsinki decision, Ankara has made no moves to reform its institutions. It is true that, after abstaining for 34 years, Turkey recently signed (but has not ratified) two U.N. conventions on political rights. And some observers were encouraged by parliament's election in May of Ahmed Necdet Sezer, the country's highest-ranking judge and a known liberal, as president of the republic—although Sezer was seen as a nonpolitical compromise candidate and has limited power. Overall, however, the authoritarian nature of the regime appears to have hardened.

This August—to cite but one example—Ankara, acting at the instigation of the army high command, took advantage of a parliamentary recess to issue a decree authorizing it to dismiss, without charges or legal judgments, civil servants suspected of Islamist or pro-Kurdish sympathies. This decree, which could possibly affect tens of thousands of individuals, was denounced as unconstitutional and arbitrary by almost all of Turkey's unions and professional associations and by numerous politicians, jurists, and columnists. In an event unparalleled in the history of the republic, President Sezer vetoed the decree on the grounds that only parliament could pass such a measure. If parliament rejects the draft law when it reconvenes

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this fall, the military may well interpret the vote as an intolerable challenge to its authority. A major national crisis could result.

This incident gives some idea of the enormous difficulties Ankara will face in adopting the Copenhagen rules. These measures represent more than simple reforms; they mean the virtual dismantling of Turkey's entire state system. This system, which places the armed forces at the very heart of political life, is deeply rooted in a centuries-old culture and in practices that have been ingrained for decades. Whether Turkey will choose to change them—and whether the army will let it—remains uncertain. Even EU membership, the ultimate incentive, may not be enough to convince the Turkish military to relinquish its hold on the jugular of the modern Turkish state.

PASHA POLITICS

THE ARMED FORCES have always occupied a privileged place on Turkey's political landscape, under the republic no less than in Ottoman times. The imperial troops, especially the elite Janissaries (until they were disbanded in the nineteenth century), enthroned or overthrew sultans at will. General Mustafa Kemal, who came to be known as Atatürk ("Father of the Turks"), would not have been able to drive out the foreign forces that occupied his country in the wake of World War I or to found the republic on the ashes of empire without the military's active assistance.

Of the ten men to become president since the republic was established in 1923, six have been high-ranking officers. Since 1960, moreover, Turkey has experienced a number of attempted putsches and four successful coups d'état. The latest, in February 1997, has come to be known in Turkey as the "virtual" or "postmodern" coup, because the troops never actually left their barracks: a thinly veiled ultimatum from the army high command sufficed to bring down the coalition government headed by the so-called Islamist Necmettin Erbakan. Those in the mainstream media who welcomed the military intervention soon began honoring the higher officers with the deferential title "pasha," the imperial term for a general.

The republican pashas, whether left- or right-wing, invariably erupt onto the political scene waving the banner of "Kemalism." The

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CORBIS-BETTMANN

Outranked: Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit, Ankara, August 1, 2000

term has become ubiquitous in the successive constitutions that the military has sponsored after overthrowing various civilian governments since 1960. Kemalism is likewise invoked in most of the laws based on those constitutions, as well as in the oaths of allegiance sworn on taking office by Turkey's presidents, parliamentarians, and high officials. To succeed or survive in modern Turkey, all opinions, initiatives, and behavior must conform to the ideas or intentions—real or imagined—of Kemal Atatürk.

Modern Kemalism is a faith simple in formulation and broadly positive in content. It has two major elements: the indivisibility of the nation and its territory and the secularism of the republic. The rigid conformity with which these basic principles are upheld is paradoxical,

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however, and ill conforms to the true spirit of Mustafa Kemal. For although Kemalism has been transformed into a strict ideology since his death, Atatürk himself was no ideologue. He pragmatically borrowed from sources as varied as the French Revolution and the totalitarian regimes of his time in order to forge a nation-state bent on modernization and economic development. Just as paradoxical is the fact that the same people who have championed so-called Kemalist orthodoxy have never hesitated to go against its very essence whenever Atatürk's policies got in the way or were found anachronistic. Atatürk's single party has been replaced with a multiparty system and his statist economy has been gradually abandoned in favor of a market-driven one. Whereas Atatürk laid down the strict principle that under no circumstances should Turkey involve itself in the internal affairs of foreign countries, his successors in the military have defended not only Turkish-speaking minorities in other countries (Greece, Cyprus, Bulgaria, and elsewhere) but also—surprisingly for a militantly secularist state—Muslim minorities in foreign lands (such as Bosnia, Kosovo, and Chechnya).

Perhaps the most poignant irony of Kemalism today is the fact that the "Father of the Turks" unalterably opposed any intervention by the armed forces in the affairs of state—a principle that his admirers have consistently violated for the last 40 years. Such departures from the founder's principles have not prevented the military from virtually deifying Atatürk, however, or elevating Kemalism to the rank of sacrosanct dogma, while arrogating to its officers a monopoly on interpretation and the right to punish suspected dissidents.

The military's principal tool in this pursuit has been the officer corps, an elite caste par excellence. As described by veteran journalist Mehmet Ali Birand in his investigative work, *Shirts of Steel*, the officer system has been remarkably effective at reproducing itself generation after generation. Candidates for military careers, selected according to strict social, political, intellectual, and physical criteria, are taken completely in hand by the state from the age of 13 or 14. Cadets undergo intensive training in special schools that are beyond the jurisdiction of the ministry of national education. In addition to military training, they follow university-level courses in history, sociology, political science, and economics. The officer is meant to become a top civilian official in uniform; as the chief of staff noted in January 1998,

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"A general should be able to act as a diplomat, whereas a diplomat should be familiar with military questions; both should be well versed in economics."

Nonetheless, officers enjoy greater privileges than civil servants at the same level: their pay is sometimes twice as high, they shop in subsidized military stores, they obtain low-interest housing loans, and they have access to exclusive holiday resorts, hotels, and clubs. Endowed with a sacred mission, they naturally occupy the pinnacle of the state, and their prestige is unequaled in Turkish society.

CONSTITUTIONAL CONUNDRUMS

A RIGID, NATIONALIST IDEOLOGY and a powerful, activist officer corps: this is what the EU is up against in trying to persuade Turkey to totally revamp a constitution that institutionalizes the army's dominant power and blocks any move toward democratization. Unveiled in 1982 by the generals who had seized power two years before, Turkey's current constitution is the source of laws and practices that frequently undermine basic freedoms and human rights. This summer, in an unprecedentedly frank statement for someone of his rank, Sami Selçuk, the chief justice of Turkey's highest court of appeal, declared that 90 articles of the constitution should be canceled or amended in order to comply with EU rules and promote democratization—so many that it might be better to "rewrite it completely from scratch." This, in blunt terms, is what the EU has been implicitly suggesting in a series of reports and notes it has sent to Ankara for more than a decade.

One of Brussels' main targets has been Article 118, which establishes the National Security Council (NSC), a kind of shadow government through which the pashas can impose their will on parliament and the government. The NSC is made up of six high-ranking military officers and five civilians. Once a month, decked out in full dress uniform, the chief of staff and the heads of the army, navy, air force, and national police, along with a sixth general acting as the council's general secretary, meet with Turkey's president, prime minister, and the ministers of defense, foreign affairs, and the interior. The council is empowered to examine all the affairs of state, whether relating to domestic or to foreign policy. Its deliberations are never made public,

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and even when decisions are announced, they are presented as "recommendations" to the government.

Civilians ignore these recommendations at their peril. Although the NSC acquiesced when its recent order to purge suspect civil servants was vetoed by President Sezer and sent to parliament for approval, the council was far less indulgent in the case of Prime Minister Erbakan. When Erbakan had the temerity to send the NSC's 20 "recommendations" aimed at "eradicating Islamist reaction" to parliament in February 1997, the military had him ousted. Erbakan signed his government's death warrant by pretending not to understand that the recommendations constituted an ultimatum.

Any public criticism of the military deemed insulting can result in a prison sentence.

The EU has not suggested that the NSC be abolished, but only that it be transformed into an informal and extraconstitutional consultative body with a civilian majority. Unsurprisingly, this idea was well received in Turkey's liberal circles. But the chief of staff hastened to dispel any illusions about the reform. Reminding Turks that the NSC's decisions are taken not by majority vote but by consensus, he declared that the council could include "even one hundred civilians, if that's what they want." As the editor in chief of the *Turkish Daily News,* Ilnur Çevik, explained, the chief of staff's apparent equanimity stemmed from the fact that the military's "qualitative superiority" on the council assured that the "consensus" it favored would be maintained—whoever joined the body. As Çevik wrote, "The military present their views and want them to be taken into consideration; no government dares challenge their views and 'advice.'" To ensure compliance, special offices set up within the general staff monitor the activities of most ministries.

The military's "qualitative superiority," as Çevik called it, is guaranteed by a number of articles of the constitution. For example, the constitution gives the chief of staff more power than the defense minister and all other members of government. Although the chief of staff comes after the prime minister in the order of protocol, in fact he has more authority in the most sensitive areas of the state. The head of the military is, in effect, responsible for the country's internal and external security, including the intelligence agencies. It is he who decides on nominations and promotions within the armed forces and who formulates defense policy.

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The armed forces enjoy a similar autonomy in the judicial domain, having their own laws, courts, and judges to deal with matters concerning military personnel—including cases where civilians are involved. Any public criticism of the military (in the press, for example) found to be "insulting" can result in prison sentences of up to six years. Crimes of opinion are tried in state security courts, until recently presided over by high-ranking officers. These tribunals enforce "emergency laws" in Turkey's nine Kurdish provinces, where an official state of emergency has been in force since the Kurdish Workers Party (PKK) launched its guerrilla war in 1984. The EU has demanded the abolition of these special courts on the grounds that they are "incompatible with a democratic system and contrary to the principles of the European Convention on Human Rights." But for the time being, at least, they remain in place.

Equally unacceptable to the Europeans is the very concept of freedom as enunciated in the Turkish constitution, the preamble to which reads, in part,

> No protection will be extended to thoughts or opinions contrary to Turkish national interests, the principle of the indivisibility of Turkey ... [or] to Turkish historical and moral values ... [or] to the nationalism, principles, reforms, and modernity of Atatürk.

Not only does the vagueness of the terms open the door to abuses, but the provision makes "thoughts" and "opinions" as punishable as acts.

Similarly, Article 130 of the constitution stipulates that "scientific research and publications" not in keeping with the above-mentioned values are to be banned by the rectors of the universities, without prejudice to additional sanctions. The Turkish Council of Higher Education (known by the Turkish acronym YÖK), created under the 1982 constitution, has the power to fire any professor suspected of ideological dissidence (who can also be tried in the courts if considered dangerous to the public order). The penal code, a number of articles of which were borrowed from Mussolini's, facilitates the judges' task in this regard. Thus Ismail Besikçi, an ethnic Turk and well-known sociologist, was sentenced under various laws to more than 200 years in prison for having expressed allegedly pro-Kurdish "separatist" views in his scholarly works.

According to a study commissioned by the Turkish Press Council, Turkish law today restricts freedom of opinion through no less than

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152 legal texts—not counting the articles of the constitution. Article 312 of the penal code, for example, the abrogation of which the EU has repeatedly sought, penalizes views judged contrary to ethnic and religious harmony. This was the article used in 1998 to strip the 75-year-old Erbakan, a veteran of the political scene for more than three decades, of his civic rights for five years. The same article was applied again this year to sentence him to one year in prison for a campaign speech he gave in 1995, a year before he was appointed prime minister. Similarly, an arrest warrant was issued in August against Fethullah Gülen, a distinguished Muslim cleric who preaches tolerance and human rights. Though the warrant was subsequently dismissed, another prosecutor indicted him again for "planning to establish a theocratic dictatorship." Gülen, who is living in the United States while undergoing medical treatment, is the spiritual leader of an Islamic brotherhood that operates a network of hundreds of schools in Turkey and abroad that have won praise even from the ardently secularist Bülent Ecevit, Turkey's current prime minister. As Çevik editorialized in the *Turkish Daily News,* "Gülen and his people have done nothing but serve this country, yet we still want to harm them by sending Gülen to prison. Isn't this odd?"

Not if one shares the view of the pashas, who tend to be suspicious of any Muslim activist who is not under state control. As General Hilmi Özkök, speaking in August at his inauguration as chief of the army, declared, any "concession to radical Islamic factions will bring this country back to the darkness of the Middle Ages."

Finally, in addition to the constitution and penal code, the EU has also objected to a number of other laws. These restrict basic rights in various ways: by restricting and outlawing the formation of political parties, professional associations, and unions; by constraining the status of civil servants; by mandating dress codes; and so on.

MERCANTILE MILITARISM

APART FROM its constitutional guarantees, the political power of the pashas would be easier to curtail if it did not rest so firmly on considerable economic and financial means as well. In Turkey, it is the chief of staff, not the prime minister, cabinet, or parliament,

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who oversees arms production and procurement (which do not figure in the state budget). It is also the general staff that draws up the annual budget of the armed forces (even though it absorbs more than a third of state revenues). Given the amounts involved—for example, the modernization of the armed forces will cost some $70 billion over the next 15 years—such budgetary control affords the military huge power. Time-honored tradition has it that parliament approves the military budget as is, without debate and by acclamation, before presenting it to the chief of staff along with its congratulations and good wishes. Again, civilian resistance is dangerous; among the "crimes" perpetrated by Erbakan that led to his downfall was his refusal to release funds requested by the chief of staff beyond the budget already approved by parliament.

Then there are the military-controlled industries. In a recent study, Taha Parla, a professor at Bosphorus University, throws light on the army's most important holdings. The main one, OYAK, is a vast conglomerate comprising some 30 enterprises in sectors as diverse as automobile manufacturing, cement works, food processing, pesticides, petroleum, tourism, insurance, banking, real estate, supermarkets, and high technology. These enterprises employ more than 30,000 people. One of the most important companies of the group is OYAK-Renault, which has an annual production capacity of 160,000 French-designed vehicles.

OYAK, among the three or four largest holding companies in Turkey, is unquestionably one of the most profitable. And with good reason: the group is exempt from duties and taxes. Big business puts up with what could be considered unfair competition because OYAK, shrewdly, has integrated the business community into its activities: OYAK's partners include the powerful holding companies of the Koç and Sabanci families—the "emperors" of Turkey's industry and trade—as well the private banking baron Kazim Taşkent. For their part, big Turkish corporations co-opt retired senior officers to serve on their boards, not only as compensation for services rendered but to maintain links with the current army brass.

OYAK's sister firm, TSKGV (Foundation for the Strengthening of the Turkish Armed Forces), is devoted exclusively to arms production. Benefiting from the same privileges as OYAK, TSKGV comprises some

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30 companies and generates tens of thousands of jobs. More than 80 percent of its revenues go into a reserve fund estimated to reach tens of billions of dollars.

ENEMIES WITHIN

THE MILITARY'S economic base, its unique constitutional status, and a plethora of repressive laws do not alone determine the balance of power between the military and the civilian authority. Other factors can play a role as well. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, for example, a combination of favorable circumstances and good statecraft on the part of then President Turgut Özal allowed him to temporarily curtail the pashas' ability to intervene in the government. Thus when Özal decided to support the allied forces during the Gulf war in 1991, the chief of staff, General Torumtay, could only resign in protest. Nor did the pashas move when Özal, acting against their well-known convictions, began to prepare the way for a political solution to the Kurdish problem and for integrating Turkey's Islamic sectors into the mainstream political system.

Özal's successors have had neither his stature nor the kind of circumstances that would enable them to follow his example, however. After Özal's death in 1993, the high command of the armed forces quickly regained the upper hand, assuming tasks it considered vital for Turkey's future. Seeing that their raison d'être had suffered a blow with the collapse of the Soviet Union and the bankruptcy of communism, the generals now launched a battle against two other enemies: Kurdish separatists and Islamic fundamentalists. The military expected this two-front war to confirm its traditional legitimacy as guardian of the Kemalist legacy and to increase its credibility with the public. To this end, ordinary Turks were bombarded with apocalyptic descriptions of the dangers in their midst.

The generals' hand was also strengthened by growing public disenchantment with the traditional political parties, whose servility to the military and apparent inability to take the least initiative further aggravated the power imbalance. The pashas thus received free rein both to diagnose the illness and to prescribe the treatment.

From the outset, the general staff dismissed the possibility of a political solution to either problem. Two all-out wars—one military,

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the other political—were launched against the two movements, Kurdish and Islamic. Drastic action was justified on the grounds that the PKK and the Islamist party were both determined to destroy Kemalist Turkey, the first by dismembering it, the second by infecting it with the virus of fundamentalism. The generals insisted that the movements were puppets in the hands of foreign powers, which supplied them generously with funds, arms, and logistical support. According to military statements made at the time, almost all of Turkey's neighbors—Syria, Iraq, Iran, Greece, Cyprus, Armenia, Sudan, Libya, and Russia—were involved, not to mention Germany, the EU, and sometimes even the United States. These Western states were accused of being too indulgent toward the Islamists, the Kurds, or both.

The army pursued its war against the Kurds relentlessly. When in 1993 the PKK renounced its senseless separatist ambitions, proposing to end the armed conflict in order to negotiate autonomy or even decentralization for the Kurdish provinces of the southeast, the general staff ignored the offers or rejected them as "tricks." The PKK's leaders—by way of their various contradictions, political errors, and outright crimes—only made things easier for the generals. With their fuzzy Marxism-Leninism followed by attempts to ally themselves with the Islamists, their preference for armed struggle over political combat, and the atrocities they committed against civilians—Turkish and Kurdish alike—the Kurdish warlords served the interests of the hard-liners in Ankara.

The EU, like the United States, has always condemned separatism and terrorism. But it deems unacceptable the notion that these ills justify authoritarian rule, state repression, and the violation of human rights. The Turkish military's attitude, on the other hand, can be summed up in a 1995 statement by Deputy Chief of Staff Ahmet Görekçi, when he announced that the army would "not allow itself to be bound hand and foot by democracy and human rights."

Nor has it, judging from the human rights reports published annually by the U.S. State Department and by various nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). Over the years, individuals who advocate conciliation, including parliamentarians of Kurdish origin, have been imprisoned by the hundreds. Parties formed by moderate Kurds have been outlawed one after another. Torture has become widespread, and disappearances and assassinations of lawyers, journalists, politicians,

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and business executives suspected of sympathizing with the rebels have multiplied. According to the Turkish Ministry of Justice, in addition to the 35,000 people killed in military campaigns, 17,500 were assassinated between 1984, when the conflict began, and 1998. An additional 1,000 people were reportedly assassinated in the first nine months of 1999. According to the Turkish press, the authors of these crimes, none of whom have been arrested, belong to groups of mercenaries working either directly or indirectly for the security agencies.

By 1999, the PKK had been totally defeated. Its leader, Abdullah Öcalan, was imprisoned and condemned to death. The group's other leaders have since renounced violence and called on their followers to disband and to defend their cause "within the framework of peace and democracy." Rather than responding to these overtures, the army, unperturbed, continues to carry out "mopping up" operations in Turkey and northern Iraq, where former fighters have taken refuge. Emergency laws and the special courts are still in force in the nine Kurdish provinces. Capital punishment has not been abolished, despite Turkey's commitment to do so in keeping with EU demands. Nor is there any prospect of recognizing the Kurds' rights, since in the eyes of the military and civilian authorities the Kurds do not exist as a community. This extends even to cultural matters, such as teaching or broadcasting radio and television programs in Kurdish. Given this situation, it is not surprising that the Kurds are enthusiastic supporters of Turkey's EU membership. At least Brussels demands that their elementary rights be respected.

Meanwhile, the struggle—this one political—against the Islamists continues with the same tenacity. After outlawing the Rifah (Prosperity) Party two years ago, the legal procedure to ban its successor, the Fazilet (Virtue) Party, is already under way. The government's wrath against the Islamists seemed undiminished by Fazilet's setbacks in the last elections, when it fell from first to third place in the parliament. Nor is Ankara mollified by the fact that Fazilet's program and goals have been so moderated that certain media no longer consider it a "fundamentalist" party, while others describe its leaders as "Muslim Democrats." Indeed, the comparison to Europe's moderate Christian Democrats is apt. What exasperates the supporters of the status quo is that Fazilet, like Rifah before it, has made itself the

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champion of democratization and human rights, thereby implicitly challenging the political power of the army.

DOUBLE VISION

TURKEY'S EU CANDIDACY has crystallized the way in which two very different visions of the country are now facing off in a contest the outcome of which is difficult to predict. On the one side stands the Turkey of what can be called the "Kemalist republicans," those who see the military as the infallible interpreter of Atatürk's legacy and the sole guardian of the nation and the state. This side has formidable power; the military enjoys not only enormous constitutional and legislative advantages but also unrivaled prestige among large sectors of the population. As a university professor in Istanbul remarked this summer, "If the Turkish people had to choose between the European Union and our army, they would choose the army!"

On the other side stand—rather cautiously—what could be called the "Kemalist democrats." They are proud of the revolution carried out by the founder of the republic eight decades ago, but at the same time they believe that the regime should adapt to modernity and Western norms. This group includes intellectuals who maintain that Turkey needs democratization regardless of EU requirements, business circles in favor of the globalization of the economy, and (perhaps ironically) Kurds and Islamists hopeful that Brussels will ensure that their legitimate rights are recognized and guaranteed.

In a recent attempt to tip the scales in favor of his own brand of Kemalism, Chief of Staff Hüsayn Kivrikoglu made an ominous declaration on August 30. Warning the government and political parties to make sure that the bill to purge suspect civil servants is adopted as soon as parliament reconvenes, Kivrikoglu added that the army would closely monitor the process to determine how "sincere" the politicians are in "removing the rotten apples" or "reactionaries" who "have infiltrated the state by the thousands in the aim of destroying it." The chief of staff went on to note that even the judiciary has been infected by the Islamic virus, citing as an example the cancellation (subsequently reversed) of Gülen's arrest warrant.

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Though the general's remarks sounded like an ultimatum, Hikmet Sami Türk, the minister of justice and himself a staunch secularist, had the courage to respond (albeit indirectly) that Turkey should avoid witch hunts and McCarthyism. And so tensions mount. With the civil service purge in the works and Brussels' "accession partnership document" soon to be considered, a confrontation between the army and civil society seems inevitable. Despite the unprecedentedly large numbers of people now willing to challenge the military's hold on Turkey's affairs, not everyone is optimistic about the outcome. In a remarkable forthcoming book, Ümit Cizre, a professor at Bilkent University in Ankara, laments that

> civil society has increasing latitude but no real strength; parliament contains opposition forces but has no real teeth; the judiciary operates with some independence at times but is by and large controlled politically; media can uncover the dark connections of organized crime, but is itself oligopolistically owned and is prone to nationalist and populist influences.

Will Turkey miss the boat for the European Union? Some of the pashas, jealous of their power, hope that it will. Others are betting that, owing to Turkey's strategic and economic importance and out of "respect for Turkey's national specificities" (to use Prime Minister Ecevit's delicate phrase), the EU will let Turkey into the union after only cosmetic reforms. This seems unlikely. But all that is certain today—as Turkey stands facing two very different paths forward—is that the negotiations between Ankara and Brussels will be difficult, painful, and will most likely last for many years to come.

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Pakistan's Jihad Culture

Jessica Stern

FREE AGENTS

THIS SPRING the U.S. State Department reported that South Asia has replaced the Middle East as the leading locus of terrorism in the world. Although much has been written about religious militants in the Middle East and Afghanistan, little is known in the West about those in Pakistan—perhaps because they operate mainly in Kashmir and, for now at least, do not threaten security outside South Asia. General Pervez Musharraf, Pakistan's military ruler, calls them "freedom fighters" and admonishes the West not to confuse jihad with terrorism. Musharraf is right about the distinction—the jihad doctrine delineates acceptable war behavior and explicitly outlaws terrorism—but he is wrong about the militant groups' activities. Both sides of the war in Kashmir—the Indian army and the Pakistani "mujahideen"—are targeting and killing thousands of civilians, violating both the Islamic "just war" tradition and international law.

Pakistan has two reasons to support the so-called mujahideen. First, the Pakistani military is determined to pay India back for allegedly fomenting separatism in what was once East Pakistan and in 1971 became Bangladesh. Second, India dwarfs Pakistan in population, economic strength, and military might. In 1998 India spent about two percent of its $469 billion GDP on defense, including an active armed force of more than 1.1 million personnel. In the same year, Pakistan spent about five percent of its $61 billion GDP on defense, yielding an active armed force only half the size of India's. The U.S. government

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estimates that India has 400,000 troops in Indian-held Kashmir—a force more than two-thirds as large as Pakistan's entire active army. The Pakistani government thus supports the irregulars as a relatively cheap way to keep Indian forces tied down.

What does such support entail? It includes, at a minimum, assisting the militants' passage into Indian-held Kashmir. This much Pakistani officials will admit, at least privately. The U.S. government believes that Pakistan also funds, trains, and equips the irregulars. Meanwhile, the Indian government claims that Pakistan uses them as an unofficial guerrilla force to carry out "dirty tricks," murders, and terrorism in India. Pakistan, in turn, accuses India's intelligence service of committing terrorism and killing hundreds of civilians in Pakistan.

Pakistan now faces a typical principal-agent problem: the interests of Pakistan (the principal) and those of the militant groups (the agent) are not fully aligned. Although the irregulars may serve Pakistan's interests in Kashmir when they target the Indian army, they also kill civilians and perform terrorism in violation of international norms and law. These crimes damage Pakistan's already fragile international reputation. Finally, and most important for Pakistanis, the militant groups that Pakistan supports and the Sunni sectarian killers that Pakistan claims it wants to wipe out overlap significantly. By facilitating the activities of the irregulars in Kashmir, the Pakistani government is inadvertently promoting internal sectarianism, supporting international terrorists, weakening the prospect for peace in Kashmir, damaging Pakistan's international image, spreading a narrow and violent version of Islam throughout the region, and increasing tensions with India—all against the interests of Pakistan as a whole.

PAKISTAN, TALIBAN-STYLE?

The war between India and Pakistan over the fate of Kashmir is as old as both states. When Pakistan was formally created in 1947, the rulers of Muslim-majority states that had existed within British India were given the option of joining India or Pakistan. The Hindu monarch of the predominantly Muslim state of Jammu and Kashmir chose India, prompted partly by a tribal rebellion in the state. Pakistan responded by sending in troops. The resultant fighting ended with a

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

CORBIS-BETTMANN

The future face of extremism: Afghan boy at religious school, Pakistan, 1989

1949 cease-fire, but the Pakistani government continued covertly to support volunteer guerrilla fighters in Kashmir. Islamabad argued then, as it does now, that it could not control the volunteers, who as individuals were not bound by the cease-fire agreement. (On the other hand, Maulana Abul A'la Maududi, the late founder of the Islamist party Jamaat-e-Islami, argued that as individuals, these "mujahideen" could not legitimately declare jihad, either.)

Pakistani officials admit to having tried repeatedly to foment separatism in Kashmir in the decades following the 1948 cease-fire. These attempts were largely unsuccessful; when separatist violence broke out in the late 1980s, the movement was largely indigenous. For their part, Indian officials admit their own culpability in creating an intolerable situation in the region. They ignored Kashmir's significant economic troubles, rampant corruption, and rigged elections, and they intervened in Kashmiri politics in ways that contradicted India's own constitution. As American scholar Sumit Ganguly explains, the rigged 1987 state-assembly elections were the final straw in a series of insults, igniting, by 1989, widespread violent opposition. By 1992,

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Pakistani nationals and other graduates of the Afghan war were joining the fight in Kashmir.

What began as an indigenous, secular movement for independence has become an increasingly Islamist crusade to bring all of Kashmir under Pakistani control. Pakistan-based Islamist groups (along with Hizb-ul-Mujahideen, a Kashmir-based group created by Jamaat-e-Islami and partly funded by Pakistan) are now significantly more important than the secular Kashmir-based ones. The Indian government estimates that about 40 percent of the militants in Kashmir today are Pakistani or Afghan, and some 80 percent are teenagers. Although the exact size of the movement is unknown, the Indian government estimates that 3,000 to 4,000 "mujahideen" are in Kashmir at any given time.

Whatever their exact numbers, these Pakistani militant groups—among them, Lashkar-i-Taiba and Harkat-ul-Mujahideen—pose a long-term danger to international security, regional stability, and especially Pakistan itself. Although their current agenda is limited to "liberating" Kashmir, which they believe was annexed by India illegally, their next objective is to turn Pakistan into a truly Islamic state. Islamabad supports these volunteers as a cheap way to keep India off balance. In the process, however, it is creating a monster that threatens to devour Pakistani society.

SCHOOLS OF HATE

In Pakistan, as in many developing countries, education is not mandatory. The World Bank estimates that only 40 percent of Pakistanis are literate, and many rural areas lack public schools. Islamic religious schools—madrasahs—on the other hand, are located all over the country and provide not only free education, but also free food, housing, and clothing. In the poor areas of southern Punjab, madrasahs funded by the Sunni sectarian political party Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP) reportedly even pay parents for sending them their children.

In the 1980s, Pakistani dictator General Mohammad Zia-ul-Haq promoted the madrasahs as a way to garner the religious parties' support for his rule and to recruit troops for the anti-Soviet war in

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Afghanistan. At the time, many madrasahs were financed by the *zakat* (the Islamic tithe collected by the state), giving the government at least a modicum of control. But now, more and more religious schools are funded privately—by wealthy Pakistani industrialists at home or abroad, by private and government-funded nongovernmental organizations in the Persian Gulf states and Saudi Arabia, and by Iran. Without state supervision, these madrasahs are free to preach a narrow and violent version of Islam.

Most madrasahs offer only religious instruction, ignoring math, science, and other secular subjects important for functioning in modern society. As Maududi warned in his 1960 book, *First Principles of the Islamic State*, "those who choose the theological branch of learning generally keep themselves utterly ignorant of [secular subjects, thereby remaining] incapable of giving any lead to the people regarding modern political problems."

Even worse, some extremist madrasahs preach jihad without understanding the concept: They equate jihad—which most Islamic scholars interpret as the striving for justice (and principally an inner striving to purify the self)—with guerrilla warfare. These schools encourage their graduates, who often cannot find work because of their lack of practical education, to fulfill their "spiritual obligations" by fighting against Hindus in Kashmir or against Muslims of other sects in Pakistan. Pakistani officials estimate that 10 to 15 percent of the country's tens of thousands of madrasahs espouse such extremist ideologies.

Pakistan's interior minister Moinuddin Haider, for one, recognizes these problems. "The brand of Islam they are teaching is not good for Pakistan," he says. "Some, in the garb of religious training, are busy fanning sectarian violence, poisoning people's minds." In June, Haider announced a reform plan that would require all madrasahs to register with the government, expand their curricula, disclose their financial resources, seek permission for admitting foreign students, and stop sending students to militant training camps.

This is not the first time the Pakistani government has announced such plans. And Haider's reforms so far seem to have failed, whether because of the regime's negligence or the madrasahs' refusal to be regulated, or both. Only about 4,350 of the estimated 40,000 to 50,000 madrasahs in Pakistan have registered with the government. Some are

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still sending students to training camps despite parents' instructions not to do so. Moreover, some chancellors are unwilling to expand their curricula, arguing that madrasahs are older than Pakistan itself—having been "designed 1,200 years ago in Iraq," according to the chancellor of the Khudamudeen madrasah. The chancellor of Darul Uloom Haqqania objects to what he calls the government's attempt to "destroy the spirit of the madrasahs under the cover of broadening their curriculum."

Mujibur Rehman Inqalabi, the SSP's second in command, told me that Haider's reform plan is "against Islam" and complains that where states have taken control of madrasahs, such as in Jordan and Egypt, "the engine of jihad is extinguished." America is right, he said: "Madrasahs are the supply line for jihad."

JIHAD INTERNATIONAL, INC.

IF MADRASAHS supply the labor for "jihad," then wealthy Pakistanis and Arabs around the world supply the capital. On Eid-ul-Azha, the second most important Muslim holiday of the year, anyone who can afford to sacrifices an animal and gives the hide to charity. Pakistani militant groups solicit such hide donations, which they describe as a significant source of funding for their activities in Kashmir.

Most of the militant groups' funding, however, comes in the form of anonymous donations sent directly to their bank accounts. Lashkar-i-Taiba ("Army of the Pure"), a rapidly growing Ahle Hadith (Wahhabi) group, raises funds on the Internet. Lashkar and its parent organization, Markaz ad-Da'wa Wal Irshad (Center for Islamic Invitation and Guidance), have raised so much money, mostly from sympathetic Wahhabis in Saudi Arabia, that they are reportedly planning to open their own bank.

Individual "mujahideen" also benefit financially from this generous funding. They are in this for the loot, explains Ahmed Rashid, a prominent Pakistani journalist. One mid-level manager of Lashkar told me he earns 15,000 rupees a month—more than seven times what the average Pakistani makes, according to the World Bank. Top leaders of militant groups earn much more; one leader took me to see his mansion, which was staffed by servants and filled with expensive furniture. Operatives receive smaller salaries but win bonuses for successful missions. Such

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earnings are particularly attractive in a country with a 40 percent official poverty rate, according to Pakistani government statistics.

The United States and Saudi Arabia funneled some $3.5 billion into Afghanistan and Pakistan during the Afghan war, according to Milt Bearden, CIA station chief in Pakistan from 1986 to 1989. "Jihad," along with guns and drugs, became the most important business in the region. The business of "jihad"—what the late scholar Eqbal Ahmad dubbed "Jihad International, Inc."—continues to attract foreign investors, mostly wealthy Arabs in the Persian Gulf region and members of the Pakistani diaspora. (As World Bank economist Paul Collier observes, diaspora populations often prolong ethnic and religious conflicts by contributing not only capital but also extremist rhetoric, since the fervor of the locals is undoubtedly held in check by the prospect of losing their own sons.)

As the so-called jihad movement continues to acquire its own financial momentum, it will become increasingly difficult for Pakistan to shut down, if and when it tries. As long as "Jihad International, Inc." is profitable, those with financial interests in the war will work to prolong it. And the longer the war in Kashmir lasts, the more entrenched these interests will become.

ADDICTED TO JIHAD

As SOME IRREGULARS are financially dependent on what they consider jihad, others are spiritually and psychologically so. Many irregulars who fought in Afghanistan are now fighting in Kashmir and are likely to continue looking for new "jihads" to fight—even against Pakistan itself. Khalil, who has been a "mujahid" for 19 years and can no longer imagine another life, told me, "A person addicted to heroin can get off it if he really tries, but a mujahid cannot leave the jihad. I am spiritually addicted to jihad." Another Harkat operative told me,

> We won't stop—even if India gave us Kashmir. … We'll [also] bring jihad here. There is already a movement here to make Pakistan a pure Islamic state. Many preach Islam, but most of them don't know what it means. We want to see a Taliban-style regime here.

Aspirations like these are common among the irregulars I have interviewed over the last couple of years.

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The "jihad" movement is also developing a spiritual momentum linked to its financial one. Madrasahs often teach their students that jihad—or, in the extremist schools, terrorism under the guise of jihad—is a spiritual duty. Whereas wealthy Pakistanis would rather donate their money than their sons to the cause, families in poor, rural areas are likely to send their sons to "jihad" under the belief that doing so is the only way to fulfill this spiritual duty. One mother whose son recently died fighting in Kashmir told me she would be happy if her six remaining sons were martyred. "They will help me in the next life, which is the real life," she said.

When a boy becomes a martyr, thousands of people attend his funeral. Poor families become celebrities. Everyone treats them with more respect after they lose a son, a martyr's father said. "And when there is a martyr in the village, it encourages more children to join the jihad. It raises the spirit of the entire village," he continued. In poor families with large numbers of children, a mother can assume that some of her children will die of disease if not in war. This apparently makes it easier to donate a son to what she feels is a just and holy cause.

Many of these families receive financial assistance from the militant groups. The Shuhda-e-Islam Foundation, founded in 1995 by Jamaat-e-Islami, claims to have dispensed 13 million rupees to the families of martyrs. It also claims to provide financial support to some 364 families by paying off loans, setting them up in businesses, or helping them with housing. Moreover, the foundation provides emotional and spiritual support by constantly reminding the families that they did the right thing by donating their children to assist their Muslim brethren in Kashmir. Both Lashkar-i-Taiba and Harkat have also established charitable organizations that reward the families of martyrs—a practice common to gangs in inner-city Los Angeles and terrorist groups such as al Qaeda and Hamas. Although these foundations provide a service to families in need, they also perpetuate a culture of violence.

BAD BOYS

THE COMPARISON to gangs and terrorist groups is particularly apt because the irregulars often hire criminals to do their dirty work—and sometimes turn to petty or organized crime themselves.

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Criminals are typically hired to "drop" weapons and explosives or to carry out extreme acts of violence that a typical irregular is reluctant or unable to perform. For example, members of the Dubai-based crime ring that bombed the Bombay stock exchange in March 1993 later confessed that they had been in Islamabad the previous month, where Pakistani irregulars had allegedly trained them to throw hand grenades and fire Kalashnikov assault rifles. Law-enforcement authorities noted that the operatives' passports contained no Pakistani stamps, suggesting the complicity of the Pakistani government.

Criminals joining supposed jihad movements tend to be less committed to the group's purported goals and more committed to violence for its own sake—or for the money. When criminals join private armies, therefore, the political and moral constraints that often inhibit mass-casualty, random attacks are likely to break down. Criminal involvement in the movement also worsens the principal-agent problem for Pakistan: pure mercenaries are even harder to control than individuals whose goals are at least partly aligned with those of the state.

EXPORTING HOLY WAR

EXACERBATING the principal-agent problem, Pakistani militant groups are now exporting their version of jihad all over the world. The Khudamudeen madrasah, according to its chancellor, is training students from Burma, Nepal, Chechnya, Bangladesh, Afghanistan, Yemen, Mongolia, and Kuwait. Out of the 700 students at the madrasah, 127 are foreigners. Nearly half the student body at Darul Uloom Haqqania, the madrasah that created the Taliban, is from Afghanistan. It also trains students from Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Russia, and Turkey, and is currently expanding its capacity to house foreign students from 100 to 500, its chancellor said. A Chechen student at the school told me his goal when he returned home was to fight Russians. And according to the U.S. State Department, Pakistani groups and individuals also help finance and train the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, a terrorist organization that aims to overthrow secular governments in Central Asia.

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Many of the militant groups associated with radical madrasahs regularly proclaim their plans to bring "jihad" to India proper as well as to the West, which they believe is run by Jews. Lashkar-i-Taiba has announced its plans to "plant Islamic flags in Delhi, Tel Aviv, and Washington." One of Lashkar's Web sites includes a list of purported Jews working for the Clinton administration, including director of presidential personnel Robert Nash (an African American from Arkansas) and CIA director George Tenet (a Greek American). The group also accuses Israel of assisting India in Kashmir. Asked for a list of his favorite books, a leader of Harkat recommended the history of Hitler, who he said understood that "Jews and peace are incompatible." Several militant groups boast pictures of burning American flags on their calendars and posters.

INTERNAL JIHAD

THE "JIHAD" against the West may be rhetorical (at least for now), but the ten-year-old sectarian war between Pakistan's Shi'a and Sunni is real and deadly. The Tehrik-e-Jafariya-e-Pakistan (TJP) was formed to protect the interests of Pakistan's Shi'a Muslims, who felt discriminated against by Zia's implementation of Sunni laws governing the inheritance and collection of *zakat*. Iran helped fund the TJP, probably in hopes of using it as a vehicle for an Iranian-style revolution in Pakistan. Five years later, Haq Nawaz Jhangvi, a Jamaat-ul-Ulema-e-Islam (JUI) cleric, established the SSP to offset the TJP and to promote the interests of Sunni Muslims. The SSP was funded by both Saudi Arabia and Iraq. Since then, violent gangs have formed on both sides.

After Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, a Sunni sectarian gang, attempted to assassinate then Prime Minister Muhammad Nawaz Sharif in early 1999, Sharif proposed to expand the special military courts that try terrorist crimes from Karachi to the rest of the country. Pakistan's Supreme Court later deemed the special courts unconstitutional. Musharraf has continued Sharif's attempt to rein in the terrorist groups by implementing, among other things, a "deweaponization" plan to reduce the availability of guns to sectarian gangs and criminals.

The problem for Musharraf is that it is difficult to promote the "jihad" in Kashmir and the Taliban in Afghanistan without inadvertently

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promoting sectarianism in Pakistan. The movements share madrasahs, camps, bureaucracies, and operatives. The JUI, the SSP's founding party, also helped create both the Taliban and Harkat. Deobandi madrasahs issue anti-Shi'a *fatwas* (edicts), and boys trained to fight in Kashmir are also trained to call Shi'a *kafirs* (infidels). Jaesh-e-Mohammad, an offshoot of Harkat and the newest Pakistani militant group in Kashmir, reportedly used SSP personnel during a fundraising drive in early 2000. And the SSP's Inqalabi, who was recently released after four years in jail for his alleged involvement in sectarian killings, told me that whenever "one of our youngsters wants to do jihad," they join up with the Taliban, Harkat, or Jaesh-e-Mohammad—all Deobandi groups that he claims are "close" to the SSP.

Sectarian clashes have killed or injured thousands of Pakistanis since 1990. As the American scholar Vali Nasr explains, the largely theological differences between Shi'a and Sunni Muslims have been transformed into full-fledged political conflict, with broad ramifications for law and order, social cohesion, and government authority. The impotent Pakistani government has essentially allowed Sunni Saudi Arabia and Shi'a Iran to fight a proxy war on Pakistani soil, with devastating consequences for the Pakistani people.

WHITHER PAKISTAN?

PAKISTAN is a weak state, and government policies are making it weaker still. Its disastrous economy, exacerbated by a series of corrupt leaders, is at the root of many of its problems. Yet despite its poverty, Pakistan is spending hundreds of millions of dollars on weapons instead of schools and public health. Ironically, the government's "cost-saving" measures are even more troubling. In trying to save money in the short run by using irregulars in Kashmir and relying on madrasahs to educate its youth, Pakistan is pursuing a path that is likely to be disastrous in the long run, allowing a culture of violence to take root.

The United States has asked Pakistan to crack down on the militant groups and to close certain madrasahs, but America must do more than just scold. After all, the United States, along with Saudi Arabia, helped create the first international "jihad" to fight the Soviet Union during the Afghan war. "Does America expect us to send in the

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troops and shut the madrasahs down?" one official asks. "Jihad is a mindset. It developed over many years during the Afghan war. You can't change a mindset in 24 hours."

The most important contribution the United States can make, then, is to help strengthen Pakistan's secular education system. Because so much international aid to Pakistan has been diverted through corruption, both public and private assistance should come in the form of relatively nonfungible goods and services: books, buildings, teachers, and training, rather than money. Urdu-speaking teachers from around the world should be sent to Pakistan to help. And educational exchanges among students, scholars, journalists, and military officials should be encouraged and facilitated. Helping Pakistan educate its youth will not only cut off the culture of violence by reducing ignorance and poverty, it will also promote long-term economic development.

Moreover, assisting Pakistan will make the world a safer place. As observers frequently note, conflict between India and Pakistan over Kashmir is one of the most likely routes to nuclear war in the world today. The Pakistani militants' continued incursions into Indian-held Kashmir escalate the conflict, greatly increasing the risk of nuclear war between the two countries.

Although the United States can help, Pakistan must make its own changes. It must stamp out corruption, strengthen democratic institutions, and make education a much higher priority. But none of this can happen if Pakistan continues to devote an estimated 30 percent of its national budget to defense.

Most important, Pakistan must recognize the militant groups for what they are: dangerous gangs whose resources and reach continue to grow, threatening to destabilize the entire region. Pakistan's continued support of religious militant groups suggests that it does not recognize its own susceptibility to the culture of violence it has helped create. It should think again.

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Restoring the Forests

David G. Victor and Jesse H. Ausubel

SKINHEAD EARTH?

EIGHT THOUSAND YEARS AGO, when humans played only bit parts in the world ecosystem, trees covered two-fifths of the land. Since then, humans have grown in number while thinning and shaving the forests to cook, keep warm, grow crops, plank ships, frame houses, and make paper. Fires, saws, and axes have cleared about half of the original forestland, and some analysts warn that within decades, the remaining natural forests will disappear altogether.

But forests matter. A good deal of the planet's biological diversity lives in forests (mostly in the tropics), and this diversity diminishes as trees fall. Healthy forests protect watersheds and generate clean drinking water; they remove carbon dioxide (a greenhouse gas that traps heat in the atmosphere) from the air and thus help maintain the climate. Forests count—not just for their ecological and industrial services but also for the sake of order and beauty.

Fortunately, the twentieth century witnessed the start of a "Great Restoration" of the world's forests. Efficient farmers and foresters are learning to spare forestland by growing more food and fiber in ever-smaller areas. Meanwhile, increased use of metals, plastics, and electricity has eased the need for timber. And recycling has cut the amount of virgin wood pulped into paper. Although the size and wealth of the human population has shot up, the area of farm and forestland

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

Sources (rounded estimates): 6000 B.C., World Conservation Monitoring Centre, World Resources Institute, and World Commission on Forests and Sustainable Development; 1990s, U.N. Food and Agriculture Organization Global Fibre Supply Model data; 2050, authors' projections.

that must be dedicated to feed, heat, and house this population is shrinking. Slowly, trees can return to the liberated land.

In the United States, this Great Restoration began with a big stick. Horrified that farmers and loggers were stripping America of its trees five times faster than they were growing, and worried about the economic consequences of a "timber famine," President Theodore Roosevelt created the federal Forest Service and pushed landowners to start sustaining timber resources. Since about 1950, U.S. forest cover has increased—despite the country's emergence as the world's bread and wood basket. Geographers have observed a transition from deforestation to reforestation in countries as distant as France and New Zealand, where new production methods have spared forests and regulation has locked the gains in place. Studies by forest experts in Finland reveal that by the 1980s, wooded areas were increasing in all major temperate and boreal forests. These mid- and high-latitude forests account for half the world's total and span some 60 countries. Such forests today are also healthier: the biomass (or total amount of living matter) per hectare (100 meters square, or about 2.5 acres) has increased even more rapidly than the size of the forests themselves.

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

But the Great Restoration is far from complete. Despite major gains in some areas, the world's sylvan balance sheet still bleeds trees, owing to widespread deforestation in the tropics. Yet even there, progress has begun to peek through. Preliminary satellite data suggest that the rate of tropical deforestation has slowed ten percent in the last decade. New studies in tropical western Africa reveal that deforestation in that region is only one-third the rate previously believed, and in some areas forests are rebounding. Brazil, for its part, is often in the forest press. Farmers' fires, cattle ranching, and timber cutting denude the Brazilian Amazon by perhaps half a percent each year, and the government seems powerless to stop it. By some estimates, four-fifths of Brazil's local wood consumption is illegally felled. Yet at the same time, Brazil has become a powerhouse in forest planting. Established on already degraded and abandoned land, eucalyptus and pine stands in Brazil supply a rising fraction of the world's lumber and paper and relieve the pressure on natural forests.

Yet still the world's forest estate dwindles. Even in countries where woody areas are expanding, threats to the remaining uninterrupted original tracts of trees—what the World Resources Institute calls "frontier forests"—have not vanished. Earth's trees therefore need a comprehensive and durable solution: to expand and accelerate the Great Restoration worldwide. Agriculture and logging—the two

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main threats to natural forests—must continue their transformation into modern, ultra-efficient industries.

The seedlings and saplings of this transformation have already been planted. But the progress and potential of modern agriculture and forestry remain little known to many policymakers, and requisite techniques are reviled by others who prefer "natural," low-intensity production. And in much of the world, the conditions necessary for these new methods, such as affordable commercial energy and effective land-use regulation, remain elusive.

The chart on pages 128–129 illustrates the immense areas at stake. Two paths now stand open. Along one, leading to the "Skinhead Earth" scenario, quaint and inefficient agriculture and forestry will persevere. By 2050, forests will dwindle by 200 million hectares—about five times the area of California—and lumberjacks will regularly shave about 40 percent of forests. Along the other, however, farmers and foresters will intensify production and shrink their footprint. Forests will spread anew to more than 200 million hectares, and only 12 percent of forestlands will hear cries of "timber." This vision for a Great Restoration is realistic—one that the right domestic and foreign policies can secure. The focus is on the year 2050. That may seem distant, but trees grow slowly, and capital-intensive logging firms adjust their practices gradually. In one decade—the time frame for most foreign policies—little change can appear. But five decades' work, with steady guidance, will make the restoration of the forests truly great.

SMART FOOD

MANY DIFFERENT FORCES, including urban sprawl, pollution, and fire, can diminish forests. But around the world, agriculture and timber cutting do much of the clearing. Farmers are usually cited as forests' primary foes. As *Time*'s millennial Earth Day issue lamented, "agriculture is the world's biggest cause of deforestation."

Just how much land is actually needed for agriculture integrates several variables: the size of the population, its income and diet, and the yield of crops grown. Already, growth in human numbers is slowing—the present population growth rate of 1.3 percent per year has declined steadily from a peak of more than 2 percent around 1970.

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Still, by 2050, the total population will have increased, perhaps to as much as 8 or 10 billion. Taming population growth further will likely lessen the threat to forests, but protecting the forests seems only a marginal addition to the impetus for population reduction.

Rising income, meanwhile, has raised the population's demand for food, multiplying the effect of its growing numbers. The rich eat more than do the poor. But the main effect of income growth has been to add meat to many diets. And in terms of land used, eating animals that eat plants is less efficient than eating plants directly. As a rule of thumb, a vegetarian diet requires about 3,000 primary calories daily. Meat-eaters consume twice that amount. Vegetarian diets could therefore markedly reduce the land required to grow food. But secretaries of state are unlikely to convince carnivores to switch from T-bones to tofu.

Given the difficulty in changing population and diet, the best way to reduce food's impact on forests will be to change the fourth factor: how farmers grow crops. Yield—the amount of crops produced per hectare of land—is the key indicator. Over the last quarter-century, average yields of cereal grains, including maize, rice, and wheat, rose 1.8 percent each year worldwide. Some countries achieved dismal results—yields rose only 0.8 percent per year in developing Africa and actually declined in Angola, Malawi, and Zimbabwe. Other countries, big ones, outpaced the pack. Yields rose an average of 2.5 percent annually in Indonesia and more than 3 percent yearly in China. These gains allowed the worldwide food supply to nearly double, while cropland expanded less than ten percent. In India, rising yields almost entirely offset increasing demand for cropland, so the area under cultivation barely changed.

The conventional wisdom, the "Skinhead Earth" scenario, holds that as much as 200 million hectares of forest will be lost in the next decades as agriculture extends to feed larger and richer populations. Current trends, however, suggest not balding but regrowth. If farmers sustain the 1.8 percent annual yield improvement they have achieved in recent decades, they could meet the growing demand for primary calories while releasing 200 million hectares of cropland.

But farmers can do even better than that and offer even more land to the trees. The authors' research with Paul Waggoner of the Connecticut Agriculture Experiment Station has shown that, with some extra effort, an increase in yield of two percent per year—a plausible goal—could

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spare a total of 400 million hectares. In other words, today's farmland could be cut by more than a quarter through smarter agricultural techniques. Sustaining a two percent rate of increase will not be easy, but history and technology suggest it can be done. Since sustained efforts to raise U.S. yields began in the 1940s, average yields for wheat and soybeans have almost tripled and corn yields have more than quadrupled. And farmers have hardly tapped the full potential. Champion American corn growers have lifted yields well above 20 tons per hectare without irrigation. Meanwhile, average U.S. corn yields stand at only 8 tons per hectare, and average world corn yields are a meager 4 tons.

How many of the hundreds of millions of hectares that farmers can spare will revert to trees? The amount depends on where cropland is abandoned and how people choose to use it. One and a half centuries ago, farmers had deforested two-thirds of Connecticut. Once they abandoned their farms to build guns and aircraft engines and sell insurance, however, the forests gradually recovered the landscape. But free land does not always become forest. In South Dakota, abandoned farms become grass prairies, not woodlands. Worldwide, no sure equation links the liberation of cropland to the return of trees. Guessing moderately, however, about half the land freed might eventually revert to forest—say, 200 million hectares, or three times the size of Texas and four times the size of Spain.

FAST FORESTS

FARMERS MAY NO LONGER pose much threat to forests. But what about lumberjacks? As with food, the area of land needed for wood is a multiple of population, income, "diet," and yield. The appropriate focus is on industrial wood—logs cut for lumber, plywood, and pulp for paper. Although trees are also cut for fuel, most fuel wood is thinned from hedgerows, shrubs, and other open sources—not forests.

Again, of the relevant factors, strategies to save the forests should not emphasize limiting population and income. Those government agencies and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) most concerned with forests have little leverage over the number of people, and societies should aim to expand, not shrink, their incomes.

That leaves "diet" and yields. The wood "diet" required to nourish an economy is determined by the tastes and actions of consumers and by the

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efficiency with which millers transform virgin wood into useful products. Changing tastes and technological advances are already lightening pressure on forests. Concrete, steel, and plastics have replaced much of the wood once used in railroad ties, house walls, and flooring. Genes, silicon, and even ceramics—not boards—are the growth materials for the new economy. Demand for lumber has become sluggish, and in the last decade, with the implosion of the wood-intensive Russian economy, world consumption of boards and plywood has actually declined.

But the appetite for "pulpwood"—logs that are chipped, softened into pulp, and then drawn into sheets of paper and board—is still climbing, driven by the five percent annual rise in pulp consumption in developing countries. Pulpwood accounts for more than a quarter of industrial wood consumption. Paperwork proliferates in developing countries, and inside the glass and steel shells of the new economy, information machines still consume paper voraciously. Reliable electronic archives and electronic books will eventually quiet the taste for paper. So far, however, life still requires hard copy.

Meanwhile, more efficient lumber and paper milling is already carving more value from the trees we cut. Because waste is costly, the best mills—operating under tight environmental regulations and the gaze of demanding shareholders—already make use of nearly the entire log. In the United States, for example, leftovers from lumber mills account for more than a third of the wood chips that are turned into pulp and paper; what is still left after that is burned for power. And further improvements in management and technology will squeeze even higher value out of products and spare more virgin wood. In British Columbia, since the mid-1980s, sawmills have lifted the lumber obtained per cubic meter of log at an average rate of 1.2 percent per year. Worldwide, the pulp and paper industry is shifting a significant share of production from chemical to mechanical pulping, which cuts the wood required for a ton of useful pulp by half. And recycling has helped close leaks in the paper cycle. In 1970, consumers recycled less than one-fifth of their paper; today, the world average is double that.

New engineering has also helped decouple demand for virgin wood from the swelling population and economy. For example, floor systems built from engineered wooden I-beams use about one-quarter less fiber than traditional construction with solid rectangular ribs. And as a

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substitute for plywood, millers make oriented strand board (OSB) by gluing wood flakes in perpendicular layers. OSB can be manufactured from small trees, and it consumes the whole tree, except for bark and limbs. By contrast, plywood mills—which peel timber into sheets and glue them together like cream cookies—work only with larger trees and leave an unpeeled core at the center of every log.

As this suggests, the wood products industry has learned to increase its revenue while moderating its consumption of trees. This is not surprising, for efforts to lower trade barriers and improve management of forest resources are increasingly exposing millers worldwide to prices, competition, and consumer requirements that are spreading innovation and efficiency more widely. Large, capital-intensive pulp and paper mills are already responding—their investors demand it. But in much of the world, sawmills thrive on remoteness, trade barriers, and artificially cheap logs that shield them from competition. By one estimate, 3,000 sawmills in Argentina function with an average input of only 1,000 cubic meters of wood per year. At such small scales—less than one-hundredth the size of the most modern sawmills—millers can hardly implement the most efficient practices.

Like fishers and hunters, foresters have typically exhausted local resources and then moved on.

Demand for industrial wood, now about 1.5 billion cubic meters per year, has risen only one percent annually since 1960 while the world economy has multiplied at nearly four times that rate. Conventional wisdom predicts that the total amount of wood harvested will reach 2.5 billion cubic meters in 2050. But the figure could be much lower if millers improve their efficiency, manufacturers deliver higher value through the better engineering of wood products, and consumers recycle and replace more. Together, these steps could shrink demand to about 2 billion cubic meters per year and thus reduce the area of forests cut for lumber and paper.

As with agriculture, yield—cubic meters of wood grown per hectare of forest each year—provides the largest leverage for change. Historically, forestry has been a classic primary industry; like fishers and hunters, foresters have exhausted local resources and then moved on, returning only if trees regenerated on their own. Most of the world's forests still deliver wood this way, with an average annual yield of perhaps

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two cubic meters of wood per hectare. If yield remains at that rate, as illustrated, by 2050 lumberjacks will regularly saw nearly half the world's forests. That is a dismal vision—a chainsaw every other hectare.

Lifting yields, however, will spare more forests. Raising average yields 2 percent per year would lift growth over 5 cubic meters per hectare by 2050 and shrink production forests to just about 12 percent of all woodlands—the Great Restoration.

Industry has already taken big steps along the restoration path by sowing intensively managed "plantation" forests that act as wood farms. According to the U.N. Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), one-quarter of industrial wood already comes from such farms, and the share is poised to soar once recently planted forests mature. At likely planting rates, at least one billion cubic meters of wood—half the world's supply—could come from plantations by the year 2050. Semi-natural forests—for example, those that regenerate naturally but are thinned for higher yield—could supply most of the rest. Small-scale traditional "community forestry" could also deliver a small fraction of industrial wood. Such arrangements, in which forest dwellers, often indigenous peoples, earn revenue from commercial timber, can provide essential protection to woodlands and their inhabitants.

Changes in both markets and regulation explain the shift toward high-yield, land-sparing forestry. Supply from "old-growth" forests—mature natural forests dominated by large, old trees—is tightening while the relative costs of trees from plantations are falling. In Oregon, for example, public pressure and laws to protect endangered species have reduced felling on federal lands by four-fifths since the mid-1980s. Offsetting that shrinking supply is rising production on private land in the southern United States—where sunlight, moisture, and good soils for forests abound. Today, the American South—which Bruce Zobel of North Carolina State University called the "wood basket of the world"—supplies 15 percent of the world's industrial timber, at a sustainable average yield of about 5 cubic meters per hectare.

Outside the United States, diminished access to traditional sources of virgin wood and the need to control wood costs are also concentrating production. In British Columbia, where most forests are old growth, regulators have reduced the allowable cut by nearly a third over the last two decades, and more restrictions are likely. Clark Binkley, former dean

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of the University of British Columbia's School of Forestry, has argued that the province's logging can remain competitive only by shrinking its footprint and raising yields to twice or three times the current average annual yield of 2.2 cubic meters per hectare. In Brazil last year, the government and a coalition of 189 environmental groups scuttled a plan to open half the Amazon forest for potential clearing. Meanwhile, nearly all new Brazilian industrial wood comes from high-yielding plantations in the country's southeast, outside the Amazon region. China has reduced cutting of natural forests by a fifth since 1995. Malaysia and Indonesia, dominant exporters of tropical old-growth logs, have both announced reductions that could halve felling in their ancient forests by 2010. New plantations in those countries will not mature in time to fill the gap, but planted forests in New Zealand, Chile, and elsewhere stand ready to deliver. Chile alone will earn $3 billion in foreign exchange this year from forest products, nearly all grown on plantations that cover only 3 percent of Chilean territory. Trade is rationalizing world wood production toward the highest—and most land-sparing—yields.

With economics already favoring intensive production, foresters should be able to lift the average world yield in lumbered forests to 5 cubic meters per hectare by 2050. A recent study compiled by Wood Resources International, the World Bank, and the World Wildlife Fund (WWF) suggests that more than a fifth of the world's virgin wood is already produced from forests with yields above 7 cubic meters per hectare. And foresters have only begun to tap the potential for high growth. Roger Sedjo at Resources for the Future has documented that economically competitive plantations in Brazil, Chile, and New Zealand can sustain yearly growth of more than 20 cubic meters per hectare with pine trees. Aracruz Cellulose, Brazil's top planter of eucalyptus—a hardwood good for some papers—has invested heavily in forestry research that now delivers an extraordinary average of 43 cubic meters per hectare. In the Pacific Northwest and British Columbia, with plentiful rainfall, hybrid poplars deliver 50 cubic meters per hectare. And under extreme conditions—with irrigation, fertilization, and intensive pest controls—eucalyptus has been clocked at 100 cubic meters per hectare (or 20 times the goal of 5 cubic meters by 2050).

Foresters can push trees even faster. Today, the most advanced tree-breeding programs are only in their second, third, or fourth generations,

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since trees, unlike annual wheat and maize, are slow to reach sexual maturity. Modern biology can already speed breeding, however, by spotting the genes for superior performance early and then growing plants with those traits through traditional methods. Genetic engineering, now in its infancy, will be able to insert or delete selected genes directly and should gradually gain acceptance. Big tree planters—such as Westvāco Corporation—are already placing large bets on biotechnology, which promises to boost the economic advantage of plantation forestry. Having spent heavily on state-of-the-art mills and to select and rejigger tree genes, the forest industry has come to prefer planted forests, which let it control what stock grows where.

Achieving the promise of high-yield forestry will require a watchful public.

Economists, environmentalists, and people who live in the woods have all raised warning flags about intensive industrial forestry. Some worry that plantation forestry is prone to fail because much of it depends on wasteful government subsidies. Indeed, public funds have helped establish viable land-sparing plantations—just as they helped initiate other new waves of industry, including jet travel and the Internet. Three-quarters of South American plantations were planted after countries adopted incentive schemes, usually subsidies. Yet today, the private establishment of new plantations is continuing despite the fact that governments are scaling back incentive programs.

Another source of concern has been the profitability of private investment in these industries. A recent PricewaterhouseCoopers study found that the 50 largest global forestry companies earned, on average, a paltry 4.1 percent return on capital investments. Overcapacity in the industry and vast potential supplies of wood from poorly regulated forests have undercut prices and hurt the performance of even the best-run firms. A history of poor returns makes it hard for the forest industry to raise still more money to continue the shift to high-yield wood production. The current consolidation of the timber industry, however, will help surviving firms win new investors. Government efforts to improve management and restrict cutting of natural forests will also favor modern industry, which has a smaller footprint.

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Environmentalists nevertheless worry that industrial plantations will deplete nutrients and water in the soil and produce a vulnerable monoculture of trees where a rich diversity of species should prevail. Meanwhile, advocates for indigenous peoples, who have witnessed the harm caused by crude industrial logging of natural forests, warn that plantations will dislocate forest dwellers and upset local economies. Pressure from these groups helps explain why the best practices in plantation forestry now stress the protection of environmental quality and human rights—and why large firms, with the most exposure to pressure, are generally the most scrupulous. In Sweden, for example, large industrial forest owners aim to follow strict codes of conduct that respect the traditional practices of indigenous peoples, whereas smaller landowners still tend to fence the reindeer-herding Saami people out of their traditional grazing grounds.

As with most innovations, achieving the promise of high-yield forestry will require feedback from a watchful public. Public scrutiny will help industry make the new technologies socially acceptable. The main benefit of the new approach to forests will not reside within the planted woods, however. It will lie elsewhere: in the trees spared by more efficient forestry. An industry that draws from planted forests rather than cutting from the wild will disturb only one-fifth or less of the area for the same volume of wood. Instead of logging half the world's forests, humanity can leave almost 90 percent of them minimally disturbed. And nearly all new tree plantations are established on abandoned croplands, which are already abundant and accessible.

FOREST-FRIENDLY FOREIGN POLICY

ACTORS IN THE WOOD DRAMA can thus take three basic approaches to preserving and restoring the world's forests: lifting crop yields, choosing value over volume in making wood products, and concentrating forestry in fast-growing wood farms. Together, these measures can increase to 3 billion hectares the area of forests that are left for nature, the protection of watersheds and indigenous peoples, and other non-industrial uses. In contrast, the "Skinhead Earth" scenario will shrink these non-industrial forests to 1.8 billion hectares. This difference—1.2 billion hectares—is almost twice the area of the Amazon

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basin. One central question remains, however: How can foreign policy help farmers, foresters, millers, and consumers do their part?

Much useful activity is already under way. Environmental NGOs around the globe have organized behind forest protection. All major forestry firms now participate in various activities to lessen the environmental harms of forestry. Multilateral development funders such as the World Bank have added the protection of forests and their role in alleviating human poverty to their agendas. The United Nations engages forestry issues through the FAO and the ongoing effort to implement commitments made at the 1992 Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro (at which forestry policies were hotly contested). Since Rio, an alphabet soup of panels, forums, and task forces on forests have filled U.N. meeting rooms. This year, the U.N. launched an annual Forum on Forests to provide an outlet for the many clamoring voices. Forests do not suffer from a lack of attention in international politics.

The problem is the absence of a clear and widely shared goal to guide policy. Because the U.N. framework includes all nations, forest agendas are confused and exceedingly complex, and progress is measured by the placement of commas and clauses. Worse, since Rio, the central debate has been whether and how to negotiate a legally binding forest treaty. Experience in managing other international environmental problems shows that binding treaties work best when they include detailed commitments with which governments can comply. A binding instrument is ill suited to forests, however, because governments—and the people they represent—do not yet share a vision for how to protect the world's woodlands. Moreover, detailed actions would necessarily vary by country and be extremely difficult to codify into a single international law. Key elements of a sensible coherent vision—such as lifting grain and forest yields—are impossible to plan top-down by regulatory treaty.

A better approach would begin by adopting a nonbinding but clear, quantitative, measurable goal: namely, a forest estate expanded by 200 million hectares in 2050 and in which a smart, sustainable forestry industry concentrates on little more than 10 percent of the forested area. This "90/10" vision would serve to anchor and focus a bottom-up process through which governments and stakeholders—individually and collectively—would explore the actions they must take to achieve their goal by 2050. Responses could then vary as necessary. Some

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countries, such as Brazil and Indonesia, could conclude that the best way they can contribute trees to the world balance sheet is by improving the regulation of their public lands. Others, such as Chile and New Zealand, could do their part by striving to become industrial wood baskets. Still others, such as Russia, could focus on improving forest institutions. Sten Nilsson of the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis has shown that Russia has great potential to spare trees by exposing the forest sector to modern market discipline and regulation.

A bottom-up process is needed because no single set of policy instruments is appropriate to all settings. Factors such as land ownership vary widely. In the United States and most of western Europe, for example, forests are held mainly in private hands. The United States alone has ten million forest owners. Most U.S. industrial wood comes from private land, and ownership fragments when inheritance splits wood tracts among offspring. In this setting, improving environmental standards in wood production has required certification schemes that are compatible with private land ownership. Programs such as the voluntary "Tree Farm" system of standards have succeeded in engaging owners of small forest parcels who are wary of costly production standards that only large landowners can afford. By contrast, in Canada and many developing countries, governments own forests and use concessions to control cutting. In such settings, policies should focus on setting the right standards for granting concessions and on the firms that do the cutting.

Measuring progress will require a better system for tracking and assessment. Data on forest cover already abound, but reliability varies by country, as do definitions of terms as fundamental as "forest." Information on key elements, such as changes in crop and timber yields and production areas, is fitfully reported in many places. All but a few countries lack data and analysis of milling efficiency. Private groups, especially commercial firms, could fill the gaps. But so far they have had little incentive to do so because no guiding forest vision has informed and focused the policy debate.

In other examples of international environmental cooperation—such as cleaning up the North Sea or combating acid rain in Europe—clear, ambitious, and achievable visions backed by data systems have proven to be key to success. In those cases, as in forestry today, governments were at first uncertain what they could achieve but were keen to make

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an effort. Nonbinding legal frameworks, along with periodic performance reviews, facilitated action and learning. Only when governments had come to understand what commitments they could realistically implement did they establish binding treaties to lock in progress.

THE FOREST 14

AN EFFECTIVE DIPLOMATIC STRATEGY for restoring forests will require adjusting conventional wisdom and updating existing institutions. Leadership by a set of key countries could substantially ease the task: Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, Finland, India, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, New Zealand, Russia, South Africa, Sweden, and the United States. These "Forest 14" control two-thirds of the world's woodlands and span diverse forest types and management strategies, from intense plantations (New Zealand and South Africa) to mixed use (China, India, and the United States) to large old-growth harvesters (Indonesia and Russia). They include major exporters (Canada and Malaysia), the world's largest importer of forest products (Japan), and a variety of consumer needs and preferences. The list encompasses forest hegemons of every region, and the behavior of governments, firms, and NGOs in these nations sets world standards in forestry.

The Forest 14 do not correspond to any existing and effective international institution, so one question will be how to convene them. The Group of 8 (G-8) might act as a catalyst. It includes 4 of the Forest 14 (Canada, Japan, Russia, and the United States), and its other members (France, Germany, Italy, and the United Kingdom) feel strong public pressure to protect forests. Already, the organization has focused on forest topics such as illegal logging and counterproductive subsidies. Moreover, the G-8 is the only high-profile international forum—other than the more inclusive International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank, and U.N.—that engages Russia, the world's most forested nation, on topics important to Moscow. And the G-8 also has experience engaging developing countries—as became evident last year with the creation of the larger G-20 to discuss key global financial and economic issues. The G-8 does not have the built-in means to analyze forest issues, but the Forest 14 could enlist its members and other partners such as the World Bank–WWF Forest Alliance to sponsor studies in their areas

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of comparative advantage—a practice used effectively for other kinds of international environmental cooperation. Topics would include lifting grain yields, setting goals and requirements for high-yield forest plantations, crafting strategies for increasing the efficiency of milling, examining the potential for recycling and substituting other materials for wood, creating programs to raise the regulatory capacity needed to stem illegal logging, and eliminating subsidies that perversely affect wood production and use.

As the stakeholders debate the vision of a Great Restoration, they will clarify the needed complementary policies and programs. One such requirement is better strategies for dealing with the vast areas that lie "in the middle"—lands that are not under intensive cultivation or wood production but are also not formal, strictly protected nature areas. To date, much of the debate over protecting forests and wilderness has focused on formally demarcated and legally protected areas. Such protection rightly safeguards Earth's greatest forest treasures, but formal protection holds little promise for most of the world's woodlands. Today, only about eight percent of world's forests are formally protected in parks. Many governments hesitate to expand formal protection, for fear of locking away land that might serve other purposes. In many settings, forest dwellers also resist "protecting" their forests because well-meaning but ham-fisted governments have tried to secure forests in their natural state by banning long-standing local practices such as hunting and small-scale forestry.

Another critical need is to find ways to assign economic value to standing forests (other than as cut timber). Most of the world's untouched frontier forest is still protected by economic factors—remote locations and unfavorable terrain keep farmers and lumberjacks at a distance. But threats multiply where roads and rails penetrate, bringing saws to trees and timber to markets. Revenue from ecotourism may help preserve forests, as might schemes to value forests' contribution to the ecosystem (such as their climate-cooling sequestration of carbon).

COMMON CAUSE

FOR THE GREAT RESTORATION to succeed, farmers, foresters, and environmentalists must recognize their common interest in high-yield production. Those concerned with forests have traditionally viewed

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farmers as part of the problem. But by lifting yields, farmers can be part of the solution. Brussels and Washington can help matters by paying farmers to grow forests instead of paying them not to grow food. Meanwhile, foresters are wary of environmentalists who, they fear, seek to make forestry unprofitable and to fence off every parcel of land that can be freed from production. Environmentalists, in turn, accuse foresters of destroying diversity, polluting the land, and displacing local people. But Big Timber and Big Green can and must learn to meet each other's core concerns.

The conflict between these groups is especially evident in the effort launched by the environmental community—and by some forest-products companies, mainly in Sweden, that already meet extremely tight environmental standards—to certify wood that is produced "sustainably." So far, only a tiny fraction of production forests have been so certified, and most consumers have refused to pay extra for "green" wood. But certification is gathering force; standards established over the next few years may lock in forest practices for decades. These standards should be set with the path to long-term restoration in mind. In principle, the leading certification system—the Forest Stewardship Council—is compatible with such a goal, but efforts are needed to demonstrate that economically feasible certification can favor high-yield growth. Certification that favors low-yield strategies may produce a happy tree but lead to a small forest.

The certification debate underscores the fact that no single approach is enough for achieving the Restoration by 2050. Policy must exert leverage in all areas: adopting new technologies and practices to improve forestry and agriculture, building a better information system, and launching a bottom-up process for translating the grand vision of the Great Restoration into detailed strategies. Realistically, one cannot expect all nations to come on board at once. But surely 14 countries can take the process seriously. With them in the lead, the rest will follow.

Although 2050 remains distant, most elements of the plan need to be put in place in half that time—by 2025. Trees are slow growers, and so the saplings that will deliver nearly all the 2 billion cubic meters of wood needed in 2050 must start growing 20–25 years earlier. The year 2040 might suffice as a start date for some fast-growing trees (such as eucalyptus and poplar), but even plantations of those trees will require

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investments in mills and other assets that are best planned and built gradually and well in advance.

To achieve all of this by 2025 will require meeting even more immediate goals. Over the next 5 years, the Forest 14 should adopt a draft strategy along the lines laid out above, which will help focus subsequent debates over policy. And they must start the decade-long process of building the data collection and analysis system necessary for bottom-up assessments of national forest policies. In parallel, they should start measuring overall progress. Will demand for cut wood really reach two billion cubic meters by 2050? If wood consumption does not level out at 2 billion cubic meters per year—perhaps because of rising demand for paper—can foresters lift yields more rapidly to compensate? Are crop yields rising at the two percent per year needed to liberate 200 million hectares of agricultural land for forests? Are wood yields rising rapidly enough so that the planted forests of 2025 will average five cubic meters' growth per hectare? Are forestry firms expanding plantations at about two percent per year—a rate consistent with historical patterns and sufficiently rapid to deliver enough planted wood by 2050? Are countries implementing policies to help the liberated land recover and to protect the forests still not cut?

News reports and publicity along the way can help realize the vision. Benchmarks set and accomplishments achieved should be well publicized to make the reality and significance of the Great Restoration apparent to all. Within the next decade, the 14 nations that lead the effort should manage to achieve no net loss in their forests. Some cutting of natural woods may continue, but it will be offset by resurgent forests growing on liberated farm and timber lands. By 2025, the Forest 14 can promise that there will be no more loss of natural forests, including the large tracts of frontier forests that are nature's vital legacy.

Neither feeding the world population nor supplying timber and pulp requires the world forest estate to shrink, as it has ever since ancient civilizations felled their forests to smelt, build, heat, and cook. Rather, while profitably meeting growing demand for wood products, humanity can vastly increase the area of forests and simultaneously reduce the amount of those forests that is disturbed. Such a Great Restoration is truly a worthy goal for the landscape of the new millennium.

For more information on the studies underlying this article see http://greatrestoration.rockefeller.edu.

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Reviews & Responses

AP/WIDE WORLD PHOTOS

The Ostankino television tower, a showpiece of Soviet architecture, burns, Moscow, August 28, 2000

The gloom about Russia today is as overdone as was the optimism of the early 1990s.

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Review Essay

Blaming Russia First

Three Books Examine Russia's Woes

Daniel Treisman

Failed Crusade: America and the Tragedy of Post-Communist Russia. BY STEPHEN F. COHEN. New York: W. W. Norton, 2000, 320 pp. $21.95.
Sale of the Century: Russia's Wild Ride from Communism to Capitalism. BY CHRYSTIA FREELAND. New York: Crown Business, 2000, 352 pp. $27.50.
Godfather of the Kremlin: Boris Berezovsky and the Looting of Russia. BY PAUL KLEBNIKOV. New York: Harcourt Brace, 2000, 353 pp. $28.00.

Pity the unpopular Russians. In July, Mexico elects its first president from outside the country's ruling party; *The Economist* magazine labels it a "real democracy." Russia elects a president from the political opposition in 1991, then holds no fewer than five competitive, generally free, national elections in the following years; *The Economist* calls it a "phony democracy." Colombia has a problem with organized crime, and Washington gives its government $1.3 billion to help fight the drug lords. Russia also has a problem with organized crime, and American politicians sternly lecture Moscow not to expect any more aid until it cleans up its act. An undercover U.S. operation finds several Mexican banks laundering drug money in the United States, and Washington apologizes to the Mexicans for conducting sting operations on their territory. An American bank allegedly launders money for Russian organized criminals, and a leading senator accuses the Russian government of being "the world's most virulent kleptocracy." When the Asian crisis scares investors away from the Brazilian market and the real collapses, commentators declare it a

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bump in the road. When the Asian crisis scares foreign investors away from the Russian market and the ruble collapses, commentators declare the crash proof of the failure of liberal economic reform in Russia.

That many Russians these days see a double standard in Western opinion toward their country is perhaps not altogether surprising. As readers of the Western press know, there are no businessmen in Russia, only mafiosi; no democrats, only corrupt politicians; no citizens, only an impoverished, nationalistic mass. Members of the emerging Russian middle class are often discouraged to learn, upon picking up Western papers, that they do not yet exist.

It has not always been this way. As Stephen Cohen points out in his new book, the Western press was overwhelmingly supportive of Boris Yeltsin and his attempts at reform in the early 1990s. But around 1998, a sea change occurred. Without acknowledging any change of position, Western editorials switched from a guarded optimism about Russia's reforms to a withering condemnation of all associated with them. The scales fell from the editorialists' eyes.

Political and economic developments in Russia in recent years have certainly been disappointing. It is fashionable to point this out. But the current gloom about Russia is as overdone as was the optimism of the early 1990s. The obstacles blocking full democracy and well-functioning markets have always been extremely forbidding—but never unsurmountable. Successes have always mixed with failures, the good with the bad. Perhaps Western opinion will eventually come to recognize this, but at the moment the frustrations of the naive optimists are joining up with the schadenfreude of the confirmed pessimists to produce a public discourse on Russia that is dyspeptic, often hypocritical, and almost completely lacking in comparative perspective. These three recent books, in different ways and to different degrees, illustrate this inadequacy.

A NEOCLASSICAL CRUSADE

What the optimists and the pessimists have in common is the hunger for a villain—the urge to cast the story of Russia in the 1990s as a simple morality tale of good and evil, promise and betrayal. They tend to differ in whom they cast in the role of villain, but the structure of their arguments is similar. Cohen, a professor of Russian studies and history at New York University, has been a confirmed pessimist since before it became fashionable. His analysis of Russia in the 1990s is simple and (since he repeats it continually throughout his new book) easy to follow. The Soviet Union in 1991, he argues, was a successfully reforming state. Most of the essential social and economic institutions "were still intact." This functioning system was destroyed by an American political crusade to transform postcommunist Russia into a "replica of America." The "missionaries and evangelists" in this crusade were so-called economic "advisers," usually from Harvard or the International Monetary Fund (IMF). This invasion by Western crusaders preaching "tight-fisted monetarism" resulted in the impoverishment of the Russian population, a drastic fall in life expectancy, and the "demodernization of a twentieth-century country." By letting Jeffrey Sachs and others of his ilk "swarm" across the Russian plains, Cohen charges, the Clinton administration has done more

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damage to U.S. interests than did the war in Vietnam.

Some readers may enjoy this book's dramatic language and unabashed Old Testament wrath. But as an account of Russia in the 1990s, the argument has, to say the least, more than a few holes. The oddest of all is Cohen's suggestion that the Soviet Union in late 1991 was a well-functioning, reforming state. To anyone who spent time in Russia that year, this claim is completely surreal. By autumn, even privileged Muscovites were standing in line for hours to buy bread. The elite stores, as Chrystia Freeland tells us in her book, had little to offer their nomenklatura clientele other than bags of millet. Only four months' worth of grain reserves remained, and fear of famine that winter was widespread. Before Yeltsin's reformers even touched the controls, Soviet industrial output had fallen by 17 percent in 1991 alone. Even before price liberalization, inflation in Russia in 1991 was more than 160 percent. Russia's general government deficit (including import subsidies and extrabudgetary funds) was almost one-third of GDP. The central planning and supply system had been decimated by Mikhail Gorbachev's perestroika, and enterprise directors were stripping assets with abandon through the semiprivate cooperatives that Gorbachev had legalized.

Although they appeared bold, the dramatic reforms of late 1991 and early 1992—freeing prices, liberalizing trade, and initiating privatization—were actually a brave face put on the central state's alarming impotence. Yeltsin's lieutenants might have tried to hold off freeing prices and privatization for another year or two, as Ukraine did. But Ukraine's subsequent inflation and asset stripping were even more severe than Russia's. There was certainly at that time an element of economic dogma in the Kremlin's policies and an unmistakable note of free-market ideology in the way they were presented. But the reformers' motivation owed at least as much to desperation.

Were these policies imposed from outside by the crusaders from Harvard and the IMF? The image of Sachs waltzing into the Kremlin to preach the true gospel of Friedrich Hayek is a romantic one. With all due respect to Sachs, however, most people who have met him would not cast him as the Pied Piper of Hamlin. He is smart and articulate enough, but there cannot be many Russian children who would follow him over a cliff, entranced by the beautiful tunes he whistles. Besides, the Russian leaders were grownups. Yegor Gaidar had read Adam Smith and Paul Samuelson long before the Harvard gang came to call. Yeltsin, although anxious for Western respectability, was first and foremost a politician; he was won over to the gospel of monetarism for little more than an afternoon.[1]

Particularly troubling in Cohen's interpretation is his apparent assumption that the Pied Pipers from Harvard brainwashed not just the Russian leadership but much of the country's population. As he points out, there were alternative economic programs—for instance, those of the Communists. But he neglects to add that most voters repeatedly rejected candidates who espoused such programs.

[1] The reviewer admits he was a "foot soldier" in this crusade, having served briefly in 1997 on a U.S. team advising the Russians on tax reform.

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From April 1993—when 53 percent of voters said in a referendum that they supported Yeltsin's social and economic policies—to the presidential election of March 2000, antireform politicians and their positions have been consistently defeated at the polls. Cohen rightly notes that the media is often biased and manipulative, but former Soviet citizens are used to reading between the lines. Similar pro-incumbent attacks backfired in 1993 and 1995, when the "parties of power" under Gaidar and then Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin failed to get even 20 percent. And even Cohen notes that in 1996, despite minor falsification of votes, "no serious observers doubted that Yeltsin had actually won." Yet if rational, adult voters chose such candidates knowing the economic policies they favored—and in all cases except perhaps Vladimir Putin they clearly did—what do the snake-oil salesmen from Harvard really have to do with it? Were they mass hypnotists as well as economic missionaries? Were Russians too young and gullible to handle democracy?

There is also something vaguely undemocratic about Cohen's demand that the United States change tack and organize an international coalition to provide Russia with $500 billion in aid. (He says he got this figure from "a Russian economist admired for his moderation and good sense.") Although Western nations would be wise to invest more in preventing instability in the world's second nuclear power, the American public has made it absolutely clear in polls that it rejects anything approaching this figure. Should the Clinton administration and Congress be faulted for respecting voters' wishes?

FACING THE FACTS

The economic shock in the 1990s was undeniably severe, and industrial output has fallen sharply. But does this amount to Russia's "demodernization"? Statistics suggest a more complicated picture. In 1990 about one in six Russian families had a car; by 1998 about one in three did. In the same eight years, an additional 32,000 kilometers of road were built. Access to home telephones increased by 40 percent, and the number of international telephone calls grew by a factor of 12. The share of the population with access to three or more TV channels increased from 36 to 68 percent. Infant mortality, after rising in the early 1990s, was lower in 1998 than at the start of the decade.

Such statistics are the domain of economists, and Cohen makes clear he is neither an "economist" nor an "adviser" (although he seems to have quite a bit of advice to offer). He is a historian, and he feels that a sense of history has been missing from the discourse on Russia: "Though it is no longer fashionable to say so in the social sciences ... political, economic, and social realities are shaped by a historical process."

To Cohen, being a historian means emphasizing continuity—"Russia cannot jump out of its skin"—and reminding the reader of Russia's authoritarian traditions and lack of experience with private property. But it is not clear quite what he wants practical politicians to do with this knowledge. In the latter case, he seems to be saying that Western policy should support reform plans that aim at a mixed economy rather than advocating American-style liberalism. Presumably he does not mean that Western politicians should also

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favor traditional authoritarian institutions in Russia rather than democracy.

Cohen is good at skewering journalists who muff their facts when racing for deadlines and take their opinions from the herd. It is entertaining in a sadistic sort of way to see him give the poor hacks a good poke in the eye. (He butters them up in advance by recalling that he once turned down a job as Moscow correspondent.) Stupidities have been uttered and written by many people, including key Russian reformers and their Western advisers, and Cohen does a good job of collecting them.

But leaving aside such dubious pleasures and the excitement of overheated rhetoric, this is pretty arid stuff. The book contains almost no direct descriptions of things Cohen has seen in Russia and few conversations with individuals—the exception is Gorbachev, who gets some direct quotes. After many allusions to "every political figure we met" and "most Russian foreign-policy specialists," one longs for a concrete name, face, or story. Nor are there anecdotes or comparisons from the country's history except a brief allusion to Russia's "time of troubles." The same clichés turn up in chapter after chapter. One winces on being told for the ninth time about Russia's "accursed" question, "Who is to blame?" The argument itself does not develop. Almost all the essential points of Cohen's condemnation of the Russian reformers and their Western supporters appear in a reprint of an article from March 1992—just a few months after the reformers entered office. Cohen apparently views this as evidence of prescience, but one wonders how open-mindedly he has observed events since then.

In the end, the book makes depressing reading, although not for the reasons Cohen imagines. Its author is a scholar of undeniable talent who published the best book around on the Bolshevik leader and Marxist theorist Nikolai Bukharin. For a generation of younger Russia specialists, his writings on the Brezhnev and early Gorbachev periods were an inspiration. Unlike many academics, he was able to see the change under the surface and grasp the hidden vibrancy of late-Soviet society. He is clearly sincere in his concern for Russia and the Russians. There were many ways he could have used his impressive gifts to illuminate Russia's evolution during the last ten years. They are not evident in the book he ended up writing.

FAUSTIAN BARGAIN

To characterize Freeland as a naive optimist is a little unfair—she is much smarter than that label suggests. But she did go to Russia with high hopes, and her narrative is colored by obvious frustration at seeing them disappointed. *Sale of the Century* is a very different sort of book from Cohen's. Its author was the *Financial Times*' Moscow bureau chief from 1995 to 1998 and the Kiev correspondent before that. Her account is well written and lively, and one has to be impressed by the energy with which its author pursued and cultivated a large selection of the leading economists, politicians, and businessmen of fin-de-siècle Moscow. There are wonderful vignettes of the main "oligarchs" and a few fascinating glimpses of ordinary Russians. She memorably notes that what struck her about the "oligarchs" was not their Rolexes and the $100,000 fur coats for their wives but the fact that they all seemed to be "looking for emergency exits"; the threat of government prosecution or even assassination by rivals always lurked

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in the background. The vivid and colorful reporting is generally excellent, punctuated with some stories that even close Russia watchers will not have read.

On the other hand, a few sources might be more clearly provided. Some anecdotes seem to be taken directly from the embittered memoir of Yeltsin's disgraced bodyguard, Aleksandr Korzhakov, a book that Freeland herself describes as "scurrilous." One would assume she has a second, more reliable source, but this is not made clear. The occasional error also creeps in. Cohen has particular scorn for those who mix up the U.S.S.R.'s Supreme Soviet with the Russian Supreme Soviet, and Freeland appears to oblige on page 57. But these are quibbles.

The book is less successful in its analysis. Again, the desire to reduce Russian events to a simple morality tale seems to take over. In this version, the villains have changed. Instead of the snake-oil salesmen from Harvard, Freeland blames the oligarchs for Russia's misfortunes. Her book, she writes, is

> the story of Russia's capitalist revolution and of how that revolution was betrayed. .... [A]t one crucial moment, the Kremlin consciously and of its own free will took a disastrously wrong turn. ... [T]hat moment came when the government made a private pact with a group of upstart capitalist entrepreneurs who became known as the oligarchs. The deal ... turned out to be a Faustian bargain, laying a corrupt, inegalitarian foundation for everything that came after it. In a way, it was Russian capitalism's original sin. Thereafter, the Russian market economy was irredeemably warped, its government unquestionably corrupt.

That deal was the"loans-for-shares" auctions in late 1995. In what can only be described as a sleazy operation, the Yeltsin administration gave tranches of shares in major state-owned corporations to selected businessmen in trust, in return for loans to the federal budget totaling around $1 billion. Later, the businessmen were allowed to sell these tranches to themselves at low prices. Careful rigging of the auctions kept competition to a minimum. As Freeland points out, there were creditable reasons why Anatoly Chubais and others went along with this—most important, the perceived need to get the oligarchs' help in keeping inflation down and defeating the Communists in the 1996 presidential election. But the auctions were both morally dubious and disastrous for public relations.

Despite the questionable nature of the deal, however, the claim that the auctions explain Russia's economic travails—that they created a "Frankenstein's monster" that "deformed" the economy and "impoverished" the population—is difficult to fit with the facts. Perhaps because her argument is widely shared, Freeland does not bother to provide much evidence. On the contrary, her own reporting undercuts this story line at various points.

First, Freeland gets causation exactly backwards. As she herself convincingly demonstrates, it was not the "loans-for-shares" auctions that created the oligarchs but the oligarchs who created the auctions. They devised the scheme among themselves, lobbied the government, even wrote some of the decrees. Frankenstein's monster already existed. Oligarch-in-chief Boris Berezovsky had made his fortune years before, marketing cars from Avtovaz. Mikhail Khodorkovsky had built up his wealth speculating on high inflation and "managing" state budget funds. The

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question by 1995 was whether these tycoons would put some of their money back in Russia rather than in Swiss banks. Furthermore, only a few of the so-called oligarchs even participated in "loans-for-shares." Some, such as Mikhail Friedman and Vladimir Gusinsky, were excluded. Even Berezovsky only got in at the last moment. And the true behemoths of the business world were not these newcomers but the leading "red directors," such men as Rem Vyakhirev of Gazprom and Vagit Alekperov of Lukoil. It would be more accurate to say the first oligarch appeared back in May 1992, when Chernomyrdin left Gazprom to join the government. But even that is probably starting the story too late.

In an economy with massive natural resources and an inheritance of gigantic, highly concentrated companies, the emergence of "oligarchs" did not require some complicated act of betrayal by a few reformers in the government. The only question was whether Russia's business barons would continue to come exclusively from the realms of the communist aristocracy or whether some of these would be elbowed out by a few "upstarts" such as Jewish former mathematicians or theater directors. Since 1991, reformers in government had had to bargain with and outfox business leaders and the regional officials with whom the tycoons often joined forces. What changed in the mid-1990s was the identity of some of the business leaders. Once upon a time, an insider such as Chernomyrdin could "open doors in the Kremlin with his foot." By the late 1990s it was Berezovsky who was badgering presidential appointees in the shower at their sports club and the press mogul Gusinsky who was yelling at officials on his cell phone.

So how exactly did the auctions "deform" the economy and "impoverish" the country? The oligarchs were not necessarily more corrupt or rapacious than the "red directors" they sometimes replaced. Freeland herself describes old-school enterprise managers who were just as adept at stripping millions of dollars from the companies they controlled. Did the firms sold in this way operate less efficiently afterward? Some probably did, but others did not. At Norilsk Nickel, for example, productivity increased by four percent in the two years after the infamous auction, compared to a drop of four percent in the nonferrous metals sector as a whole. By January 1998, its new management had paid off all wage arrears to workers.

MONEY FOR NOTHING?

That the oligarchs underpaid the government and deprived it of vital cash is certain—and hard to forgive. But estimating the shortfall is tricky. A Western company paid more than ten times as much for shares in one of the auctioned oil companies two years after the auction. But at the time the oligarchs put up the money, their gamble was extremely risky. The clear favorite to win the following year's presidential election was the Communist candidate, Gennady Zyuganov, who might well have canceled the deal with no compensation. One of the oligarchs tried to attract a Western partner to help bid for a major oil company—and was rudely rejected. "They looked at us as if we were crazy," he lamented. Even several years later, the government could not attract any bidders for the oil giant Rosneft. When Oneximbank tried in November 1997 to sell its tranche in one of the "loans-for-shares" companies, North West River

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Shipping, it received no bids even at an opening price $1 million below the amount that Oneximbank had loaned the government. Even if one accepts an extremely high estimate of the true value of the stakes transferred—up to $30 billion—the whole operation hardly amounts to the "sale of the century." It is more like a medium-sized takeover on the NASDAQ.

To make the case that "loans-for-shares" and the emergence of the oligarchs undermined and distorted the Russian economy, Freeland has to paint the late 1990s in more dismal colors than the early part of the decade. This fits the evolution of Western opinion on Russia. But it does not fit well with the statistics. The heyday of the oligarchs actually coincided with a stabilization of the economy or even a slight improvement. In the three years leading up to "loans-for-shares," monthly inflation averaged 12.7 percent; in the following three years (which included the August 1998 crisis) it averaged 2.7 percent. Foreign direct investment in 1996–98 was almost three times higher than in the three preceding years ($10.9 billion versus $3.8 billion). Real GDP fell on average by 8.5 percent a year in 1993–95 but dropped by only 2.4 percent a year in 1996–98, while the poverty rate fell from an average of 26.7 percent to only 22.3 percent. Although data on income inequality are notoriously unreliable, that also appears to have narrowed since 1994. As a sign of the social crisis, Freeland notes (as does Cohen) that male life expectancy had fallen to just 58 years by 1994. But she neglects to point out that since then it has been rising, reaching 61 by 1998. The Russian economy remains in serious condition, but the deterioration occurred before the "loans-for-shares" auctions and the media's anointing of the oligarchs.

Nevertheless, Freeland is taken by the "Faustian bargain" line. There is a memorable scene of a dinner in a kitschy, imitation-tsarist restaurant, when she badgers the head of Gusinsky's NTV, Igor Malashenko, about his network's overt support for Yeltsin during the 1996 presidential campaign. With a "world-weary sigh," Malashenko tries to explain his dilemma and stumbles into a turn of phrase that Freeland takes more literally than he had intended:

> "... I think, and I thought, that Zyuganov would be a catastrophe. I had to—how shall I put it?—sell my soul to the devil."
>
> "Do you really think that's what you did?" I asked, amazed by his frankness.
>
> "Of course I don't," Malashenko replied with not a little scorn. "But from the point of view of a middling Western intelligence, perhaps that is what I did."
>
> "By that you mean my intelligence?"
>
> "Yes, yours. You are absolutely right. I live in my own system of coordinates, that is the pure truth." And with that Malashenko and his bodyguards swept out of the restaurant.

Malashenko's gratuitous rudeness notwithstanding, there are perhaps grounds for his irritation. The blatant abuse of state television in 1996—and even more in 1999 and 2000—was indeed appalling. But there is something hypocritical about the West's scolding the Russians for such excesses, which in any case tend to backfire unless the public already supports the media's favorite. Can anyone doubt that if the U.S. Communist Party candidate were running ahead in the polls before an

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American presidential election, ABC, NBC, and CBS would be bending the rules to run critical reports? Are Americans really so much holier than Russians, or are U.S. elites merely less threatened?

As for press freedom in Russia, a network that reports critically on the federal government's war against Chechnya exists today only because Gusinsky was willing to lose more than $20 million a year to start it. For all their sins, it was the Russian oligarchs who put money into the newspapers and television stations that now compete with the state's media outlets. Their interference is at times crude, at times enlightened. As Freeland relates, one reporter on Gusinsky's paper *Segodnya* cost the magnate a deal worth $100 million, thanks to his critical reporting, and is now nicknamed by his boss the "$100 million journalist."

There was one moment in the 1990s when democracy was genuinely at risk in Russia, in March 1996. Yeltsin, trailing in the opinion polls, was being bombarded with pleas from his hard-line supporters such as Aleksandr Korzhakov to cancel the upcoming presidential election. According to Freeland, Yeltsin had already ordered his aides to prepare legal documents to do just that. If that plan had succeeded, this would have been the end—at least temporarily—of democracy in Russia. If it had failed, it would have meant civil war. As Freeland reports, however, three men persuaded Yeltsin to tear up the decree and take his chances at the ballot box. Who were these saviors of Russian democracy? Chubais, Chernomyrdin, and the hard-line minister of the interior, Vitaly Kulikov. Strange as it will seem, some of the most vilified political players in Russia's recent history were also the reason why democracy, for all its flaws, still exists.

DON CORLEONSKI

Paul Klebnikov, a reporter from *Forbes* magazine, goes one step further in reducing history to the search for a villain. In addressing Russia's troubles of the mid-1990s, Klebnikov also gravitated to the question "Who is to blame?"

> I wanted to know who Russia's real bosses were. Who had brought the country to such a state? Who was the man who stood at the top of the pyramid? Who was the godfather of the godfathers?
>
> In the autumn of 1996, I found him: Boris Berezovsky.

If one looks hard enough for a black cat in a dark room, a black cat will undoubtedly appear. Convinced that a country's poor economic performance must be the work of some malevolent "godfather of godfathers," any reporter with gumption will find someone to fit the bill. Berezovsky is a man with whom this reviewer would not like to be stuck in an elevator for too long, and after reading Klebnikov's book most readers will probably agree. But even a self-promoter like Berezovsky is not egomaniacal enough to claim credit for destroying the Russian economy single-handedly.

It is hard to know what to make of Klebnikov's reporting, since the facts are so clearly selected to fill in a predetermined picture. He seems to rely on the accounts of people with an obvious motivation to lie: for instance, he quotes liberally from the disgraced bodyguard Korzhakov and his former subordinates. In his political and economic analysis, Klebnikov's frustrations get the better of his intelligence.

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His arguments start out merely implausible. For example, he criticizes the Gaidar government of 1992 for not issuing government bonds backed up by foreign exchange or gold to soak up public savings prior to price liberalization—as if Russia had foreign exchange and gold reserves. By the end of the book he sinks to ethnic slurs:

> At the root of the disaster was the Russian penchant for playing the double game, for pursuing an essentially dishonest policy. Rather than consistently following a set of clearly defined principles, the Russian mentality was to say one thing and do another.

There are a few facts about Russia in the 1990s that observers should be able to agree upon. Economic output fell sharply. But there was nothing unique about this: it also fell in the other 14 former Soviet republics. Some of these attempted "shock therapy," others more gradual reforms or none at all; some were visited by numerous Western advisers and received large sums from the IMF, others did not. As of 1998, the cumulative drop in real GDP was greater in Russia than in seven of the other republics and smaller than in the other seven. In Russia, as in the other post-Soviet republics, real incomes also fell sharply. Many enterprises remain badly managed. The state is extremely corrupt, and this remains an important obstacle to economic and political development, just as in 1991.

On corruption, the sad truth is that nobody knows how to build an honest, effective state machine in a country where a dishonest, corrupt state already exists. Cohen does not know, Freeland does not know, Klebnikov does not know, *The Economist* does not know, the IMF does not know, and this reviewer does not know. History shows that remarkable transformations have sometimes occurred; for example, nineteenth-century Britain replaced its rotten boroughs and venal politics with party discipline and much cleaner government. Evidence suggests that democracy, economic openness, and above all, growth tend to help, although the effect can be slow. Firing a few officials in a corrupt system is about as effective as swatting a few mosquitoes in a swamp. Attempts to centralize power in a large state à la Putin will probably just replace political corruption with administrative corruption. Some changes to the tax system might help a little in Russia, but the West should stop pretending that there was a simple solution that could have worked if only Russia's leaders had not been so lazy, ideological, or corrupt.

Popular writing on Russia has taken a strange turn in recent years. A little balance and perspective would make it far easier on the reader. Perhaps all who write about the country could agree to retire some of the most distinguished clichés, to stop alluding to Gogol's "winged troika" or to the "accursed questions" and comparing Russia to the Klondike. All authors—this reviewer included—might try harder to question their assumptions, even when they are widely held. As for Russia in the 1990s, years will probably need to pass before the picture comes completely into focus. As Cohen would say, it is a question for the historians.

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Review Essay

The End of Asia?

Redefining a Changing Continent

Walter Russell Mead

Thunder From the East: Portrait of a Rising Asia. BY NICHOLAS D. KRISTOF AND SHERYL WUDUNN. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2000, 384 pp. $27.50.

"Can Asians think?" Kishore Mahbubani, Singapore's ambassador to the United Nations, famously asked in a 1997 lecture. *Thunder From the East: Portrait of a Rising Asia* drives us to ask a variation of Mahbubani's question: Can anyone think about Asia?

This is not because *Thunder From the East* is a bad book or because the authors' observations are uninformed. Nicholas Kristof and Sheryl WuDunn are a husband-and-wife team of Pulitzer-prize winning journalists who know their subject: Kristof served as *The New York Times*' bureau chief in Hong Kong, Beijing, and Tokyo, and WuDunn was a correspondent for the paper across Asia. Together they have logged thousands of miles and taped hundreds of interviews in years of travel through Asia. They have raised a family there, and with their son enrolled in a Japanese elementary school, they can offer an intimate, PTA-level view of Japanese society that is all too rare in the West.

Kristof and WuDunn describe Asians in every imaginable circumstance: from Japanese politicians revealed in private moments of frankness to Cambodian child prostitutes interviewed in front of their brothels; from bankrupt Thai ex-millionaires rebuilding their fortunes to Javanese peasants hacking "sorcerers" to death with machetes. The authors have captured the kaleidoscopic realities of contemporary Asia as few others have and reproduced them sympathetically.

GUARDED OPTIMISM

The recent Asian financial crisis, write Kristof and WuDunn, signalled a change of pace in Asia's economic growth but not

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

NICHOLAS KRISTOF

Learning to bow: The sole student at an elementary school greets his teacher near Mount Fuji, Japan

its end. In the larger historical context, the book reminds us, Asia still has much ground to recover: although Asia's GDP amounted to 33 percent of world output in 1998, up from only 17 percent in 1952, the current proportion reflects a recovery only to the levels of 1890. The best estimates available suggest that in 1700, Asian output accounted for 62 percent of world production and that as late as 1820, China's output alone exceeded all of Europe's. Asian productivity presumably will over time approach that of European and North American economies, even with the slower growth the authors forecast for East Asia. This growth eventually will restore the central role in the global economy that the Asian nations temporarily lost following the Industrial Revolution. And from this economic growth, cultural and political consequences will flow: As the United States gradually (but only relatively) declines, the authors speculate, the twenty-first century will witness Asia's return to global preeminence.

The next Asian economic miracle, suggest Kristof and WuDunn, will come from India rather than East Asia. They could well be right. Having lagged behind its East Asian neighbors in opening its economy to world markets, India's growing population and generally low productivity rates give it great catch-up potential. But as the authors point out, obstacles remain. Indian expatriates hesitate to reinvest money back home, unlike Chinese mainlanders in Taiwan and around the world who have plowed billions back into the ancestral home. Until India convinces its dispersed offspring to invest, it will fall well short of its potential.

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The book's economic and political forecasts for the rest of the region are mixed. Japan faces absolute population decline. The Chinese and most other East Asian economies will grow but at a slower rate than before the 1997–98 crisis. China, the authors predict, will ultimately be forced to abandon Tibet and Sinkiang, a province on China's northwestern border with a restive Muslim population.

"The optimist," the American novelist James Branch Cabell once wrote, "proclaims that we live in the best of all possible worlds; and the pessimist fears this is true." The authors are modestly upbeat by this definition, but they point out that success breeds its own problems. Nationalist rivalries and environmental disasters, for instance, could derail Asian progress. Nevertheless, Kristof and WuDunn's nuanced Cabellian optimism is shared by most Asia-watchers in Asia and abroad, and their ability to ground their judgment in close and careful reporting lends it additional credibility.

A MULTITUDE OF CIVILIZATIONS

On reading this book, however, the reader is struck by one basic question: What is Asia anyway? The continent is so large and diverse, and its leading countries are so differently circumstanced, that a book as exhaustive as this one only makes us ask whether it is possible to generalize meaningfully about "Asia" at all.

"India," Winston Churchill snidely remarked, "is merely a geographical expression." But the Asia of *Thunder From the East* is not even that. Pakistan is included, Iran is not. Why? And what then is Iran part of?

Kristof and WuDunn argue that their geographic Asia (roughly, moving from east to west, Japan through Pakistan) has a certain cultural unity—the influence of Indic culture throughout the region via the vehicle of Buddhism. This may be true, but one might just as well call Norway part of the Middle East because it is Christian.

Equivocal words such as "Asia" inevitably create confusion. When Kristof asks why so-called Europe "discovered" so-called Asia rather than the other way around, he refers to Ming Dynasty China's notorious failure to follow up on the early fifteenth-century voyages of Zheng He. This is interesting but sinocentric. Asian Mongols and Turks had not only discovered Europe by the time of Zheng He's travels—they had conquered great swaths of it, including the Balkans. India, the Asian country closest to the West and the likeliest candidate to "discover" it, had known both the Hellenistic and Roman worlds since the time of Alexander. By the fifteenth century, India was well into a millennium of intermittent, internecine struggle with Islam and was more closely linked to the power politics of the Mediterranean world than it was to events in China. In fact, Turkish economic and military pressures on Europe drove Western adventurers past the Cape of Good Hope to reopen the spice trade. And the struggle with Islam encouraged some Indian rulers to accept the European trading presence on European terms.

Kristof and WuDunn's problems with defining Asia and identifying a unitary course of Asian development underline a principal reason why it is so difficult to think or write clearly about the subject. Asia is not, as most of us habitually think, the complement or counterpart to Europe or even to the West. Rather, China and, with all due respect to

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Churchill, India are each—in population, in cultural diversity, and in achievement—civilizations on their own, equivalent to Europe itself rather than an individual European country. The illusion that they represent a single continental category is a byproduct of the Western ascendancy of the last two centuries, an ascendancy that temporarily made it possible to divide the world into "the West and the rest."

ABRAHAM'S GROWING FAMILY

The real analogue of Kristof and WuDunn's Buddhocentric Asia is neither Europe nor the West. It is something bigger and looser: the Abrahamic world. This world emerged from the triad of religions—Judaism, Christianity, and Islam—that trace their roots to the Biblical patriarch and spawned the great secular ideologies of scientific empiricism, liberal democracy, and Marxism. Unlike the Buddhist and Hindu world views, the Abrahamic perspective sees nature as reducible to predictable laws and history as a process with a meaningful beginning, middle, and end. The Muslim, the Marxist, the democrat, the Baconian scientist, the Christian, and the Jew all share this fundamentally similar outlook on life.

Because the Western perspective focuses on the sibling rivalries between Moses, Jesus, Mohammed, Jefferson, Bacon, and Marx, it too often overlooks the extraordinary spread of Abrahamism out of its native Middle East into nearly every corner of the world. Virtually every human culture that has encountered Abrahamic ideology has adopted it sooner or later. Asia is no exception. In the last 100 years, each major Asian state has embraced at least one Abrahamic faith. Consequently, every Asian society is today engaged in a fundamental effort to reconcile its increasingly Abrahamic outlook with its native culture.

Islam was the first branch of the Abrahamic family to put down deep roots in what Kristof and WuDunn call Asia, and now roughly half of the world's more than one billion Muslims live there. Thirty percent of the Indian subcontinent's population has accepted the message of the Koran. In contrast, although Christianity (the other missionary Abrahamic faith) appeared in the region before Islam, it failed outside of the Philippines to win significant numbers of converts until the last 125 years. Marxism—a secular outgrowth of the Abrahamic outlook—was one of the last to appear and the fastest both to rise and to fall. Its decay leaves an ideological vacuum in countries such as China and Vietnam.

Although one cannot now predict what will follow, it would be surprising if Marx's successor is not also Abrahamic. Liberal democracy, the reigning secular ideology of the Abrahamic world, was first planted in Asia early in the twentieth century and has blossomed even in countries such as Thailand, Japan, and India, which have proven resistant to the religious varieties of the Abrahamic way.

If "Asia" is adopting Abrahamic ideology, it never does so passively but always adapts as it adopts. It has also been profoundly affected by another product of the Abrahamic world. That, of course, is capitalism.

In accounting for Ming China's failure to follow up earlier exploratory voyages, *Thunder From the East* points to the relative weakness of greed as a social force in Asia. "The rich," writes Kristof, "tended to hoard their wealth in the form of gold or land

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rather than recycle it or invest in commercial ventures." Europe, by contrast, was "obsessed" with greed. This is a somewhat infelicitous way to say that mercantile activity in Asia remained limited by quasi-feudal restraints while Europe progressed to full-blown capitalism.

In effect, capitalism is simply another of the "isms" that have germinated in the fertile Western Christian seedbed of Abrahamic culture. "Accumulate! Accumulate! That is Moses and the prophets!" wrote the angry Marx. Capitalism has proceeded from and accentuated the dynamic, world-conquering nature of the Western Christian branch of the family of Abraham.

This set of social and economic behaviors has proven as aggressive and as penetrating in the economic sphere as most Abrahamic philosophies and religions have been in the ideological arena. Indeed, the endless multiplication and accumulation of capital—as opposed to the accumulation of wealth for purposes of consumption—has been the hallmark of the modern West.

Allied to the military forces of the Christian powers, capitalism fell on Asia like Byron's Assyrian on the fold. Resistance—either nativist like Gandhi's or Marxist like Mao's—proved futile. In the end, Asian societies had to defend themselves in the only way possible, by internalizing capitalist practice. Both processes continue today. Capitalism's onslaught proceeds as foreign multinationals insert themselves more thoroughly into Asian economies, and the cold, impersonal forces of market-driven exchange are painfully but inevitably adopted as previous economic patterns centered around relationships and patronage give way.

Unleashing entrepreneurial energy at the price of undermining ancient social ties, the cyclone of capitalist creative destruction is tearing across Asia as it tore—and still tears—through Europe and North America. Many of the phenomena that Kristof and WuDunn describe in Asia have their counterparts in the history of the capitalist West. The teeming, unsanitary slums crowded with peasants forced off the land, child workers, environmental disasters, and dizzying successions of booms and busts were as present in the London of Dickens and the Paris of Zola as they are in the Bangkok and Jakarta of Kristof and WuDunn. The masses of impoverished immigrants who crossed the Atlantic in disease-laden boats to pour into the slums of New York and Chicago, to toil at subsistence wages every week amid dangerous machinery and poisonous chemicals—these masses had much in common with today's peasants flocking to Asian cities.

WHITHER ASIA?

The capitalism transforming Asia today is more developed and dynamic than the one that enveloped the West in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The stages of capitalist industrialization—the spinning jenny, the railroad, the steel mill, electrical mass production, the transistor, the jet, the computer—that appeared in successive European and American generations are falling on many Asian communities in a single life span, sometimes in a single decade. We cannot simply use Western experience to predict the future of capitalist, industrial, and postindustrial Asia. Asian societies are bigger, the pace of change is faster, and both capitalism itself and the Abrahamic ideologies that enfold and sometimes challenge it are still very new in many places. They are still often felt to be alien, perhaps illegitimate interlopers.

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The comparative approach to predicting Asia's future somewhat modifies the Kristof-WuDunn conclusion. That events in geographical Asia will dominate the twenty-first century seems almost self-evident. That Asia's rising productive capacity will vastly increase its share of the world's total output is also hard to dispute. But whether all this activity can accurately be described as the "rise of Asia," as Kristof and WuDunn put it in their subtitle, is another question entirely. The enormous cultural, social, political, and economic revolution sweeping through the traditional societies of the eastern and southern coastlands of Eurasia is not as simple, benign, and one-directional as a rise.

In fact, the twenty-first century may well be remembered more for the end of Asia than for its rise. On the one hand, the universal solvents of capitalism and Abrahamic ideology will continue to sow deep social and cultural changes among the peoples of geographical Asia, steadily reducing, transforming, and remixing—although probably never finally eliminating—the last traces of pre-Abrahamic culture. A Christian Korea and an Islamic Malaysia may ultimately have as much and as little connection as Norway and Kuwait. At the same time, the growing political and cultural power of individual Asian societies, especially of China and India, will make it ever more difficult and finally impossible for observers to talk about "Asia" as a political or cultural unit. Asia tomorrow may well be what Eurasia is today: a geographically useful expression with little cultural or even political relevance. That development would be the natural and logical climax to the trends described in the pages of this remarkable book.

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Loose Nukes

Arms Control Is No Place for Folly

Executive Privilege

GEORGE PERKOVICH

With his usual farsightedness, Jonathan Schell ("The Folly of Arms Control," September/October 2000) warns of a gradual international drift toward arms proliferation unless the nuclear states together develop and implement plans to eliminate their arsenals. But in the meantime, Washington's strategic policies pose even more immediate dangers. Moreover, Schell's suggested public debate on nuclear policy would actually erode the chances of meaningful change unless it were preceded by presidentially directed reforms. Nuclear experts must equip the executive with informed proposals with which the White House can begin rethinking current strategy and impose reforms on resistant bureaucracies.

DR. STRANGELOVE

Nuclear accidents pose the greatest threat to the precariously balanced Russian-American nuclear equation. The two countries' thousands of nuclear weapons still stand poised on hair-trigger alert against each other. Even when the system is healthy, technological malfunctions, faulty intelligence, misperceptions, and crisis mismanagement are only a misstep away. Today the system is failing. Since the end of the Cold War, Russia's doomsday machine has been allowed to fall into disrepair. Indeed, the Russian nuclear infrastructure and command system are so frayed that if they belonged to the United States, regulations would compel the secretary of defense to declare the force unsafe and stand it down.

Yet, instead of dismantling this overworked machine, Russia's January 2000 national security doctrine extends nuclear weapons' missions to "repel armed aggression," a formulation that encompasses almost any scenario. In a future crisis—with NATO, to take an often-invoked example—this unrealistic strategy could pressure the Russian leadership to make nuclear threats to bolster the doctrine's credibility. NATO leaders would feel compelled to counter such threats. Any escalation thereafter would put the United States at the mercy of Russia's intelligence, warning, and command-and-control capacities. The sinking of the *Kursk* submarine revealed Russia's technological, operational, and decision-making

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competence today. And that was an exercise, not a conflict.

Even if it manages to avoid accidents, the ongoing American-Russian preoccupation with oversized, hair-triggered nuclear deterrence will preclude Russia's integration into the Western-oriented international system. Russia already feels undermined by NATO expansion and the conduct of war in the former Yugoslavia, an area of great Russian interest, without even an attempt to obtain U.N. approval. When the Clinton administration states that it will not consider reductions below 2,500 nuclear weapons, retrograde Russian nationalists and enterprising arms manufacturers justify selling advanced military technology and know-how to Iran, China, and other potential U.S. adversaries. When American politicians of both parties pursue national missile defense outside the agreed boundaries of the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, they drive those Russians who do want to cooperate with the West underground.

Russia simply does not have the resources to compete militarily with the United States. But until Washington and Moscow admit that they do not need to keep thousands of nuclear weapons poised on alert against each other, Russia will rely on cheap and dangerous nuclear solutions to balance the United States. President Vladimir Putin may try to save money by shrinking Russia's arsenal, but the anachronistic attachment to mutually assured destruction remains at the core of both countries' systems.

The thousands of American nuclear weapons under a first-use doctrine will also eventually compel China to make its own long-range force, currently a mere 20 nuclear weapons, more threatening. Beijing was inevitably going to expand its arsenal, but Washington's nuclear strategy—plus the prospect of ballistic missile defenses—will push China to put a hair trigger on its growing forces as well. The two countries lack any agreed and verifiable "rules of the road" to avoid driving off a nuclear cliff in the fog of crisis.

Many defense officials believe that the United States is caught in the middle of a China-Taiwan political faceoff that is brewing a major military crisis. A Taiwanese bid for independence would provoke a perilous spiral of progressive confrontations: China would likely launch conventionally armed ballistic missiles across the Taiwan Strait; U.S. naval forces could become engaged; and for the first time in history, two nuclear-armed states might fire missiles at each other. Once missiles fly and casualties mount, how confident can Chinese and American officials be that nuclear weapons are not going to drop from the next sortie? The U.S. bombing of China's Belgrade embassy during the war over Kosovo gives a sobering reminder that even the best-equipped military is not immune to intelligence failures or miscalculation during a crisis. Current American policies assume that China's military is bluffing and that U.S. nuclear superiority and missile defenses could intimidate the People's Liberation Army (PLA) at the critical moment. Yet Washington presses Taiwan not to declare independence precisely because the PLA may not be deterred, and the consequent risk of armed conflict is high. Indeed, President Jiang Zemin did not hesitate to threaten military force in 1996, when the Clinton administration merely allowed then Taiwanese President Lee

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Teng-hui a "private" visit to his American alma mater, Cornell University.

Finally, Schell warns of the "anarchic" consequences of Washington's refusal to follow the commandments of its "unequivocal" treaty commitment to eliminate its nuclear arsenal. Current U.S. policies certainly carry this long-term risk, but the immediate danger is more insidious. By pressing its superfluous nuclear "advantage" Washington provokes other states, including friends, to challenge U.S. hegemony. Nuclear "have-nots," including such key states as Canada, Germany, Japan, Egypt, Sweden, South Africa, and Brazil, do not fear that America will use nuclear weapons against them. But they do see U.S. nuclear policy as hegemonic arrogance and needless militarism. These states, and others that are less friendly, want the nuclear-weapons powers to fulfill their commitment under the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) to eliminate their nuclear arsenals. The United States in turn needs the goodwill of both nuclear and non-nuclear states to shape the treaty-enforcing, cooperative international system on which American prosperity and peace depend.

ALL THE PRESIDENT'S MEN

If Schell understates the immediate dangers of American strategic policy, he overstates the degree to which American officials have analyzed the conditions necessary to eliminate nuclear arsenals. A 1961 initiative by President Kennedy and his disarmament adviser John McCloy marked the last time that the U.S. government took nuclear disarmament seriously enough to explore how to make it feasible. Even leaders who have sought modest reforms have been stymied. The next administration must understand this history if it is to overcome it.

As national security adviser, Henry Kissinger tried to moderate U.S. deterrence and targeting plans, as had Robert McNamara previously. In his memoir, Kissinger claims he failed: "Achieving a more discriminating nuclear strategy ... remains to this day one of the most difficult tasks to implement, requiring a substantial recasting of our military establishment."

President Reagan tried to go further and "pave the way for arms control measures to eliminate [nuclear] weapons themselves." His unattainable Strategic Defensive Initiative ("Star Wars") purported to make this possible, provided it were implemented with the understanding that "we seek neither military superiority nor political advantage." Of course, the bureaucracy under Reagan rejected both this operating principle and the ultimate goal. Although Reagan's successors in both parties are still chasing Star Wars today, they pursue an American missile-defense dream divested of the original vision of eliminating offensive nuclear forces in a transition to a collaborative, "defense-dominant" world.

In 1993, the Clinton administration, too, called for a "fundamental ... reexamination" of nuclear doctrine. Yet, as so often has happened during Clinton's years in office, the initiative suffered from presidential inattention and reluctance to challenge Washington's odd couple of Pentagon bureaucrats and myopic and doctrinaire senators. No real change in nuclear doctrine occurred, despite huge increases in America's overall military superiority over every other nation.

Today there is not one person in the U.S. government devising a road map to

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disarmament. "We have reached the point," exclaimed General Eugene Habiger, recently retired commander in chief of all U.S. strategic forces, "where the senior military generals responsible for nuclear forces are advocating more vocally, more vehemently, than our politicians, to get down to lower and lower weapons."

Paradoxically, even "vehement" arguments from the generals who have commanded U.S. nuclear forces do not wield sufficient firepower to jolt the executive branch out of its inertia. The Navy, Air Force, and particularly the civilian wizards of Armageddon have vested interests in maintaining extravagant arsenals. Dick Cheney found this out in 1989 when he took over as secretary of defense and discovered that "nobody had ever asked how much is enough." The general who commanded the Gulf War air campaign concluded that although "nuclear weapons ... really have no utility," such pragmatic considerations do not get priority in strategic planning. "Don't ask the Pentagon to change the Pentagon," he once said. "The executive branch has to provide leadership."

This statement confirms Schell's argument that nothing will change until the White House has a president willing to be a policy innovator, initiator, and implementer. To bridge the diplomatic chasm created by unilateral American nuclear superiority, the president must now lead multilateral moves to fulfill the NPT's "unequivocal" obligation of nuclear disarmament. During the Cold War, the nuclear powers realized that their strategic policies were interdependent. Hence the philosophy underpinning the negotiations that led to the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty and Strategic Arms Reduction Treaties. The United States must proceed toward nuclear elimination with the same understanding in mind.

Collectively, national governments must define the necessary prerequisites for a safe, progressive elimination of nuclear arsenals: a global system to count and monitor fissile material; security guarantees to enable Israel to relinquish its nuclear force; verification measures to give India and Pakistan mutual assurance that their nuclear weapons have been dismantled; plans and capabilities to respond to potential rearmament by bad actors; and so on. Even if these conditions cannot all be achieved, Washington would gain much-needed international appreciation for exploring them seriously. The U.S. would cease to appear as the greatest obstacle to international denuclearization.

The current presidential candidates offer little hope of leading a cooperative charge toward disarmament. Governor George W. Bush has apparently forgotten his May 2000 speech that called it time "to rethink the requirements of nuclear deterrence," in which he advocated taking more nuclear forces off alert. Vice President Al Gore has pledged that he would initiate "a thorough reexamination [of] official nuclear doctrine" and "engage deeply in the process." But if seven years in the Clinton White House have not given Gore sufficient time to find vision or political courage on nuclear issues, can he realistically be expected to become the disarmament president?

WAG THE DOG

Schell hopes that a general democratic debate will motivate the next president to reform U.S. nuclear policy and asserts

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that "the public must give its permission and support" for an effort to eradicate nuclear weapons. Yet the complicated logistics of nuclear forces and the dynamics of proliferation and diplomacy in such areas as the Middle East, South Asia, the Korean Peninsula, and the Taiwan Strait make the eyes of most busy Americans glaze over. A disinterested public lacks the historical, international, and technical knowledge necessary to make informed policy judgments.

Furthermore, Schell gives undue credit to contemporary democracy, which is soundbite obsessed and photo-staged. Media-driven politics will undermine rather than strengthen the prospects of responsible reform. Talk-radio hosts and elected politicians, whether doctrinaire or simply vote-conscious, will take advantage of widespread public ignorance to "simplify" policy choices and make them understandable to audiences. The duty to provide information could easily degenerate into an opportunity to sell propaganda. Knowledgeable centrists may well bow out of the argument, feeling that they cannot bring sense either to the simpletons of bellicosity or to the wishful thinkers of global peace. Meaningful policy change cannot occur amid a babble of extremist discourse.

It is no accident that the vast majority of states that decided to abandon nuclear weapons programs in recent decades—Argentina, Belarus, Brazil, Kazakhstan, South Africa, South Korea, Taiwan, and Ukraine—did so outside of established democratic processes. Nor was it happenstance that the far-reaching U.S.-Soviet nuclear reductions between 1987 and 1992 were made possible by the one-party leadership of Mikhail Gorbachev and by President George H.W. Bush's bold, secretive 1991 initiative to take U.S. nuclear bombers off alert and remove tactical nuclear weapons from service. Today, six of the eight nuclear-weapons powers are democracies: the United Kingdom, France, India, Israel, Russia, and the United States. Their elected executives and parliamentary leaders are highly reluctant to stick their necks out in favor even of exploring how to eliminate nuclear weapons.

Authoritarian government is not the answer. Rather, farsighted changes in nuclear policies will depend on determined experts' pushing the president to do the necessary executive work and painstaking diplomacy. The 1991 Bush initiative, which was not vetted by the interagency process or exposed first to public debate, is a good model for how the necessary changes will begin.

MR. SMITH GOES TO WASHINGTON

The onus is now on security and nuclear-policy experts to make the next U.S. administration jettison counterproductive Cold War nuclear doctrine. The time for mutually assured destruction has passed, and the United States has the opportunity to create a policy of mutually assured safety instead. The process will begin with new presidential guidelines for the Pentagon. Specialists should debate and offer objectives that the president should endorse and the guidelines should meet. Today's neglected task of strengthening the nonproliferation regime must take priority in these guidelines. Before the guidance is completed, the president and his top officials should discuss and debate it with outside experts. Know-nothings will try to threaten reputations and careers, but a

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president emboldened by a plan that has the backing of credible experts could then rally public support to overcome the resistance of bureaucrats and congressional extremists.

The national-security establishment rewards the cautious and uncontroversial. Yet only when leaders take personal risks to push enlightened policy through the Washington mill does the nation move forward. If the stewards of nuclear policy do not rise to the post–Cold War historical challenge, they will jeopardize the nation's physical security and hasten the decline of America's international leadership.

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Reality vs. Utopia

ERNEST W. LEFEVER

Jonathan Schell's prescription for saving the world from nuclear catastrophe boils down to five interrelated propositions.

ARMING FOR PEACE

First, Schell asserts that the "existence of the world's present nuclear arsenals poses the ever-present danger of unimaginable catastrophe." Although his apocalyptic premise is theoretically true, it is also true that nuclear arms and delivery systems have not led to nuclear war. In fact, these awesome weapons have helped make possible a half-century of great-power peace, a peace paradoxically bought at the risk of nuclear conflict. Thus mutual deterrence at the strategic level has worked so far.

Ironically, the 1962 Cuban missile crisis highlighted not the danger of nuclear weapons but their stabilizing impact. This risky "eyeball to eyeball" confrontation demonstrated the virtues of nuclear restraint and reinforced the Cold War adversaries' inclination to rely on less lethal means of pursuing their interests.

Second, Schell states that "every nuclear arsenal is linked to every other nuclear arsenal in the world by ... powerful ties of terror and response." He insists that the U.S. policy of nuclear deterrence inevitably induces other states to choose the nuclear option.

Of course the proliferation of nuclear arms also proliferates dangers, but compelling evidence suggests that neither India nor Pakistan, for example, has any intention of using its small nuclear arsenal in open warfare. In a visit to both countries early this year, I found no knowledgeable person in either place who regarded the recently acquired nuclear capability as anything other than a mutual deterrent, a bargaining chip, or a source of national prestige.

In fact, all with whom I spoke thought the existence of nuclear arms would dampen the bitter conflict over Kashmir—and they could claim evidence for their case. In 1999, when New Delhi and Islamabad came to the brink of a fourth war over Kashmir, both sides pulled back. This suggests that each country had already learned the discipline of nuclear-induced restraint. After all, during the nuclear standoff between the Soviet Union and the United States, neither side ever fired a shot at the other, even though Washington was seriously provoked in Berlin, and Moscow was provoked by our U-2 flights over its territory.

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U.S. & U.S.S.R.: MORAL EQUIVALENTS?

Schell's third key point is to bemoan the shift from the early "nuclear disarmament" negotiations to "arms control" efforts. Under the arms control regime in both Washington and Moscow, he says,

> first-strike forces regularly got the better of the hope for stability. Each side habitually saw itself as lagging behind. Cries of alarm and appeals to catch up—to close the "bomber gap," a "missile gap," a "throw-weight gap," or a "window of *vulnerability*"—sounded through the halls of Congress as well as the hidden precincts of the Politburo.

Schell's views suggest a kind of unjustified moral-equivalence doctrine. Washington focused on nuclear stability over provocation, whereas Moscow occasionally threatened the use of nuclear arms to maintain control over its satellites in Eastern Europe. And the Soviet Union and the United States behaved quite differently in the global arena. As a predatory power, Moscow was hostile toward Western Europe and sought to expand its empire elsewhere by subversion.

Fourth, although Schell supports the three major arms-control agreements—the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty, the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, and the NPT—as well as the test-ban negotiations, he feels that the U.S. failure to commit to a totally denuclearized world is subverting these efforts. Schell sternly criticizes the unilateral American determination to deploy a national missile defense system, which, he insists, jeopardizes the old ABM treaty and will spur a new nuclear arms race. He also condemns the Senate for rejecting the patently unenforceable Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.

Schell rightly sees the "arms control regime" as a weak reed, even as "folly," but he cites the wrong reasons. Arms control advocates should not be faulted for seeking to avoid war but for raising utopian expectations by exaggerating the force of international treaties. Yet Schell wants to invest even greater confidence in such instruments, which he sees as handmaidens in the ultimate task of pushing the evil nuclear genie back into its bottle. Alas, nuclear arms and missile technology, like dynamite and guns, cannot be uninvented.

States, not international treaties, are and always have been the primary actors in world politics. And in grave crises the vital interests of the state always trump treaties, however solemn or multilateral they may be.

A MINIMUM DETERRENT

Schell's final thesis pins the primary responsibility for eliminating nuclear weapons on the United States. He writes that in "many parts of the world, a steady undertow of nuclear sanity" has slowed "a global scramble to obtain nuclear arms." Washington should follow this sane lead and resolve to eliminate this scourge, he argues.

However unrealistic Schell's principal proposal, he is right in implying that mutual deterrence during the Cold War could have been achieved with fewer arms on each side. After Moscow exploded its first H-bomb in 1953, Washington sought to maintain effective mutual deterrence at the lowest prudential level. But Moscow's paranoia and ironclad secrecy prevented America from knowing the numbers and disposition of Soviet nuclear forces. Then at the 1955 Geneva summit, President Eisenhower made his daring "open skies" proposal that, if implemented, would have

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provided each side with sufficient intelligence about the other's arsenals to permit something approximating a minimum deterrent approach. Premier Khrushchev promptly rejected the proposal.

This development made the U-2 espionage flights over Soviet territory a viable alternative. Had Khrushchev accepted the mutual verification of warheads and missiles, no U-2 flights would have taken off and the superpowers might well have maintained the stability conferred by mutual deterrence at a much lower level of nuclear arms, thus saving hundreds of billions of dollars.

Finally, in September 1983 Ronald Reagan's firm response to Moscow's deployment of medium-range SS-20 missiles targeted on cities from Oslo to Istanbul made possible a substantial reduction in the intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) based in the Soviet Union, East and West Germany, Belgium, and Italy. Despite pressure from nuclear-freeze advocates, including Schell, Reagan deployed Pershing IIs in West Germany to counter the SS-20s. This move got Gorbachev's attention, and in 1987 he agreed with Reagan to jettison this highly destabilizing system on both sides. The INF treaty, the most significant arms reduction of the nuclear age, was achieved not by protracted arms control negotiation or by an international treaty but the unilateral decision—backed by NATO allies—of a courageous president facing a clear and present threat.

BETWEEN UTOPIA AND HELL

Schell insists that "every last nuclear warhead" must be destroyed. This goal, in his view, can be accomplished only if American leaders heed his apocalyptic advice and launch a vigorous crusade to that end. Alas, the alternatives that statesmen face are not utopia or hell, but purgatory. Constrained by the realities of history and politics, they confront agonizing choices in their quest for a tolerable balance of power that restrains aggressors and permits—but does not assure—a measure of peace and freedom.

Nuclear weapons, like all technology, are morally and politically neutral. They are inert and have no life of their own. Weapons are not actors in the global drama but pliant tools to be used or misused by fallible human beings. Their significance derives from how statesmen employ them. For all their portent, nuclear arms so far have served as instruments of peace.

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Recent Books on International Relations

Western Europe

STANLEY HOFFMANN

Hitler 1936–45: Nemesis. BY IAN KERSHAW. New York: W. W. Norton, 2000, 832 pp. $35.00.

The second volume of Kershaw's extraordinary biography of Hitler displays such a detailed narrative sweep and analytic incisiveness that it is impossible to put down. Kershaw illuminates how Hitler's brand of leadership was little more than a series of gambles, fierce demonstrations of will, and brilliant propaganda coups. At the same time, the regime's bureaucratic fragmentation and personal rivalries resulted in growing inefficiency and an ideological radicalization that centered on Hitler's "vision" of racial purity and imperial conquest. Kershaw also shows that Hitler never gave written or detailed orders during the genocidal attempt to "solve" the Jewish question. Rather, he let his subordinates carry out what they assumed were his wishes. Since writing *Mein Kampf,* he had linked the mass murder of Jews to waging war; so as the war expanded, the killings escalated into the "final solution." Both the war and genocide were driven by his brutally Darwinian views on life and history and his sense of having little time. Furthermore, Hitler's style of leadership through improvisation and the resulting "breakdown of governmental structures" prevented other institutions or groups from bypassing him. After appointing himself supreme army commander in December 1941, Hitler left nonmilitary affairs to squabbling underlings. Yet so thorough was Nazism's control and so widespread was public support (until the defeats began to accumulate) that only in July 1944 did a serious assassination plot develop. Here Kershaw's account—and his description of Hitler's final weeks in his bunker—are mesmerizing.

Yet the central mystery remains. Why did a civilized and educated nation entrust its fate to a "self-professed political savior" whose endless threats to "annihilate" his enemies should have left little doubt about his true aims? The appeals of Nazi ideology and Hitler's early successes, as well as his ability to combine mysticism and nationalism, provide part of the answer. Still, rational explanations take one only so far.

The Search for Good Government: Understanding the Paradox of Italian Democracy. BY FILIPPO SABETTI. Montreal: McGill–Queens University Press, 2000, 313 pp. $34.95.

An ambitious and spirited book that asks what type of constitutional system works

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best for Italy. Sabetti juxtaposes his analysis of earlier political thinkers with an account of more recent Italian politics and a critique of several influential political studies. One intriguing intellectual examined is Carlo Cattaneo, who during unification advocated a mix of communal autonomy (which he believed would encourage civic consciousness) and federalism (which Italy's leaders ultimately rejected). Sabetti continues with a discussion of how national parties limited regional autonomy after World War II so they could dominate local politics, then moves on abruptly to analyze the war against the Mafia. He concludes that this fight for good government has been hampered by a "perverse emphasis on legality," yet he fails to consider that legality is required for good government. His critique of cultural explanations for Italy's political flaws—including Robert Putnam's distinction between the civic-minded North and the authoritarian, corrupt South—leads to his general condemnation of foreign misconceptions of Italy. As for the Italians, he writes, their adoption of such foreign views amounts to "self-colonization." At the end, the reader is still left in the dark about how Italian democracy will succeed.

Governing with Judges: Constitutional Politics in Europe. BY ALEC STONE SWEET. New York: Oxford University Press, 2000, 232 pp. $60.00 (paper, $24.95).

A theoretically complex but richly rewarding book. The top American specialist on Europe's constitutional courts, Stone Sweet examines their changing role and succinctly analyzes some of their most significant decisions. He contends that "parliamentary supremacy ... has lost its vitality" and points to a new reality: Laws need to be recognized by constitutional courts, which in turn serve as interpreters and shapers of national constitutions. And as courts join in the legislative process, the issue of their democratic legitimacy becomes all the more important. They have also played an essential role in protecting human rights, and the European Court of Justice has obliged the national courts to accept the supremacy of European Union law, thereby creating an enforceable charter of rights. But the question remains as to who holds the ultimate authority over the constitutionality of EU law. For example, the German Constitutional Court, in its 1993 ruling on the Maastricht treaty, flouted the European Court of Justice by asserting its jurisdiction over EU decisions and giving a strictly intergovernmental reading of EU law. The author concludes that lawmaking and policymaking have become judicialized as "legal discourse mediates partisan debate and structures the exercise of legislative power." One hopes the author soon plans a systematic comparison with the United States.

Arguing About Asylum: The Complexity of Refugee Debates in Europe. BY NIKLAUS STEINER. New York: St. Martin's Press, 2000, 192 pp. $45.00.

Migrants and Citizens: Demographic Change in the European State System. BY REY KOSLOWSKI. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2000, 232 pp. $39.95.

Immigration and European Integration: Toward Fortress Europe? BY ANDREW P. GEDDES. New York: St. Martin's Press, 2000, 208 pp. $69.95 (paper, $24.95).

Few issues are more controversial in the EU than immigration and asylum. The first of these books carefully examines

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these debates in Switzerland, Germany, and Britain, with a special focus on issues of national interest and morality raised in the arguments concerning asylum. In Switzerland, Steiner writes, these arguments have changed significantly since the Cold War as policy has become more restrictive. Supporters of tighter laws in Switzerland and Germany now make a "moral" case that "tighter laws [are] needed to maintain the humanitarian tradition of granting asylum to refugees"—while both sides claim their position best serves the national interest. And once-tolerant Britain has become increasingly critical of refugees. Nevertheless, Steiner optimistically concludes that asylum is still widely recognized as a central tenet of liberal democracy.

Koslowski looks at the migrations' importance in undermining traditional international-relations analysis. His focus on European integration's effects on immigrants also touches on the development of a European citizenship and an intra-EU migration regime. For example, EU citizenship is now granted only to nationals of EU member states, but EU citizens living in a member state other than their own can acquire limited political rights. Koslowski also discusses the rise of dual citizenship, an issue closely linked with immigrant participation in home country politics. His examination of these trends covers too many empirical and theoretical issues to satisfy completely. He is provocative nonetheless, underscoring how the context of low fertility rates and increasing migration polarizes European domestic politics and challenges the stability of democracies.

In a more focused volume, Geddes also discusses immigration in the EU context but emphasizes the dramatic difference in status between "inner" migrants who move freely from one EU member state to another and migrants coming from outside the EU. The latter face a strict intergovernmental migration policy that has served as a brake, in part because such migrations are seen as adding to the burdens of the welfare state. The author acknowledges the potential specter of a "fortress Europe" but deems it unlikely because no state is capable of controlling its borders. To date, his is the most comprehensive analysis of the EU's legal treatment of migration.

The French Overseas Empire. BY FREDERICK QUINN. Westport: Praeger, 2000, 336 pp. $65.00.

Quinn is a former American diplomat with considerable experience in the former French Empire. His book is a history of that empire "from within"—rather than "from below" or from the perspective of metropolitan France. He is good at pointing out the forms of conscious or unconscious racism that permeated French behavior and culture, and his account of French colonialism from the sixteenth century (where he begins with a woefully mistranslated fishermen's song) to the empire's collapse after World War II is comprehensive. Covering key individual actors as well as politics, economic domination, and culture, he also has much to say about the "military's and missionaries' Empire" of the nineteenth century and is keenly aware of the sprawling empire's diverse situations and conditions. De Gaulle gets due credit for having "allowed France to cut away cleanly" from obsolete entanglements. Despite minor typos and errors, a solid and impressive achievement.

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Political and Legal

G. JOHN IKENBERRY

Stay the Hand of Vengeance: The Politics of War Crimes Tribunals. BY GARY JONATHAN BASS. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000, 368 pp. $29.95.

The best work yet on the politics of justice after war. This historically rich, theoretically informed study explores both celebrated and little-known chapters in history, from St. Helena to The Hague. Bass admits that the story of war-crimes tribunals is often one of power politics and national self-interest. But this story also touches on the moral and legal sensibilities that drive liberal democracies to search for political reconciliation in the face of wartime atrocities. Taking exception to the realist view that tribunals reflect only victor's justice, Bass argues that the motivation for trials also stems from legal principles drawn from domestic politics and universal notions of rights. Only this impulse toward legalism can explain the willingness of liberal postwar leaders to risk the acquittal of brutal killers as they apply rules of law. But Bass' strongest argument is that not all victors' justice is the same. The Soviets had their show trials, and it is easy to imagine how the Nazis would have handled postwar justice. And he reminds the reader that although every international tribunal has rested on the support of liberal states, the thirst for justice often disappears when their own citizens' lives are at risk.

Crimes Against Humanity: The Struggle for Global Justice. BY GEOFFREY ROBERTSON. New York: New Press, 2000, 554 pp. $30.00.

A sweeping history of an emerging world legal system that redresses crimes against humanity, where the unfolding struggle is not between liberal and outlaw states but between state sovereignty and the global legal regime. The book first revisits historical turning points such as the Nuremberg trials and the U.N.'s Universal Declaration of Human Rights. In Robertson's view, these early human rights victories failed to challenge the system of state sovereignty and therefore had little consequence. More recently, however, human rights law has made unprecedented progress, spurred by well-publicized atrocities in the Balkans, Rwanda, and elsewhere and signaled by the new International Criminal Court. The author predicts an emerging world system of justice in which individual rights will be enshrined in laws secured by both states and the world community. The political and historical forces driving these developments are not always made clear, but the international human rights movement and the global media's attention to states' abuses matter most to this author. Whereas Bass provides a more striking and coherent account, Robertson offers a useful guide to the wider legal struggle.

The Dark Valley: A Panorama of the 1930s. BY PIERS BRENDON. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2000, 832 pp. $35.00.

Those who worry about the fragility of today's world order should remember the nightmarish 1930s. In a masterful survey of that troubled decade, Brendon traces the political pathways of the great powers in the throes of economic collapse and social upheaval. This massive book also offers fascinating sketches of democrats and dictators struggling to cope with (or exploit) the enveloping economic misery.

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But the central drama is the rise of fascism, rooted in national humiliation and nourished by the everyday anger of common citizens. Mussolini's March on Rome in 1921, for example, revealed both fascism's absurdity and its potent possibilities in a world economic crisis. American and British leaders are depicted as practical and determined but lacking a coherent script. Brendon reminds the reader of an old insight: Illiberal politics lurk in the shadow of major economic recession. The Great Depression created something similar to the fog of war, allowing rulers to create myths and manipulate mass opinion. Although the author does not break new theoretical ground, he does give fresh meaning to the question of how enlightened political order and civility can be maintained in an economic meltdown.

Peoples Versus States: Minorities at Risk in the New Century. BY TED ROBERT GURR. Washington: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2000, 448 pp. $29.95 (paper).

Ethnic conflict is often considered a defining feature of the post–Cold War landscape. But this systematic, empirically rich study by a leading scholar suggests the worst has perhaps passed. Tracking 275 ethnic and social groups since the mid-1980s, Gurr sees the reach and intensity of ethnic struggle diminishing for three reasons. First, in the former Soviet bloc the initial shock of state reformation after communism's collapse has diminished, reducing the incentives and opportunities for ethnic activism. Second, international efforts at publicizing and responding to minority-rights violations have increased, while leading states and international organizations have stepped forward to offer remedies. Most important, democratic states have improved their own policies toward ethnic minorities, resisting the temptations of assimilation and repression in favor of pluralism and group autonomy. Gurr concludes that the settlement of disputes over inequality and oppression requires a bargain in which the minority group is given rights and autonomy in return for recognizing the state's wider authority. But while democratic countries with strong political institutions can most easily reach such bargains, the elusiveness of stable democracy in much of the world tempers Gurr's optimism.

Immigration and the Nation-State: The United States, Germany, and Great Britain. BY CHRISTIAN JOPPKE. New York: Oxford University Press, 2000, 366 pp. $72.00 (paper, $22.95).

Communism's collapse and the rise of globalization have served to magnify the tensions between population flows and traditional notions of inviolable national borders. In this impressive book, Joppke points out that universal principles of justice and freedom of movement often conflict with the primacy of sovereign borders and national identity. Focusing on the United States, Germany, and Britain, he finds that states are often pulled in multiple directions, attempting to control their borders while facing human rights constraints on national sovereignty. As they create new membership categories for new immigrants, they also come under pressure to establish unitary citizenship rights. Still, each country has handled these pressures differently. America's immigrant tradition and civil-rights culture has contributed to a relatively open immigration regime, whereas Britain's colonial legacy has led

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to restrictions on immigration as well as the thorough assimilation of former colonial peoples. Meanwhile, Germany's legacy of ethnic citizenship and its guest-worker tradition have created distinct dilemmas of permanent settlement. By identifying these three patterns, Joppke nicely demonstrates the influence of national political and cultural traditions in framing immigration and citizenship rights. Most intriguing is his claim that today's immigrants—aided by modern technology—resist assimilation more than previous generations, making the diaspora a permanent feature of world political life.

Truth v. Justice. EDITED BY ROBERT I. ROTBERG AND DENNIS THOMPSON. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 296 pp. $55.00 (paper, $18.95).

This collection of scholarly essays emerged from a dialogue between the authors and officials involved in South Africa's Truth and Reconciliation Commission. Dennis Thompson and Amy Guttmann point out the inherent tension between truth and justice: Commissions must give up the criminal prosecution of evildoers to allow an airing of their deeds. Amnesty may be a required political compromise, they find, but it may not necessarily be a moral one. Several authors defend Archbishop Desmond Tutu's argument that criminal justice can be sacrificed if it leads to a greater sense of social justice, while Elizabeth Kiss argues that truth commissions can be useful in strengthening civil society by simultaneously playing investigative, judicial, political, and educational roles. And the historian Charles Maier notes the similarities between the work of truth commissions and that of historians: Both search for causes to render judgments on blame and responsibility, and both contribute to the reconstruction of a society's narrative of its own past. Although these essays do not speak with one voice, they are generally supportive of truth commissions, particularly as practiced in South Africa.

Economic, Social, and Environmental

RICHARD N. COOPER

Ocean's End: Travels Through Endangered Seas. BY COLIN WOODARD. New York: Basic Books, 2000, 300 pp. $26.00.

Water: The Fate of Our Most Precious Resource. BY MARQ DE VILLIERS. New York: Houghton Mifflin, 2000, 338 pp. $26.00.

These highly readable books cover the earth's most distinguishing feature—abundant water in liquid form—and complement one another nicely; the former focuses on salt water, the latter on fresh water. Woodard addresses how human activity has altered once-pristine seas, sometimes with disastrous effects. Part travelogue and part ecology lesson, his book covers the eutrophication of the Black Sea, the decline of the North Atlantic cod fishery, the retreat of the Mississippi delta, the bleaching of the Belize coral reef, the nuclear contamination of the Marshall Islands, and the warming of the Antarctic peninsula. It is an informed, balanced, and constructive account, albeit with a bias toward small fishermen.

De Villiers underscores the contrast between water-rich and water-scarce countries. He focuses on the pressures that human demands place on supplies of

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fresh water—the use of rivers as channels for waste disposal, imprudent diversion for irrigation, and the legitimate human needs of growing urban populations. Special attention goes to the increasingly depleted aquifers (ancient underground reservoirs), where water is pumped out faster than it is replenished. Water levels are dropping in many parts of the world, including areas of high food production such as India, Pakistan, northern China, and the high plains of the United States. Genetically engineered plants might promise less demand for agricultural water, but the author enjoins that water resources need to be managed more efficiently. A good way to start would be to cease regarding water as a free good.

Assessing Financial Vulnerability: An Early Warning System for Emerging Markets. BY MORRIS GOLDSTEIN, GRACIELA L. KAMINSKY, AND CARMEN M. REINHART. Washington: Institute for International Economics, 2000, 150 pp. $15.95 (paper).

The Asian financial crises of 1997 occurred in countries with previously exemplary economic performances, catching many analysts, investors, and officials off guard. That surprise prompted extensive work on possible "early warning" indicators for currency and banking crises. This short, thoughtful book represents the latest and most comprehensive treatment of the subject, summarizing earlier efforts as well as making its own important contribution. The results are mixed. With an appropriate set of indicators, the authors find, ample warning of currency crises is usually possible at least 12 months in advance. Banking crises are somewhat more difficult to predict, perhaps partly because their beginnings are more difficult to date. But any warning system also produces "false positives," or warnings of crises that do not occur. And most early-warning indicators missed the Indonesian currency crisis altogether. In short, analysts are not able to forecast the future accurately—even in retrospect. But the findings presented here are a useful addition to the information available to investor and policymaker alike.

Markets for Clean Air: The U.S. Acid Rain Program. BY A. DENNY ELLERMAN, PAUL L. JOSKOW, RICHARD SCHMALENSEE, JUAN-PABLO MONTERO, AND ELIZABETH BAILEY. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000, 362 pp. $39.95.

Auctions of tradable emission rights have long been advocated by some economists but dismissed by practitioners as impractical and undesirable. In 1993, however, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency inaugurated a significant experiment in pollution control by auctioning tradable rights to emit sulfur dioxide. (Produced by burning coal and heavy oil, this compound is the main source of acid rain.) This book provides a detailed evaluation of how this "market for clean air" was established and how effective it has been at reducing sulfur emissions; a discussion of the effects of acidity on rain and lakes is beyond the book's scope. The EPA program has been remarkably successful at reducing sulfur emissions at relatively low cost, confounding skeptics and providing useful guidance for possible extension to other areas. But the authors warn against casual applications to other areas such as greenhouse gas

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emissions, in which the rigorous conditions underpinning the sulfur dioxide arrangements are missing.

Did Microsoft Harm Consumers? Two Opposing Views. BY DAVID S. EVANS, FRANKLIN M. FISHER, DANIEL L. RUBINFELD, AND RICHARD L. SCHMALENSEE. Washington: AEI Press, 2000, 133 pp. $10.00 (paper).

Many countries would love a national firm as successful as Microsoft. Yet the United States has time and again broken up its highly successful companies, as it did with Standard Oil 90 years ago and AT&T 15 years ago (and almost with IBM in the 1970s). Now *U.S. v. Microsoft* is underway, and the AEI-Brookings Center for Regulatory Studies has provided a signal service by inviting leading economic witnesses on both sides to state their cases and critique each others' cases. A mixture of law and economics, the book's focus is not on the consequences of a possible breakup of Microsoft—the remedy proposed by a judicial finding that the firm violated U.S. antitrust laws—but on whether its marketing behavior harmed consumers. For this reviewer, the United States has the better case, but readers should form their own judgments. An excellent illustration of how thoughtful analysts and the American judicial system accept the importance of preserving healthy competition within the American economy.

Feeding the World: A Challenge for the Twenty-First Century. BY VACLAV SMIL. Cambridge: MIT Press, 2000, 362 pp. $32.95.

The world's population recently surpassed six billion, up three billion in the last half-century alone and probably on its way to ten billion before stabilizing. An adequate diet is a necessary—if not sufficient—condition for civilized society. For decades, Cassandras have been forecasting a looming world shortage of food, and Smil asks whether the earth in fact can adequately feed ten billion people or more. After a detailed investigation of soil loss, water shortage, environmental degradation, pestilence, harvest and post-harvest losses, diets, and nutritional requirements, he resoundingly says it can. He finds great "slack" in raising food and bringing it to the dinner plate, which leaves great scope for enormous improvements in efficiency at each link in the chain, from food production to adequate nutrition. That said, improvements in efficiency will not come automatically; they rely on effective dissemination of scientific knowledge and adequate incentives to adopt such knowledge at each link. But the possibilities exist. This book should be read, however, less for its conclusion than for its rich and highly informed discussion of all aspects of food production and consumption.



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Military, Scientific, and Technological

ELIOT A. COHEN

Mars Unmasked: The Changing Face of Urban Operations. BY SEAN J. A. EDWARDS. Santa Monica: RAND, 2000, 108 pp. $15.00 (paper).

The City's Many Faces. EDITED BY RUSSELL W. GLEN. Santa Monica: RAND, 2000, 653 pp. $52.50.

Air Operations in Urban Environments: Exploring New Concepts. EDITED BY ALAN VICK. Santa Monica: RAND, 2000, 285 pp. $25.00.

If one looks at the uniforms of American soldiers and marines, one will see a battle dress designed to blend with the eastern woodlands—mottled green, brown, and tan splotches. As these three volumes from RAND suggest, however, the environment of warfare in the new century is increasingly urban. This trend is not entirely new, of course. American soldiers fought their way through cities as early as the Mexican and Civil Wars. World War II, Korea, and Vietnam all brought their share of urban fighting, as the burnt-out wrecks of Manila and Hue mutely testified. But military training and doctrine have largely tended to emphasize operations in easier, unpopulated environments. The American experience in Somalia and the far grimmer Russian history in Chechnya suggest that this assumption must change, and military institutions are gradually starting to adjust. These books—the first a summary volume, the second a rambling collection of conference proceedings, the third a technical study—reflect two dominant facts. First, the urbanization of much of the world means that fighting in cities is an assured part of the future of warfare; second, the technical challenges are enormous, particularly to a force that wishes to hold collateral damage and its own casualties to the barest minimum.

Fortitude: The D-Day Deception Campaign. BY ROGER HESKETH. New York: Overlook Press, 2000, 513 pp. $40.00.

Until a few years ago, copies of this book circulated as D-Day aficionados' samizdat. It is nothing less than the official history of the pre-D-Day deception operations, written in the years immediately after the war by one of the top officials of the London Controlling Section, which was in charge of spreading carefully contrived misinformation to German intelligence. It is also a superbly written insider's account, from which several historians have drawn but which few have equaled. As a tale of espionage and counterespionage, meticulous planning and organization, and applied psychology used for the highest stakes, it is simply superb.

The Challenge of Change: Military Institutions and New Realities, 1918–1941. EDITED BY HAROLD R. WINTON AND DAVID R. METS. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2000, 304 pp. $50.00.

Students of technological and doctrinal change in war inevitably turn to the interwar period. Rarely have the implements of war evolved so rapidly, and rarely have so many talented soldiers grappled with the implications of those changes. The authors, both professors at Air University at Maxwell Air Force Base, have assembled a *Who's Who* of period scholars who also understand the contemporary relevance of their work. Dennis Showalter's brilliant

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summary essay, "Military Innovation and the Whig Perspective of History," is by itself worth the price of admission. Examining with a critical eye the notion that innovation is an obvious and easily judged phenomenon, the book is well worth reading for any student or advocate of organizational and doctrinal change.

The Bombing of Auschwitz: Should the Allies Have Attempted It? EDITED BY MICHAEL J. NEUFELD AND MICHAEL BERENBAUM. New York: St. Martin's Press, 2000, 350 pp. $27.50.

The failure of Great Britain and the United States to attack directly the Nazi extermination of the Jews remains an issue of controversy. This fine collection of essays—supplemented by some 40 essential documents—emerged from a joint symposium by the Air and Space and Holocaust Museums. The authors disagree sharply—one historian regards the notion that the Allies could have usefully bombed Auschwitz as "Monday-morning quarterbacking," while another calls the failure to do so "a missed opportunity of monumental proportions." Collectively, the authors have assembled not only the best and most recent technical assessments but thoughtful reflections on how to judge the hard-pressed political leaders and generals of the time. The broader questions may be unanswerable, but they merit pondering nonetheless—particularly in an age that has seen its share of massacres uninterrupted by external intervention.

Planning the Unthinkable: How New Powers Will Use Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Weapons. EDITED BY PETER LAVOY, SCOTT D. SAGAN, AND JAMES J. WIRTZ. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2000, 257 pp. $45.00 (paper, $19.95).

The old rules of the nuclear game were clear, complete with the jargon of "time-urgent hard target kill" and similar ungainly esoterica. These essays, which do not all immediately focus on the future, deliver a central message: Whatever new powers may think about weapons of mass destruction, they probably do so differently than did the United States or the Soviet Union. The volume offers numerous case studies, which include fascinating (if chilling) reading on a variety of countries (Iraq, Iran, Israel, India, Pakistan, and North Korea) as well as terrorist groups; one senses that the list is not exhaustive. The challenge for the United States, these essays conclude grimly, is figuring out how to respond to the use of such weapons when—not if—they are used.

Nuclear Monopoly. BY GEORGE H. QUESTER. New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 2000, 234 pp. $44.95.

An interesting mix of political science and history by a wise student of strategic affairs, this book covers the brief period of the American nuclear monopoly, from 1945 to 1949. The author has no hesitations about exploring counterfactual scenarios and indeed is very good at it. Could the United States have engaged in preventive war? Was the H-bomb necessary? Could the United States have extracted more political mileage out of its window of strength? One might not think playfulness a virtue in matters nuclear, but this book suggests otherwise—and it reminds us that history took only one of an infinite number of possible paths.

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The Clandestine Cold War in Asia, 1945–65. EDITED BY RICHARD J. ALDRICH, GARY D. RAWNSLEY, AND MING-YEH T. RAWNSLEY. Portland: Frank Cass, 2000, 291 pp. $57.50 (paper, $24.50).
One "front" of the Cold War consisted of the shadow war of clandestine and special operations. This dense but fascinating collection of essays sheds a great deal of light on such subjects as British support for Burmese insurgents in the late 1940s, the Malayan insurgency, the collaboration between Ramon Magsaysay and Edward Lansdale in suppressing the Huk insurrection in the Philippines, and of course, skullduggery in Hong Kong. Despite the air of Graham Greene-ish romance that floats over these pages, the subjects are important if (by nature of the volume) somewhat disjointed. Not a book for the general reader, but one definitely of interest to students of the subject.

Center for Strategic Education. http://www.sais-jhu.edu/cse/ links.htm
First, truth in advertising: this reviewer is the director of the Center for Strategic Education at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies. That said, and due modesty aside, this page provides an excellent collection of Web links for those interested in strategic studies. Assembled and annotated by William Arkin, the best national-security Webhead around, this page will direct the reader to a variety of resources, including Internet tutorials, media, government, and international resources, as well as general references.

The United States

PHILIP ZELIKOW

Madeleine Albright and the New American Diplomacy. BY THOMAS W. LIPPMAN. Boulder: Westview, 2000, 372 pp. $27.00.
This first substantial account of Madeleine Albright's tenure as secretary of state is a good one, written by a *Washington Post* diplomatic correspondent who crisscrossed the world with her. Lippman found that a "flair for trenchant one-liners and rhetorical challenges would not serve Albright well as secretary of state, a job in which people expected her to translate her words into action, but it took her half her tenure to learn that." Straining to be fair, Lippman shows that Albright has articulated a clear world-view in which American ideals can be applied to just about all of the world's trouble spots and social problems. The actual applications seem guided more by serendipity than strategy. While observing her various missteps and criticizing her efforts to manipulate the press, Lippman also credits Albright with success in the Kosovo war and perseverance in Middle East diplomacy during Binyamin Netanyahu's tenure as Israeli prime minister. But what lingers is a character sketch that her British colleague at the U.N. once cabled home to his government. (This remarkable portrait is quoted more fully in Ann Blackman's *Seasons of Her Life,* pages 268–70.) Granting that Albright has skill at boiling the complex down to the simple, the ambassador wrote that she "conveys a mixture of authority and insecurity. She is not good at devising a detailed game plan for pursuing broad objectives."

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Woodrow Wilson: A Penguin Lives Biography. BY LOUIS AUCHINCLOSS. New York: Viking Penguin, 2000, 128 pp. $19.95.

This brief entry in the *Penguin Lives* series reminds the reader of Wilson's astonishingly rapid ascent to national prominence and power by compressing the story. Auchincloss gracefully draws out a few key themes, such as Wilson's crucial relationship with his adviser Colonel Edward House and the baleful influence of the president's second wife, Edith Galt. His portrait of Wilson's dual personality does not wear as well. Indeed, the author is more convincing in his elegant cameo of Wilson's great foe, Henry Cabot Lodge. Auchincloss grants that Wilson's high ideals still win praise. But he adds that "it has always seemed to me that it is a simple matter for a man to dream of peace and leagues and international understandings. The whole trick in such matters is not to dream them but to implement those dreams."

Kennedy's Wars: Berlin, Cuba, Laos, and Vietnam. BY LAWRENCE FREEDMAN. New York: Oxford University Press, 2000, 505 pp. $35.00.

American Tragedy: Kennedy, Johnson, and the Origins of the Vietnam War. BY DAVID KAISER. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2000, 566 pp. $29.95.

These two books put forth an interpretation of J.F.K.'s foreign policy that is more sophisticated and much more positive than earlier accounts. Kennedy's breadth of knowledge and ironic sensibility made him wary of Cold War shibboleths and open to quiet accommodation. Yet he was dealing with a Soviet leader inclined to mistake conciliation for weakness and a domestic environment that pushed him toward confrontational posturing. Facing real crises, Kennedy found himself performing amazing balancing acts on the high wire, with the safety net below frayed by his loose, ad hoc decision-making style. Nonetheless, by 1963 he had achieved real successes of lasting import. He was in the midst of yet another balancing act—Vietnam—when his life was cut short. A veteran scholar of great skill, Freedman is well versed in the new evidence, and his judgments are measured and perceptive. His is the best one-volume treatment of Kennedy's foreign policy in print.

Although Kaiser looks at Eisenhower and L.B.J. as well, his Vietnam book is strongest on the Kennedy period. On Johnson, his account ably complements Fred Logevall's *Choosing War* in the way it stresses Johnson's choices and responsibility. Kaiser persuasively argues that Kennedy would have avoided a major American war in Vietnam had he lived. Many critics have disagreed with Kaiser. But amid the debate about "what ifs," one basic contrast between Kennedy and Johnson now stands out. From the very start, Kennedy's premises about Indochina were skeptical and open to diplomatic exits. Johnson's premises and mindset were always different—more passionate, tormented, and vain.

Robert Kennedy: His Life. BY EVAN THOMAS. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2000, 509 pp. $28.00.

This is a good season for readers still curious about the Kennedy era. Thomas has written a terrific biography of Robert Kennedy, weaving his way through the dense thickets of rumor, gossip, and charges with hardly a scratch, superbly

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sorting out the evidence with the experience of many years working with Washington's darker stories. R.F.K. emerges with all his volatility, idealized yearnings, quickness, and insecurity intact. It is not always an attractive portrait, but it is a very human one. Markedly different from and inferior to his older brother as either a statesman or a politician, Bobby was still indispensable to him. The real subtext of this book, however, is its recreation of the ugly netherworld of American political life in those years, when the shady practices of an older Washington mixed poisonously with the heady power and charged politics of the high Cold War. J. Edgar Hoover was a top predator in that world; his malignant influence shadows almost every chapter of this book.



Honey and Vinegar: Incentives, Sanctions, and Foreign Policy. EDITED BY RICHARD N. HAASS AND MEGHAN L. O'SULLIVAN. Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 2000, 211 pp. $16.95 (paper).

This is a book on how American foreign-policy makers should wield carrots as well as sticks. But it turns out to be even more—a handy guide to the characteristic dilemmas of the post–Cold War era. Until now, hardly anyone has analyzed just how to use incentives in dealing with problem countries. Taking a comprehensive collection of cases that examine U.S. relations with China, Iraq, North Korea, South Africa, the former Soviet Union, and Vietnam—as well as Europe's effort to engage Iran—Haass and O'Sullivan have distilled some clear messages. Washington needs a clearer road map, sharper analysis of decision-making in target countries, more coordination with allies, and a better effort to manage the domestic politics that often confound policies of engagement. Although credible sticks must complement carrots, the contributors explain why the equation should usually work both ways. An interesting observation, buttressed by Ken Juster's Iraq case, is that a little engagement can actually be a prerequisite to successful coercion. When rallying a coalition, it helps if others can see you tried a bit of friendship first.

Western Hemisphere

KENNETH MAXWELL

The Future of the Western Hemisphere: A Shared Vision Toward 2015. BY THE AMERICAN ASSEMBLY. http://americanassembly.org.

The most recent gathering of regional worthies by the American Assembly has once again produced the usual collection of predictable platitudes. This time, they recommend that the western hemisphere countries reduce poverty by 50 percent in the next 15 years, narrow income inequality, and improve education, jobs, health care, and social-security protection. Faster, sustained economic growth and increased government spending on social programs can achieve all this, the report optimistically notes. No sensible Latin American

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president or shantytown dweller would disagree with such admirable goals. But how to get from aspiration to desired outcome—especially when the report also shuns "fiscal deficits"—remains an open question.

The report also has obvious recommendations for Latin American democracy: the need for more transparency, checks and balances, and equal rights under the law, all of which fall under the umbrella of a "new political culture." But the assembly leaves the precise meaning of this new political culture largely unspecified, even contradicting the report's starting assertion that the countries of the western hemisphere "share public values." The report strongly favors the completion of "hemispheric integration"—essentially a pan-American free trade area by 2005—but fails to mention immigration, Colombia's crisis, or Brazil's unwillingness to follow the U.S. lead in trade liberalization (which has fizzled anyway since Clinton failed to secure "fast-track" authority). Nor is there any sense that the hemisphere is becoming an increasingly differentiated region, as North America, the Andean countries, and the Southern Cone follow different tracks at different speeds. If the new U.S. president wants to anticipate the new complexities and dangers south of the border, he will have to look somewhere other than this report. Achieving "a shared vision towards 2015" will prove a complicated business.

Born in Blood and Fire: A Concise History of Latin America. BY JOHN CHARLES CHASTEEN. New York: W. W. Norton, 2000, 320 pp. $26.95.

A briskly written yet sophisticated introduction to Latin America that will be greatly welcomed by nonspecialists and experts alike. Chasteen paints on a very broad canvas, but he succeeds in capturing with enviable conciseness the major ingredients of Latin America's uniqueness and complexity. Especially welcome is his graceful integration of Brazil into the overall picture, which general histories of Latin America often lack. He first takes the reader from the European conquest through the colonial consolidation by Spain and Portugal before looking at the role of indigenous communities in the new order imposed by the Europeans and African slavery's social and cultural consequences. He then follows with the independence movements and the uneven attempts at nation-building in the nineteenth century; race, ethnicity, religious and liberal ideologies, and the roles of key individuals are also covered. Chasteen concludes with the recent return to economic liberalism, this time in the context of open elections, continuing poverty, and social exclusion of large segments of the population. A stellar performance.

Border Games: Policing the U.S.-Mexico Divide. BY PETER ANDREAS. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2000, 192 pp. $26.00.

The U.S.-Mexico border today is the most heavily traveled and one of the most heavily fortified land-crossings in the world. Vicente Fox has already set the cat among the pigeons with his call for an open border between the two countries. Just how provocative—and how politically impossible to implement—this suggestion is becomes immediately apparent in Andreas' remarkably timely book. Andreas argues that borders are not becoming irrelevant in the age of globalization. In fact, he compares the U.S.-Mexico frontier

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to the European Union's ever-tightening borders. In the American case, the borderless economy created by the North American Free Trade Agreement coexists with a barricaded confrontation point where law enforcement and law evasion face off with escalating intensity. As a result, the border-control operation has been transformed from a low-maintenance and politically marginal activity into an intensive, high-profile campaign against drugs and migrant labor—both of which Andreas sees as the inevitable, market-driven, and clandestine results of the growing economic relationship.

The Brazilian People: The Formation and Meaning of Brazil. BY DARCY RIBEIRO. Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2000, 376 pp. $34.95.

The late Ribeiro was a remarkably prolific scholar, novelist, and activist for Brazil's indigenous and underprivileged. Upon returning to Brazil in 1974 after a ten-year political exile, he became Rio de Janeiro's lieutenant governor and federal senator. Brilliantly translated by Gregory Rabassa, this book is the decades-old product of Ribeiro's labors as he attempted to come to terms with the complexities of Brazil's national identity. Scholars and other critics have faulted his work, but Ribeiro's enthusiasm and broad interpretation never appealed to academics anyway. More important, as Elizabeth Lowe says in her helpful introduction, this highly readable and enjoyable book marks the end of a grand tradition that encouraged Brazilians to understand their country as a product of its ethnic roots. For Ribeiro, Brazil was the "most beautiful and luminous province on earth" but was cursed by its history of class and ethnic antagonism. Nonetheless, Brazil's strength lay in its people's fundamental creativity and the promise offered by its mixed blood and Latin roots. Ribeiro was confident that Brazil will someday pose a worthy challenge to the United States and Canada—"mere transplants of Europe onto broad spaces overseas ... [that offer] no novelty to the world."

The Political Right in Postauthoritarian Brazil: Elites, Institutions, and Democratization. BY TIMOTHY J. POWER. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2000, 296 pp. $55.00 (paper, $19.95).

In this important new book, Power addresses the central conundrums of Brazil's democratic transition and explains the long-term continuities that mark its political system and hinder reform. The old Brazilian military regime, he argues, rested on a long-lasting, symbiotic partnership with a group of conservative politicians. Although the regime eventually faltered, these politicians survived and dominated the political class on which the newly democratized institutions depended. As Brazil faced enormous economic inequalities, these conservative stalwarts adamantly opposed efforts to redistribute income or democratize the economy. Thus a paralyzing dilemma arose between the need to gain the former authoritarians' support to make democracy possible and the threat to reform that their participation posed. Another weakness also lingered: Many of the surviving institutions established (or gutted) by the authoritarian regime remained powerless. After examining the role of the right in political parties and the national legislature during the postauthoritarian period, the

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author concludes that these continuities have prevented Brazil from achieving the fundamental changes essential for a democratic consolidation. This powerfully argued and carefully documented work demonstrates the drawbacks of Brazil's conservative transition from military to civilian rule.

Eastern Europe and Former Soviet Republics

ROBERT LEGVOLD

Empire: The Russian Empire and Its Rivals. BY DOMINIC LIEVEN. London: John Murray, 2000, 486 pp. £27.50.

Lieven explores not simply the rise, life, and fall of the Russian Empire—including its Soviet variant—but the entire notion of empire, from Rome to Han China and even (for some purposes) to the United States. He asks what they are, how they differ, why they succeed, and why they fall. Russia, however, is his reference point. Before his ambitious treatment of his Russian subject, he first compares the Russian Empire with its British, Ottoman, and Hapsburg counterparts, and he later contrasts separately the Soviet empire with the same three. Lieven manages to put a tight, coherent focus on a very large subject while producing a book rich with insights and provocative comparisons. Even his thoughts about the new postimperial Russia add perspective. This is one of those books that not only sheds light on a subject but also challenges one's scale of historical thinking.

Transitional Citizens: Voters and What Influences Them in the New Russia. BY TIMOTHY J. COLTON. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2000, 324 pp. $65.00 (paper, $24.95).

How far has the average Russian come on the road from subject to citizen? In painstakingly careful fashion, Colton studies the results of Russia's first two parliamentary elections and the 1996 presidential election and gives a remarkably refined and systematic answer. It turns out that when multiple—rather than isolated—influences are factored in, Russian voters are already more like their Western counterparts than many observers have thought. Despite the weakness of Russia's party system, for example, voters are heavily influenced by partisan preferences. They also vote by issues, not ethnicity or religion. Although they do respond to personality, it is not as important as Western specialists have assumed. In contrast to the West, however, age counts more than education or income as a determining factor of behavior. Still, Colton acknowledges that whether the Russian voter will be an anchor or an Achilles' heel of democracy depends on institutions and an ethos yet to be constructed.

The Moldovans: Romania, Russia, and the Politics of Culture. BY CHARLES KING. Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 2000, 303 pp. $39.95 (paper, $24.95).

Small and remote from the attention of much of the world, Moldova nonetheless possesses a history embodying all of the intricacy of a southern European state at the intersection of great empires and great turmoil. Moldova (formerly Bessarabia) also presents in sharp relief the dilemmas

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of a people struggling to locate themselves and build a new order on the ruins of their Soviet past—while coping with a separatist movement that has torn away a large chunk of territory. King is the first to explore in lucid detail this harsh linkage, tracing through the ages Moldova's transfer back and forth between Romania and Russia. He deals particularly well with the political-cultural effects of Soviet rule and the challenges of transcending that rule's creature, the Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic.

Lenin: A Biography. BY ROBERT SERVICE. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2000, 561 pp. $35.00.

Scholars will probably still be writing biographies of Lenin a hundred years from now, so is a new one necessary at this point? Yes, for two essential reasons, says Service. First, the chance to read the notes and memoirs of Lenin's family and friends in newly opened archives—versus the sanitized versions released by his Soviet hagiographers—allows an author to fashion a far more personal biography than before. Second, newly available official records suggest a leader more complex than the one-dimensional, largely pathological figure who emerges from the recent work of Russian scholars from whose eyes the scales have fallen. Service's Lenin is no soft-hearted, liberal romantic and certainly not the omniscient, heroic father figure of Soviet myth. He is hard, immensely calculating, fanatical, narrow-sighted, and cruel when it serves his purpose. But he is not cynical at the most fundamental level. On the contrary, argues Service, he remained possessed by an idea to the very end.

Building Security in the New States of Eurasia: Subregional Cooperation in the Former Soviet Space. EDITED BY RENATA DWAN AND OLEKSANDR PAVLIUK. Armonk: M. E. Sharpe, 2000, 304 pp. $74.95.

Although unfortunately ignored by the outside world, the post-Soviet territory continues to disintegrate and reintegrate as alignments grow ever more complex and political polarization slowly gathers force. To get a hard-headed, thoroughly informed sense of the patterns emerging, there is no better place to start than with this book. Indeed, it is the first and only attempt to size up the many inchoate attempts at subregional cooperation in the former Soviet Union. The topics are superbly chosen, ranging from the strategic grouping among Georgia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan, and Moldova to the energy and transport network in Central Asia and the Caucasus; contributors also examine security in the contexts of subregional cooperation and the impact of Islam. The analysis is uniformly balanced and succinct. Combined, the essays convey how much is in the works while illuminating the height of the obstacles at every step of the way.

The Politics of Gender After Socialism. BY SUSAN GAL AND GAIL KLIGMAN. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000, 169 pp. $39.50 (paper, $15.95).

Reproducing Gender: Politics, Publics, and Everyday Life After Socialism. EDITED BY SUSAN GAL AND GAIL KLIGMAN. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000, 443 pp. $65.00 (paper, $24.95).

The Politics of Gender extends Gal and Kligman's introduction to *Reproducing Gender.* Together, the two books provide

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much more than a consideration of gender issues in contemporary eastern and central Europe. The second book explores the politics of reproduction and abortion, the sociology of gender images, changing patterns of stratification, and male-female relations within the home before examining the role of women in politics. The contributors not only show what has and has not changed since the old order's collapse; they create another vantage point from which to judge the whole process of postsocialist political and economic transformation. Many of the essays in *Reproducing Gender,* particularly those by scholars from the region, are descriptively rich, offering a revealing sample of attitudes but with a somewhat rough-and-ready analytical infrastructure. Not so with Gal and Kligman's own work, which melds the project into an unusually sophisticated and subtle composite.

Middle East

L. CARL BROWN

No God but God: Egypt and the Triumph of Islam. BY GENEIVE ABDO. New York: Oxford University Press, 2000, 240 pp. $25.00.

Persian Mirrors: The Elusive Face of Iran. BY ELAINE SCIOLINO. New York: Free Press, 384 pp. $26.00.

Turkey Today: A Nation Divided Over Islam's Revival. BY MARVINE HOWE. Boulder: Westview, 310 pp. $26.00.

Egypt, Iran, and Turkey are the Big Three of the Middle East. Each has a population of over 60 million, and each can look back on centuries, if not millennia, of political and cultural distinctiveness. These three perceptive and up-to-date accounts offer comparative insights into a dominant issue confronting the region: relations between religion and the state. Abdo sticks most closely to this subject, whereas Sciolino and Howe range more widely. Each knows her country. Sciolino and Howe have been reporting on Iran and Turkey, respectively, since 1979; Abdo has followed events in Egypt throughout the 1990s.

Iran and Turkey emerge as mirror opposites. Iran's clerical regime faces efforts to liberalize and secularize society, while Turkey's secular regime seeks to hold the line against the expression of religion in public life. As a result, the chador in Iran and the headscarf in Turkey become battle ensigns in this ongoing struggle. Meanwhile, the Egyptian government hunts with the hounds and runs with the hares. It has accepted the *shari`a* as the source of legislation and has permitted outrageous legal decisions such as mandating that a scholar (Nasr Abu Zaid) charged with apostasy must be separated from his wife. At the same time, it uses heavy-handed state power against Islamists. The implicit message in all three books is that compromises between the governors and the governed could be achieved. Governments might become less uptight about beards, chadors, and scarfs and Islamists less inclined to politicize piety. Inflexible ideologies and entrenched interests, however, are not to be ignored.

Given that the Kulturkampf in these three countries often revolves around the hotly contested role of women, the fact that much of the best coverage has come from intrepid female American reporters adds an extra dimension. To this impressive roster of Abdo, Howe, and Sciolino could

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be added Judith Miller, Mary Ann Weaver, and Robin Wright.

Jordan: Case Study of a Pivotal State. BY ASHER SUSSER. Washington: Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2000, 134 pp. $19.95 (paper).

Created as Transjordan by Britain after World War I, Jordan has a slight historical pedigree, limited resources, and far stronger immediate neighbors—all of whom at one time or another have sought Jordan's demise. Its Palestinian population, whose roots are from Mandate Palestine west of the Jordan River, probably constitute a majority, and the Palestinian (indeed, the Arab) nationalist image of Hashemite Jordan has historically ranged from completely negative to ambivalent. Yet Jordan today is more stable, more liberal, and more democratic that most Middle Eastern states. The country has survived Nasser's Arabism, the Israeli flirtation with the "Jordan is Palestine" option, and even occasional doubts by great-power patrons about the country's future—in part because these states check each other's ambitions and settle for Jordan's continued existence as the best solution. Jordan also owes its survival to the long reign (1953–99) of the late King Hussein, who relied on a small group of completely loyal "king's men" and stepped his way through the minefields of domestic and international constraints in masterful fashion. A succinct and sympathetic historical review.

Who Rules Iran? The Structure of Power in the Islamic Republic. BY WILFRIED BUCHTA. Washington: Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2000, 239 pp. $19.95 (paper).

An invaluable book for anyone who wants to know who's who in Islamic Iran, sort out the various governing institutions, look up Iranian election results, learn about the various opposition groups inside Iran and beyond, and more. At the same time, the book is more than just a handy reference tool. It is also a very readable study of modern Iran that assesses "Iran's maze of power centers," the Iranian opposition, and finally the ongoing power struggle from 1997 to 2000 between moderates and fundamentalists. Buchta is especially good when presenting the many vested interests intent on stifling liberalization efforts. These include the paramilitary *Basij,* the Revolutionary Guard, and the many foundations (*bonyads*) that operate as autonomous sources of patronage by dispensing economic fiefdoms that lie beyond governmental control. The author's sobering analysis suggests that President Mohammad Khatami and a majority in the *Majlis* (parliament) may not prevail. Referring to Islamic Iran's first president—who was ousted and forced to flee the country in 1981—the conclusion asks, "Is Bani-Sadr's past Khatami's future?"

Touching Peace: From the Oslo Accord to a Final Agreement. BY YOSSI BEILIN. North Pomfret: Trafalgar Square, 2000, 292 pp. $50.00.

Israeli-Palestinian diplomacy over the decades—with its many wars, occupation, third-party mediators, secret talks, and finally open negotiations—constitutes a compelling subject. One of the most fascinating phases in this long history is the run-up to the 1993 Oslo Agreement and its fitful aftermath. Two stimulating accounts by participants, one Palestinian

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and one Israeli, already exist: *Through Secret Channels* by Mahmoud Abbas (also known as Abu Mazen) and Uri Savir's *The Process: 1000 Days that Changed the Middle East.* Now Beilin, the kingpin on the Israeli side who set up and monitored this negotiating breakthrough, offers his account. Especially interesting is his story of how this initiative had to be carefully navigated to avoid the shoals of domestic Israeli politics. At several crucial junctures, Beilin even withheld information about the negotiations from his own superiors (Shimon Peres and Yitzhak Rabin) fearing that they might abort them. The latter third of this book presents Beilin's bold agenda of changes that Israel needs as it moves to a "time of peace," deftly addressing foreign policy, relations between religion and state, electoral reform, the Israeli Arabs, and more.

Asia and the Pacific

LUCIAN W. PYE

East Meets West: Human Rights and Democracy in East Asia. BY DANIEL A. BELL. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000, 369 pp. $65.00 (paper $19.95).

An American professor at Hong Kong University, Bell has hit upon a clever method for critiquing East Asian views of human rights and democracy—the contentious subjects of the "Asian values" debates—by developing long Platonic dialogues between fictional characters. His main protagonist is the American "Sam Demo," an officer for a fictitious, U.S.-based nongovernmental organization called the National Endowment for Human Rights and Democracy. Demo first engages in rigorous discussions with a Hong Kong business executive and a human-rights activist before debating the pros and cons of democracy in Singapore with Senior Minister Lee Kuan Yew. His investigation concludes with a dialogue set in 2007 with a political philosophy professor at Beijing University on the possibility of Confucian-style democracy. By using this superb method for exploring philosophical issues, Bell has produced a tour de force of great depth. Fortunately for the author, Lee Kuan Yew has spoken his mind enough about the subject that Bell has no trouble using Lee's own words. Demo, however, forces Lee to examine more closely certain points that he is prone to slip over. The sum effect is a solid philosophical work, respectful but tough-minded, that illuminates East Asian political perspectives and forces Americans to reexamine their own assumptions.

The Missionary and the Libertine: Love and War in East and West. BY IAN BURUMA. New York: Random House, 2000, 323 pp. $25.95.

In this volume, the journalist and writer Buruma has collected his recent writings on the cultural encounter between East and West. Most are gems of literary criticism on Asian authors, from Yukio Mishima and Nagisa Oshima to N. C. Chaudhuri and V. S. Naipaul. Other chapters offer insightful profiles of political leaders such as Corazon Aquino and Benazir Bhutto and penetrating discussions of the international clash of cultures, particularly between Americans and Japanese. Buruma claims that his study has a central thesis: namely, that the original relationship of the West as the

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missionary-teacher and the East as the lotus-eating, opium-smoking pleasure-seeker has been reversed. Now the East is the stern lecturer on "Asian values" (which Singaporeans and Malaysians originally learned from their British masters) and the whores of Babylon are in London and New York. Fortunately, his forced theme is not pushed much beyond the introduction. Instead, this clever and thoughtful writer has produced page after page of witty and insightful analysis, displaying his exceptional literary skills and his deep knowledge of Asia's cultural scene.

Informal Politics in East Asia. EDITED BY LOWELL DITTMER, HARUHIRO FUKUI, AND PETER N.S. LEE. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000, 330 pp. $59.95 (paper $19.95).

This scholarly examination of the political role of personal relationships and informal networks in Asia provides an authoritative framework for a subject that has largely been left to gossip and insiders' talk. As the authors make clear, it is impossible to appreciate the full political dynamic in China, Japan, South Korea, and Vietnam without accounting for the importance of such relationships. Separate chapters address the psychological and cultural foundations of informal groupings and the attendant issues of loyalty, sincerity, and trust; factions in the Chinese Communist Party; and the interactions between formal structures and informal politics that produce political change in China. The authors agree that the state-centered approach to politics—which has dominated European political thought and stresses the separation of state and society—does not necessarily apply to Asia, where society-based relations powerfully affect political life. Even under the strict discipline of communism, for example, Chinese *guanxi* (connections) often provided the bases for factional politics. In all the countries examined by the authors, informal networks have had both positive and negative effects, providing the framework for quick communication and action but also opening the door to corruption.

Kashmir in Conflict: India, Pakistan, and the Unfinished War. BY VICTORIA SCHOFIELD. New York: St. Martin's Press, 2000, 286 pp. $18.95 (paper).

The Kashmiri conflict has taken on even greater urgency since the nuclear arms race escalated between India and Pakistan in 1998. Schofield has reviewed the entire record of the conflict, interviewed many participants, and struggled to find possible solutions. She finds the complications began in 1846, when the British "sold" the Muslim-populated valley of Kashmir to a Hindu ruler. At the time of partition in 1947, his great-grandson (the maharajah of Jammu and Kashmir) became angered by Pakistani raids and decided to join India. War between India and Pakistan was halted in 1949 only by a U.N. cease-fire. By then it had become a multiparty conflict, including not just the United Nations but the people of Jammu and Kashmir; the U.N. then ordered Kashmir to choose by plebiscite its fate, but India never permitted it. Schofield concludes with five plausible scenarios, none of which can provide long-term peace but only a gradual improvement of the status quo. If successful, these steps would reduce tensions by allowing people on both sides to pass back and forth with greater ease. Her book also provides

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excellent context for understanding the continuing terrorist violence perpetuated by militants, many of whom are backed by one side or the other.

The Other Side of Silence: Voices from the Partition of India. BY URVASHI BUTALIA. Durham: Duke University Press, 2000, 308 pp. $54.95 (paper, $17.95).

An extraordinary oral history of a horrendous human tragedy. Butalia's account of the partition of India, when 12 million people moved across the new national boundaries and as many as 2 million died, lays bare the passions of fear and hatred that too often drive the India-Pakistan relationship. She details the demographic and ethnic developments that affected partition and recounts the traumas that women in particular experienced, including her own family. The raw horror of it all is mitigated by the author's skillful prose, which draws the reader into the Indian story. The frequent necessity of using the glossary only makes more vivid the unique social context of the tragedy. Butalia's hope is that by putting the unspeakable into words, she will help heal the trauma and thereby help repair the India-Pakistan relationship.

Africa

GAIL M. GERHART

Can Africa Claim the 21st Century? BY THE WORLD BANK. New York: Oxford University Press, 2000, 292 pp. $30.00.

The World Bank has come a long way since it first launched its campaign of one-size-fits-all, neoliberal orthodoxy for developing economies more than 20 years ago. Growth is still the centerpiece of its prescriptions for reform, but the subtlety and range of its diagnoses and prescriptions have markedly increased, as this landmark prospectus for African development amply illustrates. Added to growth are now many other primary goals, including poverty reduction (defined as halving the number of people living on less than $1 a day by the year 2015) and passing the "ownership" of development decisions from lenders and donors to the policymakers of recipient governments. The implications of these recommendations—for income redistribution, reordered political priorities, improved standards of management, and qualitatively different relationships between rich and poor countries—are spelled out with as much candor as the Bank's current development discourse permits. But the Bank's annoying habit of tiptoeing around its own failings remains. The worst effects of structural adjustment programs are barely mentioned, and only two pages are devoted to the urgent need for debt relief. Nevertheless, this report is essential input to any discussion of African development today.

Burundi on the Brink, 1993–95: A U.N. Special Envoy Reflects on Preventive Diplomacy. BY AHMEDOU OULD-ABDALLAH. Washington: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2000, 170 pp. $8.95 (paper).

This instructive memoir by a senior Mauritanian diplomat examines the political situation in Burundi during the two years surrounding the 1994 genocide in neighboring Rwanda. Dispatched as a special U.N. representative with a mandate

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to mediate in Burundi's simmering civil war, Ould-Abdallah inserted himself with skill and determination into the country's fratricidal brew of bloodshed, suspicion, fear, and rumor—and achieved significant successes in crisis control and longer-term peacemaking. After his departure (which he says was occasioned by the politics of Boutros Boutros-Ghali's campaign for reelection as U.N. secretary-general), some but not all of these advances were reversed. Would-be mediators will find much wisdom and a depth of perception often missing in the memoirs of non-African diplomats in Africa. A good case study for students of conflict resolution.

The UDF: A History of the United Democratic Front in South Africa, 1983–1991. BY JEREMY SEEKINGS. Athens: Ohio University Press, 2000, 371 pp. $24.95 (paper).

Beyond Our Wildest Dreams: The United Democratic Front and the Transformation of South Africa. BY INEKE VAN KESSEL. Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 2000, 385 pp. $49.50 (paper, $19.50).

These impressive and complementary studies both look at the history of the United Democratic Front, the political umbrella movement that mobilized mass resistance to apartheid inside South Africa during the 1980s in tandem with the exiled African National Congress. Seekings, a South African sociologist, concentrates on the UDF at the national and regional levels, analyzing the movement's complex evolution, internal tensions, and relationship with the ANC. Van Kessel, a Dutch social researcher, takes a bottom-up approach, focusing on case studies of two urban affiliates of the movement and one rural one. Her account brings out the dynamics of local struggles, emphasizing the importance of generational conflict, religious expression in political life, and the popular quest for a more moral social order in local communities. Both books probe far below the surface of South Africa's liberation struggle to expose the often messy and inconclusive underside of politics—the part outsiders rarely see and victors prefer to forget once they prevail. Two excellent contributions to modern South African history.

Policing Africa: Internal Security and the Limits of Liberalization. BY ALICE HILLS. Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2000, 212 pp. $53.00.

Studies on the role of the police in Africa are rare, so this is a welcome effort to piece together some of the available research findings, including information from the files of foreign-aid programs. The author, a British security expert, fleshes out the often skimpy data by developing an analytical model of police systems and then using the model to draw contrasts in policing among a variety of African countries. The picture is a gloomy one in which crime prevention, respect for law, and citizens' rights take a back seat everywhere to the internal security needs of incumbent regimes. Political liberalization cannot succeed in Africa, Hill observes, as long as leaders remain above the law and continue to regard police forces as instruments of personal power. Yet this long-entrenched pattern shows few signs of changing in the countries surveyed, which include Uganda, Namibia, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Somalia, Somaliland, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

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United States Interests and Policies in Africa: Transition to a New Era. EDITED BY KARL P. MAGYAR. New York: St. Martin's Press, 2000, 202 pp. $59.95.

This collection of essays offers no new angles of vision, but it does provide a concise historical overview of American foreign policy in Africa from the colonial period up to about 1998. Five regional chapters (on northern, western, central, eastern, and southern Africa) survey the pre–Cold War, Cold War, and post–Cold War eras, emphasizing continuity and change in the definition of U.S. interests in each region. Contrasts between rhetoric and reality are noted, but little space is given to how policies are shaped by domestic constituencies. The editor draws stark conclusions: Barring major unforeseen developments, the marginalization of Africa by American policymakers seems likely to continue, given that U.S. geostrategic interests are minimal outside the northeast corner of the continent, and trade and investment seem unlikely to expand much in the near future. Unless domestic constituencies favoring a more active stance acquire greater weight in shaping priorities, U.S. policy will remain fundamentally reactive, with prodemocracy rhetoric glossing over diminishing political and economic commitment.

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

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

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Letters to the Editor

Jean-François Boittin and Norman Birnbaum on globalization; Herb London defends national missile defense; Ruth Wedgwood reflects on East Timor; and others

EXCEPTION TO THE EXCEPTION

To the Editor:

Sophie Meunier's "The French Exception" (July/August 2000) is a potpourri of clichés, non sequiturs, and sophisms. It displays ignorance of French history, politics, and current events. Defense of the French language is nothing new; it has been the stated goal of the Academie Française since its creation in the seventeenth century. The Union pour la Démocratie Française (UDF)—not a political party, as Meunier calls it, but a conglomerate of smaller components—has not, along with the centrists, "finally embraced European integration"; integration has always been its raison d'être. In the Uruguay Round, movies and music were never discussed; television programming and the Directive Television Sans Frontières—a European, not French, law—were the only subjects of debate. Finally, local dialects and regional languages have not recently been "downplayed," as Meunier writes; they have actually been encouraged.

I have a few words of advice for Meunier. First, choose adjectives carefully. If French agriculture subsidies are "astronomical," then how would one describe American ones? (The average American farmer gets more subsidies than his European counterpart.) And do the millions of French soldiers in the cemeteries near Verdun justify the epithet "humiliating reliance on American help"? Second, avoid personal attacks. Pascal Lamy, the new European Union (EU) trade commissioner, might be French, but he has demonstrated that he is a staunch free trader in his current and past jobs. Finally, do not forget the big picture. How can one write on globalization and France in 2000 and not mention the euro, of which France has been the strongest supporter over the past ten years?

Meunier's article is disappointing especially because the questions she raises are fascinating if seen in a different light. Why is it that resistance to globalization stems primarily from the United States, after the longest period of economic expansion since World War II? After all, I was in Seattle and saw 50,000 protesters, very few of whom were French, who received qualified support from President Clinton. And why did France and the United States, prodded by anti-globalization nongovernmental organizations like Public Citizen, kill the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development negotiations on investment? And finally, how will the world—not France—react if globalization, as presented by its chief cheerleader, Milton Friedman, is really perceived (wrongly in my opinion) as Americanization?

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One last thought: one should not forget that José Bové, despite all his communication skills, would still be an unknown sheep farmer if the United States Trade Representative (USTR) had not deliberately chosen to retaliate against very symbolic French targets in response to the EU ban on American hormone-treated beef. It just happens that there are also American symbols in France, and only very shortsighted people could express surprise at the result. The USTR created José Bové, or at the very least, made his day.

JEAN-FRANÇOIS BOITTIN
Minister Counselor, Economic and Commercial Affairs, Embassy of France

To the Editor:

Sophie Meunier discusses French attitudes toward the United States, but perhaps she would care to reflect on American attitudes toward France.

Perhaps a clue to the clash between American and French sensibilities can be found in the difference between Catholicism and Protestantism. Catholicism in France was rigorous but also included a certain acceptance of the inevitable weakness of the flesh. If we understand American Puritanism as the terrible suspicion that someone, somewhere, might be enjoying life, a dour American refusal to cultivate *les douceurs de la vie* would certainly lead to skepticism (mixed with envy) toward France.

Meunier instructs us that Americans are individualistic—a familiar theme. But if we believe observers like Alexis de Tocqueville, Professors Robert Putnam and Richard Sennett, and those exceptionally acute historical observers, our novelists, then Americans today are hardly individualistic.

Perhaps these differences were not far from French minds when Foreign Minister Hubert Vedrine refused at Warsaw, in June, to affix France's signature to a vacuous declaration on democracy.

The French are odd. They suppose that their values are at least as universal as ours, and that they know a lot about history and statecraft. Is it possible that they are serenely undisturbed by American criticism, since they think that the real historical oddity is the United States?

NORMAN BIRNBAUM
Professor, Georgetown University Law Center

BEYOND PENNY-PINCHING

To the Editor:

It is fashionable to blame Congress, as Richard N. Gardner does, for reduced foreign affairs expenditures ("The One Percent Solution," July/August 2000). But the 150 Account has not been a presidential priority in the 1990s. Indeed, the Office of Management and Budget in both the Bush and Clinton administrations has been a bigger barrier to higher spending for foreign affairs than any congressional committee. President Clinton has rarely used his bully pulpit and persuasive powers on behalf of those programs. Two secretaries of state since 1992 have been either unwilling or unable to mobilize effective support for their department. In April, Secretary of the Treasury Lawrence Summers bragged that "we have successfully reduced our annual contributions to the multilateral development banks (MDBs) by nearly 40 percent, or $700 million, in real terms since 1995." Congress has merely taken its cue from the executive branch and made cuts of its own in foreign affairs accounts.

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Unfortunately, neither presidential campaign suggests that Clinton's successor will expend political capital to pursue Gardner's lofty goal of a roughly 50 percent increase in the 150 Account by 2005. The squeeze on discretionary accounts, including the 150 Account, by entitlement spending will only increase in the decade ahead. The more likely response to Gardner's challenge is that the next U.S. administration—Republican or Democratic—will continue to conduct foreign policy on the cheap.

In any case, the answer to underfunding cannot simply be "more for everything." We need to prioritize. This may mean cutting out or turning over to other nations some of our foreign assistance responsibilities. We should not do everything, but what we do we should do well.

This prioritization has, in fact, begun, as suggested by Summers' statement about reduced U.S. contributions to the MDBs. The problem is that the effort is occurring without public debate and without a clear explanation of why certain decisions are being made.

If we have decided that we can forego multilateral aid expenditures because the United States already makes a substantial contribution to global peace and prosperity through our troop and base commitments around the world, we should say so. Certainly, East Asia, the Persian Gulf, and Europe would be more dangerous, less prosperous, and experiencing greater human misery without the U.S. military presence. Perhaps we should get credit in assistance circles for this significant contribution. These expenditures are not matched by countries deemed in development circles to be "generous," including Japan and Germany.

However, the United States—if it is to retain a leadership mantle—cannot be regarded simply as a hired gun for global peacekeeping. Nor, as our generals would attest, can we pursue our global interests through military means alone.

In any list of priorities, reliable, adequate funding for American diplomacy needs to be at the top. Last year, the bipartisan Overseas Presence Advisory Panel laid out a blueprint for strengthening American diplomacy, but it received only tepid support from the Clinton administration. The next administration can easily do better.

Ambassador Gardner is right. The United States cannot continue to lead on the cheap. The discussion should now be focused on what to cut and what to add so that our leadership and pursuit of global interests are once more credible and perceived as such in the United States and abroad.

CASIMIR A. YOST

Professor and Director, Institute for the Study of Diplomacy, Georgetown University

NUCLEAR SHIELD

To the Editor:

Jonathan Schell and Igor Ivanov make the same point: deployment of a national missile defense system (NMD) would be destabilizing because it would promote a new round of nuclear proliferation and deployment worldwide ("The Folly of Arms Control" and "The Missile-Defense Mistake," September/October 2000). Although this conjecture may be true, it is just as likely that NMD would have the opposite effect. A stable world may be one in which the United States can act to secure peace without the fear of a nuclear attack.

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Schell and Ivanov's concern that NMD would promote new proliferation is also rife with curious speculation. Since western Europe has not shown an inclination to spend more than an aggregate one percent of GDP on defense, why would a U.S. defense prompt more significant spending, especially if this defense gives the United States flexibility in neutralizing hostile gestures directed at Europe by rogue states? Similarly, how would Russia mount a nuclear buildup when it cannot meet conventional arms expenditures today?

If, by the way, NMD is not feasible, as Schell suggests, then the Chinese have nothing to worry about. If it is feasible, particularly during boost phase when missiles are slow and hot, then deterrence is enhanced, since the Chinese can't possibly know which of their missiles can penetrate our defenses.

Like Schell, I believe it would be desirable to eliminate all weapons of mass destruction. But since that may be the most romantic idea of all, NMD may turn out to be a reasonable way to achieve the goal he proposes. Moving from a world where civilian populations are held hostage to nuclear incineration to a world in which the nuclear threat is reduced is, to me, both moral and stabilizing.

HERB LONDON
President, Hudson Institute

TROUBLE IN TIMOR

To the Editor:

James Traub's account of the U.N. mission in East Timor is far too rosy ("Inventing East Timor," July/August 2000). As my recent visit to East Timor made clear, the U.N. has underperformed and is still unprepared for the long-term security dilemma of that isolated nation of one million people.

Traub says that the U.N. is "fully aware of East Timor's importance as a test case and has sent out a kind of A-team of international technocrats" who "speak four or five languages." Right idea, wrong languages. Only a handful of U.N. staff speak Bahasa Indonesia (a Malay tongue) or Tetun, preventing them from communicating with 80 percent of East Timor's population. Translators offer no substitute, since few local Timorese speak more than rudimentary English. And the U.N.'s commitment in East Timor to a smorgasbord staff from around the world—considered in U.N. circles to be the weakest of any recent mission—forbade the obvious alternative of tapping into the 320 million regional speakers of Malay.

The U.N. Transitional Administration for East Timor (UNTAET) building overlooking the harbor in Dili is also chockablock with P-5s, D-1s, and D-2s—expensive senior staff—who happen to lack any experience in providing basic government services. (Running interference in New York is different from planning a road system.) Senator Jesse Helms needn't worry about world government—even this small effort has been tied in knots. For example, all contract purchases over $200,000 (in other words, 20 cents per citizen) have to be routed back to New York to queue up on the agenda of the General Assembly contracts committee. District administrators in isolated parts of East Timor complain that even their smallest projects have been micromanaged from UNTAET headquarters, and many of the international donors have chosen to avoid the roadblock and deliver aid directly to the

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countryside. At a recent meeting with international donors, UNTAET mission chief Sergio Vieira de Mello was forced to concede that aid delivery on the ground was disappointing: as of July 1, less than four percent of the $147 million pledged to the U.N. trust fund for East Timor had been delivered.

The U.N.'s halting performance has prompted a panicky course correction. After public criticism this summer from José Ramos-Horta, the leader of the National Council for East Timorese Resistance (CNRT), the U.N. announced that it would replace its district administrators with local Timorese and would turn over four ministries to Timorese leadership. But this may cause a different problem: a failure of democracy.

Traub says that the CNRT's "authority appears to be unquestioned." In fact, many are concerned that some of the CNRT's older leaders—who have sentimental ties to Portugal—often confuse their coalition with democracy itself. The CNRT has never been elected at the polls, but its nominees are presented whenever scholarship moneys are available, or a representative of "youth" or "women" is to be put on a governing council. The Falantil, the military arm of the Fretilin (the strongest party in the CNRT), have kept their weapons and remain in Aileu, 90 minutes from Dili. Traub is right when he notes that many Falantil leaders are "highly respected" for resisting Jakarta and seeking independence over the last 25 years, but there is also a simmering fear that they may become enforcers for the CNRT. (The Falantil recently blocked U.N. staff from leaving the Aileu district to protest the U.N. and nongovernmental organizations' bar against food aid to armed groups. U.N. staff were also evacuated from Aileu last June when Falantil factions had a falling out among themselves.) Chinese entrepreneurs are still deterred from returning by the CNRT's refrain of East Timorese nationalism, and 250 Muslim families remain holed up in the downtown mosque in Dili, scared to venture back to their homes.

Traub is profoundly wrong in supposing that East Timor's "future status is unambiguous." Yes, the country will be nominally independent. But its dependence on international military protection has no obvious end date or end state. Tiny East Timor cannot equip a significant military force itself, apart from guerrilla resistance. Its long-term national budget of $43 million, which must pay for everything—schools, roads, courts, and military—will not be enough to buy hardware or field a large force against a Goliath neighbor. Portugal is too far away to provide much more than diplomatic support. And Australia is an ambivalent source of comfort. For 25 years, Australia accepted Indonesia's annexation of East Timor because Canberra did not want a quarrel with a large neighbor, and the oil reserves of the Timor Gap looked promising. Australia didn't dare go into East Timor during the pre-election militia intimidation because Jakarta said it would regard intervention as an act of war. And Australian security forces are feeling stretched—down to 48,000, and unable to offer troops for the Solomon Islands or Fiji during their recent paroxysms—because of the rotation into East Timor. Meanwhile, the U.N. is pressing Australia to give up most of its share of the Timor Gap gas and oil.

Traub's claim that the "militias have remained behind the border, harassing

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refugees but otherwise posing very little threat" is dated at best. In late July and early August, pro-Jakarta militia fired on U.N. patrols from inside East Timor, killing two peacekeepers, and in macabre fashion, cut off the ears of one of them. U.N. workers at the refugee camps in western Timor have had to withdraw after being attacked with machetes, and three refugee workers were recently killed, including an American. Over the course of the spring and summer, there have been 16 militia attacks on U.N. peacekeeping posts and an attempted shoot-down of a U.N. helicopter. The U.S. Permanent Representative to the U.N., Richard Holbrooke, who had hoped to downsize the peacekeeping force last June, noted on September 5 that the situation is "alarming" with "clear deterioration" and "substantial evidence that the Indonesian military ... are ... equipping and training the militia to go back into East Timor." Militia leaders have recently called for partition of East Timor, with resettlement of pro-Jakarta refugees near the border with Indonesia—an arrangement similar to that of Republika Srpska and Serbia.

In December 1975, the U.N. Security Council condemned Indonesia's invasion of East Timor, heralding the "inalienable right of the people of East Timor to self-determination and independence" and calling on Indonesia to withdraw its forces. The council certainly did not treat East Timor, contrary to Traub's assertion, as "an internal Indonesian problem." But council resolutions are not self-enforcing, as we have learned the hard way. East Timor's awkward distance from Australia—the island's nearest point is 350 miles from Darwin, not 150 miles, as Traub says—means that giving real effect to de jure independence will almost certainly require another long-term U.N. commitment.

RUTH WEDGWOOD
Senior Fellow for International Organizations and Law, Council on Foreign Relations

HIT MEN

To the Editor:

My colleague Gail Gerhart criticizes Edgar O'Ballance's book *The Congo-Zaire Experience* for its "odd omission of the long-confirmed responsibility of the CIA for the 1961 murder of Patrice Lumumba" ("Recent Books," September/October 2000). Whatever this allegation is, it is not "long-confirmed."

The Church Committee concluded 25 years ago that "in the fall of 1960, two CIA officials were asked by superiors to assassinate Lumumba. Poisons were sent to the Congo and some exploratory steps were taken toward gaining access to Lumumba." But the assassination was not attempted. The Church Committee goes on: "Subsequently, in early 1961, Lumumba was killed by Congolese rivals. It does not appear from the evidence that the United States was in any way involved in the killing." No new evidence has been published in the last quarter-century to contradict this finding.

Lumumba was the Congo's first prime minister. He was struggling with his tribal allies against the president, Joseph Kasavubu. He was also, with Soviet political support, opposing the U.N. force that had been dispatched to help stabilize this failing state. Lumumba was arrested by government forces in December 1960. Against a backdrop of controversy over this arrest, and fearing

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they could not keep him in custody for long with their fractious military, government leaders instead delivered Lumumba into the hands of Katanga, a rebel government in southern Congo. The Katangan leaders killed Lumumba and two of his aides.

To be fair to Gerhart, the story has its nuances. Though not involved in the scheme, the CIA station chief had learned a few days earlier of a Congolese government plan to send Lumumba to another of his many enemies (not the Katangans). The station chief and his superiors in Washington did nothing with the information. They perceived no obligation to help Lumumba and had little capacity to interfere.

PHILIP ZELIKOW

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